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LEITER FROM THE DEPARTMENT CHAIR
Volume XVI of Res Publica has arrived! For that we can thank the hard work of its student
editors, especially co-editors Amy Uden and Michael Burgess. They have chosen capitols from
here and abroad and from ancient times to the present to grace the cover: an appropriate choice
given their conscious effort to produce a journal offering analysis on classical and contemporary
themes and featuring international and American locales.
The impressive quality and variety of papers contained in this volume reflects the students'
efforts, but it also reflects the culture of academic excellence the department as a whole has
developed over the years. The culture is maintained by the faculty's commitment to a particular
institution, the two-course sequence beginning with research methods and ending with the
senior seminar. It is in these classes that students learn to channel their intellectual curiosity
about the world into researchable questions, normative frameworks, and empirical models. The
department is subject to the same forces we study: institutions shape our culture and culture
anchors our institutions.
A short inventory indicates the amazing array of interests our culture of intellectual curiosity
has created. From the national arena to the local venue in the US, and from international
institutions to values among world nations, the range and variety of the topics studied is
stunning. IWU political science students in this volume explore many unexpected places from
Sub-Saharan Africa to Australia - even the "dark continent" of their own backyard, e.g., the
McLean County Board. In reading this journal, you will move from the influence of the public
mood on the US Supreme Court, to the impact of postmaterialist values on "hung" parliaments
in Northern Europe and Canada, to an understanding of what will be required for Iran to
transition to democracy.
Intellectual curiosity is indeed alive and well in our department. It ranges far and wide. Please
let your own curiosity do the same as you peruse these pages.

James Simeone
April 2011
Bloomington
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EDITORS' INTRODUCTION
In assembling Res Publica XVI, we have had the honor of engaging a span of scholarly work that
is broad in both method and substance. Perhaps more than any other edition, this year's journal
represents many of the unique research threads that make up the discipline of political science.
The concept of "res publica" itself also suggests the dynamic and diverse character of political
science. The phrase itself has been used in incredibly diverse contexts, from the title of the early
Roman political writings of Cicero, to the name of a contemporary Estonian populist party. The
world has been witness to much of the power and volatility of politics in the year 2011, making
it all the more evident that political scholarship requires continued commitment to intellectual
inquiry, in order to further our understanding of this dynamic field.
Res Publica, as one of the few undergraduate scholarly journals in existence, provides a unique
venue for nascent scholars to contribute to the intellectual dialogue. Our contributing authors
have used the skills they have developed during their undergraduate careers to create original
research, tackling issues from the international realm to the local level of government. We offer
our thanks and congratulations to these contributing authors for their willingness to engage the
scholarly dialogue, building upon their already excellent academic accomplishments.

Furthermore, we express our appreciation to Kim McDonald and Jillian Schmitz for their
dedication and patience in assisting us with the creation of Res Publica. We also thank the
Illinois Wesleyan political science faculty for entrusting us with the task of assembling a journal
that is not only a representation of the diversity of our department, but also of our larger
university. This product, created by the hard work of Wesleyan students, represents the
outgrowth of the faculty's investment in our intellectual development and of their continued
support throughout the editorial process.

Michael Burgess & Amy Uden
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SUPREME COURT RESPONSIVENESS: AN ANALYSIS OF INDIVIDUAL JUSTICE
VOTING BEHAVIOR AND THE ROLE OF PUBLIC OPINION

Michael Browning
This study attempts to explain why the Supreme Court responds to public mood by analyzing
individual justice liberalism and comparing it to public liberalism between the years of1970 and 2001.
Three theories suggesting why the Court may respond to public opinion are discussed, including the
replacement, political adjustment, and the attitude change hypotheses. The method of using Court
reversals to determine the ideology of the Court is presented and implemented. Along with ideology and
the public mood, the overall Court mood is used as an independent variable to explain the driving force
behind changes in individual justices' voting behavior. The study concludes that the Court mood is the
strongest and most significant factor in changes in judicial voting behavior, while public opinion and
ideology explain little to none of the variance.

Abstract:

INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court's role in American society is one of the essential parts of the checks
and balances of the United States government. The lifetime tenure of justices frees them from
the tyranny of public mood during election seasons and allows them to decide cases on the
basis of the law rather than public preferences. In Federalist Paper No.7S, Alexander Hamilton
argued that if periodic instead of lifetime appointments were made, the temptation would be
too great to consult popularity rather than the Constitution and the laws. In Federalist Paper
No.76, Hamilton also described the Court as lithe least dangerous branch" because of its
inability to make laws and policies of its own. It is also arguably the least democratic branch,
because it is the most independent branch. However, despite the Court's immunity from public
opinion due to the process of appointments, as opposed to elections, evidence suggests the
Court still regularly decides in line with public opinion. William Mishler, Reginald Sheehan1,
Kevin McGuire, and James Stimson2 analyze the relationship between public opinion and the
Supreme Court using Stimson's index of public mood from 1992 and 1999, respectively. In their
analyses, Mishler and Sheehan find that the Supreme Court responds to public opinion at a lag
of five years with an R-squared of .66, significant at the .01 level. McGuire and Stimson find a
relationship at a lag of one year with an R squared of .71, significant at the .05 level. Given these
data, public opinion has an influence on the Court, but because lifetime appointments separate
the justices from direct accountability to public opinion, there must be other explanations as to
why public opinion affects the Court.
THEORIES OF RESPONSIVENESS
To best explain how the Supreme Court might be affected by public opinion, three
theories are generally used. The Dahl-Funston hypothesis, also known as "replacement
hypothesis," articulates that because the president and senators' beliefs and positions are in line
1 Mishler and Sheehan 1993; 1994; 1996.
2 Stimson and McGuire 2004.
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with the public mood when elected, their choices for justices are also likely to reflect that mood.
Dahl argues that a president generally gets to appoint two justices for every four years spent in
office, which can effectively "tip the balance on the normally divided Court."3 Mishler and
Sheehan note that this theory is consistent with the attitudinal model of judicial decision
making which states that justices assume the bench with ideologies and beliefs that typically
remain constant throughout their tenure. 4
The political adjustment hypothesis is much more direct, as it states that justices might
purposefully change or tweak their positions in order to bring their decisions in line with the
public mood. Political adjustment suggests that justices are concerned with the enforcement of
their decisions. This hypothesis is best summed up by Justice Frankfurter in Baker v. Carr.
Frankfurter wrote "The Court's authority - possessed of neither the purse nor the sword ultimately rests on sustained public confidence in its moral sanction."s
The " attitude change hypothesis" is the final of the standard three theories on court
public relations. It conflicts with the attitudinal model in that it specifically theorizes that a
justice's personal ideology might change in time to fit with broad and enduring changes in
public opinion. Judges, like other members of society, are affected by societal norms, even if
they are unaware of society's effects on them. Mishler and Sheehan acknowledge that the
attitude change hypothesis cannot reliably be tested because there are no independent measures
of social change, and McGuire and Stimson do not even theorize on the matter, preferring to
test the replacement and political adjustment hypotheses instead.6
THEORIES OF MEASURES
McGuire and Stimson set up their empirical analysis by using Stimson's 1999 index of
public mood as the independent variable and the Supreme Court's liberalism as the dependent
variable? However, they identify a unique problem with analyzing all of the Court's cases as
an indicator of the Court's ideology, citing McGuire, Smith and Caldeira8 in their theory
explaining why reversals provide better indicators of the Court's ideology.
The reversal hypothesis relies on the idea that lower courts' decisions " center around the
Supreme Court's ideal." This idea states that because lower courts are restricted by stare decisis,
they make decisions that attempt to reflect policy outlined in Supreme Court precedents.9 This
"vertical stare decisis" causes lower court decisions to cluster around the moderate center of the
Court's known preferences. Potential litigants estimate their chances of winning given these
known preferences, and decide to seek certiorari based on those chances. If the Supreme Court
is perceived as conservative, more liberal lower court decisions will be considered too liberal for
3 Dahl 1957, quoted in Mishler and Sheehan 1996, 171 .
4 Mishler and Sheehan 1996.

S Baker v. Carr 1962, quoted in Mishler and Sheehan 1996, 173.
6 Mishler and Sheehan 1996; McGuire and Stimson 2004.
7 McGuire and Stimson 2004.

8 McGuire, Smith, and Caldeira 2004.

9 Songer, Segal, and Cameron 1994.
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the Court. In other words, there would be more conservative petitioners making accurate (and
inaccurate) estimates as to their likelihood of winning at the Supreme Court level. These
accurate estimates become reversals, while the inaccurate estimates become affirmances.
McGuire, Smith, and Caldiera write that " as the Court becomes more conservative, there are
more liberal policies that will be reversed by the justices and fewer conservative lower court
decisions that they will reject."lO Thus the reversals, or the accurate estimates, reflect where the
Court lies ideologically, while the inaccurate estimates portray an incorrect image. Tests of the
reversal hypothesis reveal that when using only reversals, the Court appears to be liberal
through the Warren Court and then more conservative through the Burger and Rehnquist
courts, until Clinton's appointments brought the Court back towards a moderate center. Using
only affirmances showed close to the opposite, suggesting that the Warren years were very
conservative years for the Court, something widely known to be untrue. The reversal model
also explains 82 % of the variance in the ideological composition of decisions, where the
standard model using both reversals and affirmances only accounted for 70% . 11
McGuire and Stimson also test the reversal hypothesis. Their data support their
hypothesis, showing affirmances with an R squared of .03, reversals with .60 and all cases with
.57.1 2 The most compelling results of their research show significantly strengthened
relationships between Court composition/public opinion and the liberalism of Court outcomes
when using reversals as opposed to all the cases. Given the reversal hypothesis, there is a
strong argument that using both affirmances and reversals contaminates models attempting to
illustrate the liberalism of Supreme Court decisions, and that previous studies of the Court may
have underestimated the effect of public opinion.l3
Another research issue concerns the response time of the Court to public opinion.
Mishler and Sheehan predict a lag in the evidence of a response to public opinion in the Court's
decisions because replacing justices takes time, as does political adjustment.l4 According to
their theory, justices would only logically respond to enduring shifts of public opinion.
Norpoth and Segal criticize the lag theory, stating that "if the Court only acts on change that has
endured, their decisions should be influenced by contemporaneous as well as lagged public
opinion. illS The time lag concern is worth discussing because Mishler and Sheehan show that
public opinion is "significantly and positively correlated with trends in the Court's decisions at
a lag of five years; and the relationship approaches significance at t+3 as well."l6 The absence of
evidence of a lag at one year, two years, and four years may be attributed to the short length of
the time series used. In reply to Norpoth and Segars concern that justices should be affected by
contemporaneous opinion, Mishler and Sheehan respond that justices may only respond to

10 McGuire, Smith, and Caldiera 2004, 7.
11 McGuire, Smith, and Caldiera 2004.
12 McGuire and Stimson 2004.
13 McGuire, Smith, and Caldiera 2004, 16-17.
14 Mishler and Sheehan 1993.
15 Norpoth and Segal 1994, 712.
16 Mishler and Sheehan 1993, 92.
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durable shifts in public opinion, something that contemporaneous opinion has not yet had time
to prove. They expand their theory to explain a small impact of public opinion in the first year
that will "gradually increase over time before ending or leveling off at some impossible-to
predict future point."17 Their results support this theory.
THEORIES REGARDING INDIVIDUAL JUSTICES
Mishler and Sheehan also examine the issue at an individual level. They look at
Supreme Court justices in a psychological manner, reasoning that attitudes are affected by
personally held beliefs, the strength of those beliefs, how they are expected to behave, and
societal norms.18 Their hypothesis states that justices with more extreme ideologies will be less
likely to move to the center (public opinion), while justices who are already moderate will be
more likely to move one way or the other. They use yearly data from the Supreme Court Data
Base from 1953 - 1992, analyzing only justices who served for 12 years or longer.. Evaluating the
percentage of liberal votes cast by each justice each year, they compare it to Stimson's public
mood index from 1991. Their analysis supports their hypothesis, showing "that moderate
justices are more consistently responsive to fluctuations in the public mood than either liberal or
conservative justices." 1 9
All three analyses by Mishler and Sheehan20 and the analysis by McGuire and Stimson
show that decisions of the Court diverge from public opinion around 1980. 21 This could be
caused by a sharp increase in liberal public mood coupled with several increasingly moderate to
conservative appointments to the Supreme Court that began in the Reagan years and continued
through Bush Sr., thus affecting the balance of the Court.22 This would be consistent with the
replacement hypothesis as well as Mishler and Sheehan's theory that moderate justices are the
swing votes that cause the Court to follow public opinion.23
RESEARCH QUESTION AND HYPOTHESIS
In approaching my analysis of individual Supreme Court justices, I start by questioning
if Supreme Court decisions between the years of 1970 and 2001 reflect long-term public opinion
trends. Given that they do, are moderate justices providing swing votes that cause Supreme
Court decisions to follow public opinion?
The hypothesis stating that the Supreme Court follows public opinion due to moderate
justices is based on the theories of Mishler and Sheehan that state that moderate justices are
more likely to be affected and swayed by public mood than more ideologically extreme justices.
17 Mishler and Sheehan 1994, 718.
1 8 Mishler and Sheehan 1996.
19 Ibid., 189.
20 Mishler and Sheehan 1993; 1994; 1996.

21 McGuire and Stimson 2004.
22

Mishler and Sheehan 1993.

23 Mishler and Sheehan 1996.
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As a result, a balanced Court will appear to follow public opinion rather closely in its decisions,
because the moderate justices swing the decision in the direction of the public mood.24 I expect
the empirical evidence between 1970 and 2001 to support the hypothesis that as the Court
becomes ideologically imbalanced, its decisions will stray from public opinion.
MEASURES
Mishler and Sheehan observe the relationship between public opinion and Supreme
Court decisions by individually examining each of the nine seats on the Supreme Court
between 1953 and 1992. They measure each justice's ideology by doing a content analysis on
newspaper editorials at the time of the justice's nomination to the Supreme Court. They code
each justice as either extremely conservative (-1), moderate (0), or extremely liberal (1) and sum
the scores to determine the ideological balance of the Supreme Court for each year. This
method of coding efficiently identifies the ideology of the Court, but it makes a critical error by
assuming that a justice's ideology stays the same throughout their tenure. Two justices within
the scope of my study, Justices Blackmun and White, disprove that theory altogether. In the
model, ideology scores for each justice were calculated by using a moving average of their
liberalism scores from their previous three years on the Court.
Mishler and Sheehan also limit their study to justices who served a minimum of twelve
years, presumably because twelve years provides a sufficient amount of time to see how the
justice's ideology reflected in his or her decisions. Because of the already limited number of
cases, I decided to use all justices who served between 1970 and 2001. Where multiple
regression models turned up insignificant results, bivariate correlation was used as an alternate
attempt at observing the relationship.
To determine the ideology of Supreme Court decisions, Mishler and Sheehan use the
Supreme Court Database and calculate the percentage of liberal votes cast by the justice in
question for each year.25 They exclude per curium opinions, memoranda, and judicial power
decisions because of the difficulty in coding the ideological direction of a decision or the routine
nature of these types of decisions. I will be using the Supreme Court Database, which provides
the data for each justice's vote as well as the vote's ideological identification. I will also include
all decisions that could be coded, as some per curium opinions do have a discernable
ideological direction. The database codes votes and decisions as liberal if, in criminal
procedure, First Amendment, civil rights or due process cases, the vote is pro-individual, pro
affirmative action, pro-female in abortion, or pro-civil liberties, to name a few. In economics or
union cases, liberal votes and decisions are pro-union, pro-debtor, anti-business, or pro
consumer, etc. Conservative votes and decisions are coded as the opposites of the liberal votes.
Exact lists of coding criteria are found in the Supreme Court Database codebook.
To create a liberalism score for each justice, the votes were tallied for each year of their
tenure. The total liberal votes were then divided by the total number of cases in which an
24 Mishler and Sheehan 1996.
25 Ibid.
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ideological direction was discernable, producing a justice liberalism score for that year. The
restrictions on this model were that the votes were only tallied from reversals, as they are a
better indicator of a justice's ideology.26
In addition to concerns about Court ideology, another measurement issue deals with the
independent variable of public mood, which has proved a challenge to measure accurately
throughout much of the literature. James Stimson solves this seemingly daunting task with his
public mood index. His index is available on his website, and many scholars, including those
cited in this study, rely on it as a dependable indicator of the liberalism of public opinion on a
yearly basis.
With the variables of individual justices' ideologies, the overall Court's ideology, and
the public's overall political mood affecting the ideological direction of Supreme Court
decisions between 1970 and 2001, the model will attempt to establish a nuanced analysis of how
individual justices make their decisions. It should be noted that 2001 provides a good stopping
point because Stimson's standard error on his public policy mood index gets exponentially
larger in more recent years. The independent variables for each individual justice are the
Court's mood, the individual justice's ideology, and the public's mood. The dependent variable
is the justice's liberalism score for each year he or she served on the Court.
Table 1 below represents the overall model strength for each of the time lags considered
in the study. Figure 1 graphically depicts the relationship between the Court mood and public
opinion over time.

Table 1: Overall Model Strength for Time-Lagged Models

time
ReaI'
Pearson
Correlation
Significance
(2-tailed)
N

I

Time +1
Years

I

Time+2
Years

I

Time +3
Years

I

Time+4
Years

I

Time+5
Years

.550

.510

.504

.552

.370

.001

.003

.003

.001

.037

.072

32

32

32

32

32

32

26 McGuire, Smith, and Caldeira 2004.
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DATA ANALYSIS
In order to find the point at which justices can be expected to respond to public mood,
models for the current year and five time lags were run for the entire Court mood. Bivariate
correlation models show that the Court responds to public mood immediately (realtime) and
also at time lags of one, two, and three years. While the four year lag was also significant, it was
less so, and the five year lag did not return any significant results.
This is not surprising, as justices may be responding both to immediate public trends as
well as prolonged public changes in mood, which fits with the argument of Norpoth and Segal.
The study continued by focusing on realtime as well as the three year lag because they were the
most statistically significant with the strongest correlations to public mood.
Models were run testing the justices' liberalism scores against public mood in realtime
and at a lag of three years. The justices' ideology and the Court's overall mood were used as
controls. As mentioned before, ideology was calculated using a moving average from the votes
of the previous three years. This measure of ideology accounts for the theory being tested here:
that justices do not make decisions based off of a solid, unchanging ideology. Instead, my
ideology measure allows for a changing judicial attitude. By using an average of the previous
three years, the ideology score balances out what might be considered outlier years when the
docket contained uncommon numbers of certain types of cases. In the years examined, 1970
through 2001, eighty percent of cases concerned either criminal procedure, civil rights, first
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amendment, economic activity, or judicial power. Of these, 22% were criminal procedure, 19%
were civil rights, 9% were First Amendment, 18% were economic activity, and 13 % were judicial
power. This balance of law issues allows the study to accurately examine the ideology of each
justiceP
The purpose of the model was to find out which justices responded to public opinion,
and thus affected the outcome of the Court's decisions, causing the overall Court mood to
follow public opinion. The results, however, did not follow that line of logic. Very few of the
justices showed any significant correlation with public opinion at all. Those who did, Justice
Souter in realtime, and Justices Blackmun and Burger at a three year lag, reacted by moving
away from public opinion, rather than parallel to it. In the cases of Blackmun and Burger,
ideology turned out to be a strong driving force, with Betas of .758 and .395 respectively. When
it comes to the moderate justice thesis, this model failed to show a strong correlation with
public opinion.
Findings concerning ideology were also surprising, as this is not typically a dominant
factor in justices' votes. The attitudinal model of judicial decision making states that justices
make decisions based off of attitudes or ideologies that remain the same throughout their
tenure. However, the results of this model tell quite a different story. After observing changes
in justices' liberalism scores from year to year, the model was designed to assume that the
attitudinal model was partially incorrect, instead asserting that justices' ideologies actually do
change throughout their tenure. Room was made for this hypothesis by calculating the justice
ideology independent variable as a moving average of previous years' votes. Even with this
moving ideology variable, ideology only appeared to significantly affect Justice Blackmun's
votes in realtime and T+3 (with strong Betas of .818 and .758 respectively), and Chief Justices
Burger and Rehnquist in T+3 (with weaker Betas of .395 and .304, respectively) . Because Justice
Blackmun started his tenure conservatively in the 1970s and ended quite liberally during the
1980s, the resulting ideological shift logically accounts for the change in his voting behavior
better than public mood, even though public liberalism declined during the 70s and increased
during the 80s. In addition, though his voting record correlated with public mood at T+3, it did
so in a negative direction (Beta of -.430). This negative correlation might exist because his shift
in liberalism is actually quite a bit more dramatic than the public's, which usually tends to be
slow and even. Justices Burger and Rehnquist's ideologies, on the other hand, correlate
positively with their voting records. It may be possible that their role as Chief Justice has
something to do with their ideologies playing into their decisions more than the other justices,
but that hypothesis could only be addressed in another study.
The results show that the strongest variable affecting justice's votes was the Court's
overall mood. Aside from Breyer and Souter's bivariate correlation exceptions (most likely due
to their small sample sizes of years on the Court), Court mood came in as the strongest
27 Further study has shown this statement to be incorrect. Data shows that justices vote with different

ideologies depending on the law issue at hand. By aggregating all of the issues, this study has produced
an inaccurate measure of the justices' ideologies. See 2011 research by Michael Browning for a resolution
of this issue.
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significant independent variables affecting each justices' votes. This is to be partly expected, as
Court decisions are composed of justice's votes, but given that there are nine justices, it is
noteworthy that overall Court mood is such a strong force on an individual justice's vote
regardless of ideology. A likely explanation for the importance of Court mood is that as the
overall mood of the Court shifts to accommodate public opinion, justices adjust their vote in
order to stay relevant. This can especially be seen in the results for some of the moderate
justices (who are potential swing votes) at a three year lag, namely O'Conner, Kennedy, and
Powell. Burger is even surprisingly affected by the overall Court mood, suggesting that even
ideologically extreme justices care about their relevance to the Court.
While the results of the model do not point to individual justices as the reason behind
the Court's correlation with public opinion, they do suggest that the composition of the Court is
important. However, the variance in individual justices' voting behavior contradicts parts of
the attitudinal model by suggesting that justices change their votes to be in line with the overall
mood of the Court. This casts some doubt on the replacement hypothesis as the sole
explanation for why the Supreme Court tends to correlate with public opinion. If the
replacement hypothesis affected Supreme Court voting in any significant way, we would not
see much of a change in voting behavior during the 11 year period between 1994 and 2005 when
the composition of the Court did not change at all. The results of this model (from 1994-2001)
do not show a static Court, but instead show an almost random pattern during those years. The
small sample size restricts the conclusions that can be made from this observation, but it does
suggest that there is more to be explained concerning how the Supreme Court behaves as an
institution. The results of this model suggest a combination of rational choices made by
individual justices, while the overall Court follows the theory of political adjustment with
occasional shifts that occur when justices are sometimes replaced by their ideological opposites.
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Table 2: Realtime Multiple Regression Model
Dependent Variable: Individual Justices' Voting Patterns

Model and
Independent
Variables

N

Adjusted.
R- Square

Overall
Model
Sig.

Court
Mood
(Sig.):j:

Ct Md.
Std.

Error:j:

Ideology

Id. Std.

(Sig.)

Error

Public
Mood
(Sig.)

PM
Std.
Error

Individual
Justice
.000

21

Marshallt

.014

Stevens

27

.546*

Brennan

23

.375

Breyert

8

Soutert

12

.513*

.010

Ginsburg

9

.807***

.000

Blackmun

24

.772***

.000

White

23

.660***

.000

O'Conner

21

.723**

.003

Kennedy

15

.636***

.000

Burger

16

. 776***

.000

Powell

16

.881**

.007

Stewart

11

.717***

.000

Rehnquist

30

.550**

.001

Scalia

16

.698*

.036

Thomast

11

.548

.502*

.162

.437*

(.02)

(.451)

(.033)

.544**

.270

(.002)
.489*
(.040)

.033

.216
.155

(.086)
-.200
(.423)

.153
.315

.135
(.357)
.399
(.160)

.518

-.047

.509

(.188)

(.911)

(.197)

.899**
(.009)
.906*
(.045)
.534***
(000)
.914***
(.000)
.853***
(.000)
.842***
(.000)
.993***
(.000)
.945***
(.000)
.912**
(.007)
.617***
(.000)
.832***
(.000)
.705*
(.021)

.320
.407
.172
.155
.152
.172
.167
.125
.225
.170
.160
.481

.067
(.818)
-.285
(.165)
.818***
(.000)
.083
(.539)
-.002
(.988)
.076
(.667)
.183
(.313)
.247
(.142)
-.539
(.130)
.219
(.110)
.251
(.112)
-.279
(.298)

.476
.308
.149
.170
.171
.370
.268
.158
.404
.176
.300
.499

-.849*
(.026)
-.014
(.970)
-.221
(.141)
-.203
(.207)
.056
(.664)
.058
(.741)
-.228
(.355)
-.221
(.235)
.387
(.303)
.115
(.422)
.210
(.171)
.281
(.338)

* p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.OOl
tMultiple Regression model insignificant, results displayed are from bivariate correlation,

:j: Variable Betas

measured with Pearson Correlation; Standard Error measured with F-Test.

.479
.494

.984
2.337
.528
.388
.352
.449
.608
.507
.926
.423
.389
1 .408
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Table 3: Time +3 Years Multiple Regression Model
Dependent Variable: Individual Justices' Voting Patterns

Model and
Independent
Variables

N

Adjusted.
R- Square

Overall

Court

Model

Mood

Ct Md.
Std.

Sig.

(Sig. ):j:

Error:j:

Ideology
(Sig.)

Id. Std.
Error

Public

PM

Mood

Std.

(Sig.)

Error

Individual
Justice
Marshallt

21

Stevens

27

.563***

.000

Brennan

23

.293*

.036

Breyert

8

Soutert

12

Ginsburg

9

.836**

.007

Blackmun

24

.868***

.000

White

23

.668***

.000

O'Conner

21

.724***

.000

Kennedy

15

.652**

.002

Burger

16

.855***

.000

Powell

16

.867***

.000

Stewart

11

.668*

.013

Rehnquist

30

.562***

.000

Scalia

16

.645**

.001

Thomast

11

.502*

.162

.092

(.020)

(.451)

(.692)

.542**
(.001)
.594*
(.032)

.208
.179

.258
(.094)
-.062
(.865)

.151
.464

.185
(.193)
.105
(.804)

.518

-.047

-.324

(.188)

(.911)

(.434)

.364

.209

-.464

(.245)

(.515)

(.129)

.943**
(.002)
.690***
(.000)
.662**
(.001)
.844***
(.000)
.792**
(.001)
1.08***
(.000)
.867***
(.000)
1.02**
(.005)
.721***
(.000)
.853**
(.001)

.179
.135
.156
.157
.183
.117
.119
.236
.165
.203

-.177
(.387)
.758***
(.000)
-.122
(.510)
-.062
(.724)
.016
(.925)
.395*
(.026)
.070
(.732)
-.299
(.335)
.304*
(.039)
.242
(.241)

.326
.097
.231
.236
.363
.240
.199
.371
.186
.402

-.179
(.391)
-.430***
(.000)
.325
(.153)
.096
(.620)
.143
(.440)
-.523**
(.016)
.051
(.797)
.021
(.946)
-.177
(.247)
.036
(.864)

.783**

-.026

.031

(.004)

(.940)

(.927)

*p<.05, **p<.Ol, ***p<.OOl
tMultiple Regression model insignificant, results displayed are from bivariate correlation,

:j: Variable Betas

measured with Pearson Correlation; Standard Error measured with F-Test.

.433
.679

.524
.330
.501
.450
.489
.380
.449
.953
.408
.556
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CONCLUSIONS

While this study failed to explain the reason that the Supreme Court follows public
mood, it did bring to light a reason why it does not. Given the results of this study, it can be
asserted that moderate justices are no more likely to heed public mood than extreme ideological
justices, or that extreme ideological justices may pay attention to public opinion in a negative
way (see Burger, T+3). What remains to be seen is how the Supreme Court follows public
opinion overall without any of the individual justices being significantly affected by the public
mood. Several explanations exist, including the possibility that while none of the justices are
significantly affected, there is enough variation in the group that the seemingly random back
and forth movements of the justices actually amount to an adherence to public mood. Yet
another possibility is that the cases and votes in this study were not broken down by issue.28
Some justices' ideologies can change significantly depending on the issue, and a more careful
study may show that some individual justices actually do follow public opinion on certain
issues that are important to the American public. Finally, this study was restricted by a small
number of cases, and while the liberalism scores for each justice are seemingly accurate, the
number of years for some justices on the bench were simply too few to study. Despite these
limitations, this study achieved significant results and was able to verify that the overall mood
of the Court is a powerful factor in judicial decision making. Further research into voting
blocks, as well as Court leadership and swing voting, may reveal why the Supreme Court
correlates strongly with the overall public mood and whether or not it falls in line with the
political adjustment hypothesis.

28 See author's 2011 work for testing of this hypothesis.
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WHAT'S THE HANG UP?:
EXPLORING THE EFFECT OF POSTMATERIALISM ON HUNG PARLIAMENTS

Jennifer Biess
Elections in majoritarian states are supposed to produce single-party majority governments.
However, the most recent elections in the three main advanced industrial majoritarian parliamentary
democracies - the United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia - failed to produce majority governments. No
single party won a majority of the parliamentary seats in any of these three elections, a condition
commonly referred to as a hung parliament. Despite the literature's tendency to dismiss hung
parliaments as electoral abnormalities, this recent wave of hung parliaments among such similarly
situated states suggests the presence of an underlying causal factor that contributes to these outcomes.
The current study analyzes the role played by the rise of postmaterialist values in advanced industrial
societies in the occurrence of hung parliaments through multiple least squares regression. While the study
is not able to arrive at a universal explanation for hung parliaments in all three cases, it is able to explain
hung parliaments in Australia and Canada.

Abstract:

INTRODUCTION
Elections in majoritarian states are designed to produce single-party majority
governments. However, the most recent elections in the three main advanced industrial
majoritarian parliamentary democracies - the United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia - failed
t� produce majority governments. No single party won a majority of the parliamentary seats in
any of these three elections, a condition commonly referred to as a hung parliament. Despite the
literature's tendency to dismiss hung parliaments as electoral abnormalities, the recent wave of
hung parliaments among such institutionally similar states suggests the presence of an
underlying causal factor that contributes to these outcomes.1 This study seeks to analyze the
role played by the rise of postmaterialist values in the occurrence of hung parliaments in
advanced industrial societies.
After the UK's 2010 general election, its hung parliament sparked a national
conversation over electoral reform. However, there is widespread disagreement over which
system is best.2 If the UK and other countries seek to ameliorate their "hung parliament
problems" and want to enact electoral reform, it is imperative to first understand what causes
hung parliaments. Armed with that information, these countries can make educated decisions
about more appropriate electoral systems. While this discussion is limited to three specific
countries, the general lessons can be extended to other advanced industrial states, especially
those with majoritarian electoral systems.

1 Kalitowski 2008.
2 Wheeler 2010.
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LITERATURE REVIEW

The Westminster Model
The UK, Australia and Canada are all built on the Westminster model of parliamentary
democracy, also referred to as the majoritarian or plurality model. Westminster model
democracies generally have two-party systems. Proponents of this structure emphasize the
ability of the two-party system to provide voters with a clear choice between two alternatives
and produce dominant single-party majority governments.3 Two party systems also tend to be
one-dimensional in that the two parties generally only differ on one main issue.4
Electoral systems in majoritarian polities generally follow the first-past-the-post style of
elections and use single member districts. Whoever wins the most votes in a given district,
whether a plurality or a majority, wins the seat. While this is the most common electoral format
in Westminster model democracies, there are some exceptions. Australia uses the alternative
vote system, in which voters order the candidates in terms of preference. First, they calculate
the vote based on voters' first choices. If no candidate wins a majority, the candidate who
received the least number of votes is eliminated, and his or her votes are redistributed to the
voters' second choice candidate. This process continues until one candidate wins a majority of
the votes in that district; thus, it is often considered a true majority election formula.5
Despite their electoral and party structures, third parties have been able to win seats in
all three states included in the current study, albeit with varying degrees of success. Generally,
one of the two traditional parties represents the ideological left, which is popular with the
working class, and the other stands for the ideological right, which traditionally appeals to the
middle class.6 In the UK, the traditional parties are the Labour Party, which has historically
been ideological left party, and the Conservative Party, which has been the ideological right
party; however, the Liberal Democrat Party has emerged as a strong, ideologically centrist third
party. In Canada, the established national parties are the Liberal Party and the Conservative
Party, where the Liberal Party represents the ideological left and the Conservative Party
embodies the ideological right. A variety of minor parties are prominent. Together minor
parties have garnered about thirty percent of the votes in recent elections.? Two-party politics is
strongest in Australia. The Australian Labor Party is the traditional party of the ideological left,
while the Liberal-National Coalition represents the traditional party of the ideological right.
Although there are a variety of minor parties, the most notable is the recent rise of the Green
Party in Australia, which has increased its share of the vote from 1 % in 1990 to 12% 2010.8

3 Lijphart 1999.

4 Ibid.
5 Ibid.

6 Inglehart 1990.
7 Parliament of Canada.
8 Newman 2004-2005 (for years 1987-2004); Australia Votes 2007; Australia Votes 2010.
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Hung Parliaments
Elections in Westminster model parliamentary democracies are designed to produce
stable single-party majority governments. However, exceptions do occur, and these exceptions
are referred to as hung parliaments. By definition a hung parliament is "one in which no party
has an overall majority," meaning also that no single party has won more than half of the
parliamentary seats.9 Generally, hung parliaments have been interpreted as isolated electoral
anomalies.1 °
The most recent elections in the UK, Canada, and Australia have all produced hung
parliaments. Before Australia's 2010 election, its most recent hung parliament occurred in
1940.11 In the UK, before the 2010 general election the most recent hung parliament occurred in
1974.12 Of the three states compared in the present study, Canada has experienced hung
parliaments most frequently. Of the nine federal elections held between 1957 and 1979, six
resulted in hung parliaments. However, from the 1980 election until the 2004 election Canadian
federal elections produced majority governments each time. The federal elections of 2004, 2006,
and 2008 all produced hung parliaments)3 However, the phenomenon of hung parliaments has
largely been ignored in the literature. The purpose of this study is to identify factors that
explain this current wave of hung parliaments in advanced industrial Westminster model
parliamentary democracies.
The Decline of Class-Voting and the Rise of Postmaterialist Values
Traditionally, class has been the primary electoral cleavage. Some scholars argue,
however, that in advanced industrial societies the emergence of new social issues has led to a
decline in the dominance of class-based voting.14
Clark and Upset argue that the importance of class in advanced industrial societies is
decreasing because "in recent decades traditional hierarchies have declined and new social
differences have emerged." 15 Clark and Upset claim that class-based voting has declined and is
being replaced by post-industrial politics, which they refer to as the New Political Culture
(NPC) . The following circumstances define the NPC: (1) social and economic issues are clearly
distinguished; (2) social issues and consumption issues are more salient as compared to
fiscalj economic issues; (3) issue politics and more widespread citizen participation are
increasing while hierarchical political organizations have declined; and (4) the NPC views are
more prevalent in younger, more educated, and more affluent people and societies.16 Clark and
Upset ground their reasoning in terms of the economy and the family, which relate to the
decreased influence of hierarchical social structures. It is these hierarchies, they argue, that

9 BBC News 2010.
10 Kalitowski 2008.
11 Liddy 2010.
12 Butler and Kavanagh 1974.
13 Parliament of Canada 2009.
14 Clark and Lipset 2001; Inglehart 1990; Dalton 2002.
15 Clark and Lipset 2001, 40.

16

Ibid., 278.
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maintain rigid class structures. They contend that political issues change with increased
affluence: with increased affluence, people will take basic security needs for granted and
consider other things, including lifestyle and amenity issues. This decreases the power of class
and hierarchy.1 7 They also argue that the family has embraced more egalitarian values, which
further decreases the importance of hierarchical arrangements in society.18
However, Hout, Brooks, and Manza dispute Clark and Upset's claim that class is
declining; instead they argue that class is becoming more complex. They concede that
dichotomous class models are no longer appropriate, but affirm that this does not mean class is
dying. Hout and his colleagues make several specific criticisms of Clark and Upset's work.
First, they point to the persistence of income inequality despite the growth of the middle class to
show that class is still relevant in the modem context.19 From a methodological stance, they
argue that the Alford Index used by Clark and Upset to measure the decline of class-based
voting is too crude and underestimates the importance of class in voting.20 21 Most importantly,
they argue that Clark and Upset do not clearly make the case relating hierarchy and class.22 This
critique points to the conceptual gap in Clark and Upset's argument.
While Clark and Upset focus on hierarchical societal structures that promote rigid class
stratification, Inglehart's theory of postmaterialist values focuses on the impact of increased
affluence on an individual's value priorities, drawing primarily on Maslow's hierarchy of
needs. His argument is two-fold. First, Inglehart posits that when people experience economic
scarcity and hardship they will give high priority to economic security and safety needs.
However, people in an environment of affluence do not experience the same scarcity, so they
will move beyond economic security and safety needs and place more value on higher order
aesthetic and intellectual needs, which he refers to as postmaterialist values.23 Second, Inglehart
stresses that the conditions in which one grows up are most important, since it is when values
form. Because of this he stresses that the impact of postmaterialist values should increase over
time as more people grow up in affluent circumstances.24
Inglehart recognizes that materialist values, those based on economic security and safety
needs, will still be prevalent in society. This leads him to argue that postmaterialists will prefer
change-oriented political parties.25 Traditionally, the "change-oriented" parties are those of the
ideological Left. This would lead affluent, middle-class voters to vote for Leftist political parties
despite their class-based connection with the parties of the Right. Furthermore, working class
17
18
19

Clark and Upset 2001, 4l .
Ibid., 51.

Ibid., 60.
20 The Alford Index is calculated by subtracting the percentage of middle class voters who vote for the

traditionally working class party from the percentage of the working class that vote for the working class
party.

21

Ibid., 63.
22 Ibid., 59.

23
24

Inglehart 1971.

Ibid.
25 Ibid.
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voters, who are more likely to experience scarcity and possess materialist values, may choose to
vote for the parties of the Right who traditionally espouse those values.26 Because of this,
Inglehart contends, liThe rise of Postmaterialist issues, therefore, tends to neutralize political
polarization based on social class."27
Dalton characterizes Inglehart's framework as lithe most systematic attempt to describe
the value changes that are transforming advanced industrial societies."28 Dalton makes a clear
distinction between materialist and postmaterialist values. Values that stem from physiological
needs, which include both sustenance and safety needs, are deemed materialist; these values
include economic stability, economic growth, fighting rising prices, strong defense forces,
fighting crime, and maintaining order. After safety and sustenance needs are met, people can
attend to their social and self-actualization needs. Postmaterialist values stem from these higher
order needs and include having a less impersonal society, having more say in your job or
community, having more say in government, valuing free speech, believing that ideas count,
and valuing green space.29
However, he also identifies two key areas of criticism of Inglehart's argument. The first
pertains mostly to Inglehart's methodology. Several studies argue that Inglehart's value index is
closely associated with the tides of economic conditions instead of the conditions of one's
childhood. The other school of criticism debates the nature of value change. Flanagan argues
that values are changing on more than just a single materialjpostmaterial dimension, while
Braithwaite contends that societal values are moving from security-based to harmony-based
values3o. Dalton concedes that Inglehart's theory is overly simplistic, but also contends that
critics who disagree on the nature of value change can fit their frameworks within Inglehart's
broader one.
Beck presents another critique of the postmaterialist values argument. He posits that
societies have moved from the first modernity to the second modernity. The first modernity
entails lithe collective patterns of life, progress and controllability, full employment and
exploitation of nature;" however, the developments of the first modernity have been fraught
with unintended consequences, which the second modernity must now rectify.31 Thus, the
recent concern with issues like environmentalism and nuclear disarmament, which are
postmaterialist values from Inglehart's perspective, actually is the result of the consequences of
development during the first modernity. Thus, for Beck the second modernity is reflexive.32
While Beck presents an interesting alternative thesis to the discussion of value change, he still
seems to agree that postmaterialist society or second modernity has different values than
materialist society of first modernity. Thus, while the exact nature of value change is still being

26
27

Inglehart 1990.

29
30
31
32

Ibid.

Ibid., 259.
28 Dalton 2002, 79.
Ibid.; Flanagan 1982; 1987; Braithwaite 1996.
Beck 1999, 2.
Ibid.
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debated, scholars agree that values have changed in advanced industrial societies; it is this point
that is central to the current study.
Both Dalton and Inglehart posit the existence of a New Politics dimension that accounts
for the emergent postmaterialist values.33 Dalton distinguishes between the "Old Politics" and
"New Politics" to differentiate between traditional and postmaterialist political alignments.34
Class is the primary factor that structures the old political cleavages, with the Old Left
representing the working class and labor unions and the Old Right identifying with business
interests and the middle class.35 New Politics is the postmaterialist political dimension. While
Dalton recognizes that Old Politics is still the primary ground for partisan conflict, he argues
that New Politics affects party systems in advanced industrial societies, because "it can cut
across the established Old Politics cleavage."36 Since new political cleavages do not line up with
old political cleavages, the emergence of this second dimension does not further polarize the
major parties. Also, non-established parties have been more likely to adopt postmaterialist
positions than the major parties, which has helped smaller parties be more successfuP7
Furthermore, the introduction of the New Politics cleavage has contributed to partisan
dealignment, which refers to "the erosion of the social group basis of party support."38 This
trend has increased electoral volatility and loosened the hold that the cleavages of Old Politics
had on voter choice.
This may also help to explain the importance of anti-party sentiment amongst
electorates in the UK, Canada, and Australia. Belanger contends that there is a feeling of
"political malaise" in postindustrial nations; people are becoming more critical of political
parties, especially after those parties fail to meet the electorate's expectations for policy and
service provision. While Belanger does not specifically connect his argument to those made by
Dalton, this could be due to Dalton's claim that it is generally minor parties that embrace
postmaterialist platforms rather than the traditional parties. Similarly, Belanger argues that
while this feeling is detrimental to major parties, it can be positive for third parties. Political
malaise manifests itself in two forms: negative attitudes toward the major parties, which he calls
specific antiparty sentiment and negative attitudes towards parties per se, which he refers to as
general antiparty sentiment.39 He finds that antipartyism brings people to vote for third parties.
This is especially true of people who feel specific antiparty sentiment; however, third parties
who utilize antiparty rhetoric and paint themselves as "antiparty parties" benefit from general
antiparty sentiment as wel1.40

33

Dalton 2002; Inglehart 1990.

34 Dalton 2002, 134.

35
36
37
38

Ibid.
Ibid.
Dalton 2002.
Ibid., 183.

39 Belanger 2004.

40

Ibid.
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THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND HYPOTHESES

But why are these developments relevant to the recent wave of hung parliaments in
majoritarian states? The decline of the old political cleavage of class and the rise of new political
postmaterialist issues has complicated the way in which people vote. The choice is no longer
between two distinct alternatives as proponents of the Westminster model claim. Class is
declining in its importance because other issues - postmaterialist social issues - are rising in
saliency. Thus, voters are no longer simply voting for whichever party most naturally
represents them based on their class background.
This study will draw primarily on Inglehart's conception of postmaterialist values and
Dalton's analysis of party politics in response to the rise of these values. The central hypothesis
of this work is that the decline of Old Politics and the concurrent rise of New Politics explains
the increased frequency of hung parliaments in advanced industrial Westminster model
parliamentary democracies. From this, I posit two hypotheses:
Hl:

The decline of class-based voting increases the likelihood of hung parliaments

H2:

The increase of postmaterialist values increases the likelihood of hung parliaments

Following Dalton's argument that the rise of postmaterialist values has contributed towards
party dealignment, I also predict the following:
H3:

Decreased partisanship increases the likelihood of hung parliaments.

Furthermore, non-established parties are more likely than traditional parties to embrace and
support postmaterialist issues. From this, I expect that minor parties that have incorporated
postmaterialist values and also antiparty sentiment towards major parties because they have
not adapted to these issues, which leads to the following hypotheses:
H4: Increased
Hs:

specific antiparty sentiment increases the likelihood of hung parliaments.

Incorporation of post-materialist values by minor parties increases the likelihood of hung parliaments.

METHODS
This study is a small comparative case study that includes the following cases: the
United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia. These cases have been selected because they are all
advanced industrial Westminster model parliamentary democracies that have experienced
recent hung parliaments. This study approaches hung parliaments not only from a cross
national perspective, but also from a longitudinal one. General elections from the following
years are included in the study: from 1983 until 2010 in the UK, from 1984 until 2008 in Canada,
and from 1987 until 2007 in Australia.
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OPERATIONALIZATION AND MEASUREMENT

Dependent Variable:

Occurrence of Hung Parliament: While a dummy variable could be used to denote whether or not
a state's general election resulted in a hung parliament, this study operationalizes the hung
parliament variable instead as the size of the majority, in terms of parliamentary seats obtained
by the party that wins the most seats in the election. Explicitly, this will be measured as the
percentage of parliamentary seats won by the "winningest" party, which controls for the size of
the parliament. This variable indicates a hung parliament when the value of this measure is less
than fifty percent.
Independent Variables:

Class-based voting: To measure class-based voting the Alford Index is used. This measure
subtracts the proportion of middle-class voters who vote for the working class party from the
proportion of working class voters who vote for the working-class party.
Postmaterialist values: To measure the prevalence of postmaterialist values in each of the states in
this study, I use the four-item index of postmaterialist values from the World Values Survey.41
This index is derived from the following question series: "If you had to choose, which one of the
things on this card would you say is most important? And which would be the next most
important?" The answer choices are: "maintaining order in the nation," "giving people more
say," "fighting rising prices," and "protecting freedom of speech." Depending on their answers
to both questions, respondents are coded as materialist, postmaterialist or mixed. For each
country, the measure used is the percentage of respondents that are coded as postmaterialist on
this index.
Strength of Party Identification: To measure strength of party identification, the following
question is used: "Would you call yourself a very strong (fill in party), fairly strong, or not very
strong?" The measure used is the percentage of respondents who indicate very strong party
identification as a proportion of the total sample, which includes respondents who did not
identify with a political party.
Strong Antiparty-sentiment: In accordance with Belanger's operationalization of this sentiment,
questions from election studies asking for the respondent's feelings toward major parties are
used. If the respondent expresses negative feelings toward both major parties, they exhibit
specific antiparty sentiment. Questions used to measure this variable are worded similarly to
the following: "How do you feel about the [insert appropriate party]?" Strong antiparty
sentiment is measured as the percentage of respondents that indicated strong negative feelings
toward both major parties.

41 European and World Values Surveys four-wave integrated data file; World Values Survey 2005 official
data file.
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Index of Third Party Ideology: This index ranges from zero to two and is comprised of two criteria:
social justice issues in minor party ideologies and success of green parties. With regards to the
former, third party platforms are referenced where available for mentions of social justice and
equality for women and minority groups. Where party platforms are not available, secondary
data describing the political parties is used. Environmentalism is another prong of
postmaterialism. However, the presence of this cannot be measured by looking at party
platforms because in the contemporary political climate, most parties, not just third parties, take
a stance on environmental issues. A better indicator of the importance of environmental issues
is the presence of a green party. However, the mere presence of a green party does not indicate
that it is politically strong. Therefore, this study counts only green parties that won at least one
parliamentary seat in the general election. These two indicators, inclusion of women's and
minority rights into the party's election platform and the presence of a seat-winning green
party, are combined into an index of post-materialist value incorporation. This index ranges
from 0 to 2, where zero means neither criterion is met. One indicates that one of the criterions is
met, and two indicates that both criteria are met.

DATA AND ANALYSIS PLAN
Most of the data for this study is gathered from the Australian Election Study (AES), the
Canadian Election Study (CES), and the British Election Study (BES). However, the data
regarding postmaterialist values came from the World Values Survey (WVS) . While it would
have been ideal to measure postmaterialist values using the various national election studies, no
question or set of questions regarding postmaterialist values has been consistently asked across
all three nations over time. Although the waves of the WVS do not directly correspond to the
election years in the UK, Canada, and Australia, this data is preferable because it asks
consistently worded questions to respondents in all three nations for each wave, providing
greater consistency over time and across cases. Therefore, the data for each country from the
wave of the WVS that is closest to the election is used as a measure of postmaterialist values at
the time of the election. Finally, data regarding the dependent variable is obtained from election
result archives. The data will be analyzed using a series of multiple least squares linear
regressions. Preliminarily, bivariate correlations are run at each stage of the analysis to test for
multicollinearity. Next, regression models are run for the entire model using data from all three
cases. Then, separate regression models are run for each country individually. Because of the
small number of general elections included in this study, a significance level of .10 is used.
DATA ANALYSIS
Analysis Across All Cases
The bivariate correlations show that multicollinearity exists between the percentage of
respondents who exhibit antiparty sentiment and both the percentage of respondents who are
strong party identifiers and the Alford Index of class voting. To account for this, five separate
multiple regressions are run: one including all variables (Model l), one excluding antiparty
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sentiment (Model 2), one excluding strong party identifiers (Model 3), one excluding class
voting (Model 4), and finally one excluding both strong party identifiers and class voting
(Model S) . Model 2 and Model S completely alleviate the effects of multicollinearity from the
analysis.
Table 1: Postmaterialist Values and the Occurrence of Hung Parliaments in All Cases
Dependent Variable: Occurrence of Hung Parliament, in percentage of seats won by the winningest party
Model l
Model 4
Model 2
Model 3
Model Make-Up
All variables
Class voting
Strong Party
Strong Antiparty
(Variable excluded to
included
excluded
Identifiers
Sentiment Excluded
account for
excluded
collinearity)

1983-2010)
Model 5
Class voting and
Strong party
identifiers
excluded

Dependent Variable
Class Voting
(Alford Index)

0.050
(.140)

.069
(.097)

.072
(.140)

Postmaterialist Values

-.144
(.216)

-.359*
(.188)

-.152
(.218)

Percent of Strong
Party Identifiers

.421
(.377)

.992**
(.311)

Strong Antiparty
Sentiment

-1.709*
(.096)

Index of Third Party
Ideology

-6.149
(5.161)

.418
3.692
(.027)
19
***p<.OO1, **p<.05, *p<.10

Adjusted R2
F-test
Model Significance
N

-.167
(.209)

-.188
(.210)

.442
(.381)
-1.880*
(.948)

-1.603**
(.723)

-1.887**
(.687)

-6.958
(5.750)

-6.738
(5.179)

-6.705
(5.245)

-7.317
(5.274)

.454
5.365
(.006)
19

.418
4.229
(.019)
19

.378
3.885
(.023)
19

.364
4.630
(.016)
19

Model l includes all five variables. The model is significant (p<.027) and accounts for
41.8% of the variance in the dependent variable, the percentage of parliamentary seats won by
the winningest party. However, because of the multicollinearity, the only variable that is
significant is antiparty sentiment in the expected direction: as strong antiparty sentiment
increases, the percentage of seats won by the winningest party decreases, which means that
hung parliaments are more likely. Excluding antiparty sentiment from the analysis resolves the
problem created by multicollinearity.
Model 2, which excludes anti-party sentiment and resolves the multicollinearity
problem, is significant (p<.006) and accounts for 4S.4% of the variance. Both postmaterialist
values and strong party identifiers are significantly related to the percentage of seats won by the
winningest party in the hypothesized directions. As the percentage of respondents who are
postmaterialist increase, the percentage of seats won by the winningest party decreases making
hung parliaments more likely. As the percentage of respondents who are strong party
identifiers decreases, the percentage of seats won by the winningest party decreases.
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Models 3, 4 and 5 exclude strong party identifiers, class voting, or both, respectively.
Each of these models is significant; however, the only significant independent variable is
antiparty sentiment. This suggests that the antiparty sentiment variable is picking up on
variance in the dependent variable that can be attributed to class voting and strong party
identification. Class voting and the third party ideology index are not significant in any of the
five models.
The United Kingdom
Amongst only the UK cases, bivariate correlations show that class voting is significantly
negatively correlated with the third party ideology index, and postmaterialist values are
significantly and negatively correlated with the percentage of respondents that are strong party
identifiers. This again poses the problem of multicollinearity. To avoid multicollinearity a
variety of different regression models are run. The first model includes all five independent
variables. Models 2 through 6 each exclude one of the independent variables. These models do
not completely alleviate the multicollinearity issue, since no single variable is responsible for
this problem as in the overall analysis. To completely resolve multicollinearity, Model 7
excludes both class voting and postmaterialist values, and Model 8 excludes both the
percentage of respondents who are strong party identifiers and the third party ideology index.
Table 2A: Postmaterialist Values and the Occurrence of Hung Parliaments in the UK: Models 1 -4
Dependent Variable: Occurrence of Hung Parliament, in percentage of seats won by
the winningest party (1983-2010)

Model 2
Class voting excluded

Model 3
Postmaterialist values
excluded

Model 4
Strong party
identification
excluded

1.224
(.743)

-.491
(.961)

Model Make-Up
(Variable excluded to
account for
collinearity)
Dependent Variable
Class Voting

Model l
All variables included

Postmaterialist Values

.803
(.636)

1.086
(.716)

Strong Party
Identification

2.465
(.887)

1.567
(.706)

2.301
(.999)

Strong Antiparty
Sentiment

-2.127
(1.790)

-.529
(1.610)

-2.845
(1.934)

1.147
(2.814)

Third Party Ideology

5.095
(1.790)
.709
3.923
(.365)
7

-12.545
(5.643)
.586
3.120
(.257)
7

12.960
(14.048)
.622
3.471
<.236)
7

-21.929
(20.497)
.270
.681
(.667)
7

Adjusted R2
F-test
Model Significance
N

.938
(.690)

*p<.10, **p<.OS, ***p<.OOl

.545
(1.313)
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Table 2B: Postmaterialist Values and the Occurrence of Hung Parliaments in the UK: Models 5-8
Dependent Variable: Occurrence of Hung Parliament, in percentage of seats won by
the winningest party (1983-2010)

Model Make-Up
(Variable excluded to
account for
collinearity)

Model 7
Class voting and
postmaterialist values
excluded

Model 8
Strong party
identification and
third party ideology
excluded

Model 5
Strong Antiparty
Sentiment Excluded

Model 6
Third Party Ideology
Excluded

Class Voting

.399
(.571)

.699*
(.178)

.410
(.474)

Postmaterialist Values

1.043
(.662)

.909
(.428)

-.561
(.829)

Strong Party
Identification

1 .771
(.733)

2.234**
(.475)

.904
(.663)

-1.627
(.880)

-.878
(1.907)

-.510
(2.405)

.835
8.573
(.107)
7

-8.773
(6.064)
.406
2.368
(.249)
7

.331
.503
(.707)
7

Dependent Variable

Strong Antiparty
Sentiment
Third Party Ideology
Adjusted R2
F-test
Model Significance
N

-7.346
(9.903)
.649
3.772
(.220)
7

*p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.OOl

None of the models are significant. However, in Model 6, which excludes the third
party ideology index, class voting and the percentage of respondents who are strong party
identifiers are significant. These relationships are significant in the hypothesized directions: as
the class voting decreases, the percentage of seats won by the winningest party decreases, and
as the percentage of respondents who are strong party identifiers decreases the percentage of
seats won by the winningest party decreases. While Model 6 itself is not significant, it accounts
for 83.5% of the variance in the dependent variable. This suggests that lack of significance may
be attributable to the small sample size.
The prevalence of postmaterialist values is not significant in any of the models.
Antiparty sentiment is not significant in any of the models and is not significantly correlated
with any of the other independent variables. This stands in sharp contrast to the overall
analysis where antiparty sentiment is highly correlated with two of the independent variables
and the only significant independent variable when it is included in the model. This and the
overall insignificance of any of the models suggest that the UK does not follow the pattern
observed in the overall analyses.
Analysis of Canada
Amongst only the Canadian cases, the third party ideology index is excluded from the
Canadian analyses because it did not vary. All cases received a value of one, because there have
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consistently been third parties that espouse postmaterialist values, but a green party has never
won a parliamentary seat. The bivariate correlations indicate that postmaterialist values are
significantly correlated with the percentage of respondents who are strong party identifiers and
the percentage of respondents who exhibit strong antiparty sentiment. Also, class voting is
correlated with strong antiparty sentiment.
Again, these correlations introduce the problem of multicollinearity to the multiple
regression analysis. To account for this multiple models are run. The first model includes all
four independent variables. Models 2 through 5 each exclude a different independent variable.
Model 6 excludes both the percentage of respondents who are strong party identifiers and the
percentage of respondents who exhibited strong antiparty sentiment. Model 7 excluded both
class voting and postmaterialist values.
Table 3A: Postmaterialist Values and the Occurrence of Hung Parliaments in Canada: Models 1 -3
Dependent Variable: Occurrence of Hung Parliament, in percentage of seats won by
the winningest party (1984-2008)

Model Make-Up
(Variable excluded to
account for collinearity)
Dependent variable

Model l
All variables included

Model 2
Strong antiparty
sentiment excluded

Model 3
Postmaterialist values
excluded

Class Voting

-.704
(.554)

.314
( ..482)

.640
(1.268)

Postrnaterialist Values

-4.599
(1.160)

-2.091**
(.571)

Strong Party Identifiers

.518
(.427)

-.049
(.554)

Strong Antiparty
Sentiment

1 .634
(1.282)

Adjusted R2
F-test
Model Significance

.915
.14.409
(.195)
6

N

***p<.OOl, **p<.05, *p<.10

.149
(1.206)
-2.242
(2.393)

.912
21.847
(.015)
6

.288
1 .674
(.395)
6
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Table 3B: Postmaterialist Values and the Occurrence of Hung Parliaments in Canada: Models 4-7
Dependent Variable: Occurrence of Hung Parliament, in percentage of seats won by
the winningest party (1984-2008)

Model Make-Up
(Variable excluded to
account for
collinearity)
Dependent variable
Class Voting

Postrnaterialist
Values

Model 4
Strong Party
Identifiers excluded

Model 5
Class voting
excluded

-.574
(.605)
-4.292*
(1 .259)

Strong Party
Identifiers

Model 7
Class voting and
postmaterialist
values excluded

.334
(.371)
-4.376**
(1.205)

-2.046***
(.232)

.590
(.584)

.493
(1.173)
-2.755
(1.508)

Strong Antiparty
Sentiment

1.255
(1.381)

2.552
(1.642)

Adjusted R2
F-test
Model Significance

.895
15.153
(.063)
6

.819
10.026
(.045)
6

N

Model 6
Strong party
identifiers and
strong antiparty
sentiment excluded

.934
43.577
(.002)
6

.266
2.086
(.240)
6

***p<.OOl, **p<.05, *p<.10

Model l is not significant, nor is any of its independent variables, which is most likely
due to the various multicollinearity issues present in this model. In all of the subsequent
models, the prevalence of postmaterialist values is the only significant independent variable.
Furthermore, the relationship always is in the hypothesized direction: as the prevalence of
postmaterialist values increases, the percentage of seats won by the winningest party decreases.
Furthermore, only models 2, 4, 5 and 6 are significant, but models 3 and 5 are not. The key
difference between these two sets of models is that the former includes the postmaterialist
values variable and the latter does not. The most instructive comparison is between Model 6
and Model 7 both of which completely resolve any multicollinearity problems. Model 6
accounts for 93.4 % of the variance in the dependent variable and only the postmaterialist values
variable is significant, while Model 7 excludes postmaterialist values and only accounts for
26.6% of the variance. This suggests that the prevalence of postmaterialist values is most
important in explaining the size of the parliamentary majority in Canadian elections.
Analysis of Australia
When analyzing only the Australian cases the third party ideology index is also
excluded because it does not vary. While there has also been a history of third parties
espousing postmaterialist values, the 2010 election is the first federal election in which a green
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party candidate won a seat in the House of Representatives. However, the 2010 Australian
Election Study data is not available at the time of writing and the election has been excluded.
Therefore, all Australian elections scored a value of one for the third party index variable.
Table 4: Postmaterialist Values and the Occurrence of Hung Parliaments in Australia
Dependent Variable: Occurrence of Hung Parliament, in percentage of seats won by winningest party (1987-2007)

Model l
All variables included

Model 2
Strong antiparty sentiment
excluded

Model 3
Postrnaterialist values
excluded

Class Voting

-1.060

-.913**

-1.076***

(Alford Index)

(.321)

(.130)

(.088)

Postmaterialist Values

.362

.424**

.339***

(.154)

(.081)

(.043)

Independent Variables

Percent of Strong Party

1.043

.988**

Identifiers

(1.963)

(.156)

Strong Antiparty

-.172

-5.634*

Sentiment

(10.473)

(1.588)

Adjusted R2

.880

.923

.958

F-test

10.185

21.036

53.870

Model Significance

(.230)

(.046)

(.001)

N

6

6

6

***p<.OO1, **p<.05, *p<.10

The percentage of respondents who are strong party identifiers is significantly
correlated with the percentage of respondents who exhibit strong antiparty sentiment, which
indicates multicollinearity. The problem of multicollinearity is addressed by running three
different models. Model l includes all four independent variables. The second model excludes
the percentage of respondents who are strong party identifiers. The third model excludes the
percentage of respondents who exhibited strong antiparty sentiment.
Due to multicollinearity, the first model is not significant nor is any of its independent
variables. However, Model 2 is significant and accounts for 92.3 % of the variance in the
dependent variable. All three included independent variables are significant. Model 3 is also
significant and accounts for 95.8% of the variance in the dependent variable. All the variables
included in the model are significant.
In Model 2, the percentage of respondents who exhibit strong antiparty sentiment is
significant in the expected direction: as the percentage of respondents exhibiting antiparty
sentiment increases, the percentage of seats won by the winningest party decreases. In Model 3,
the percentage of respondents who are strong party identifiers is significant in the expected
direction: as the percentage of respondents who are strong party identifiers decreases, the
percentage of seats won by the winningest party decreases making hung parliaments more
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likely. Class voting is significant in both Model 2 and Model 3, but not in the expected direction:
as class-based voting decreases, the percentage of seats won by the winningest party increases.
In both Model 2 and Model 3, the prevalence of postmaterialist values is significant, but not in
the expected direction. The data show that as the prevalence of postmaterialist values increases,
the percentage of seats won by the winningest party increases. Possible reasons for these
unexpected results will be discussed in the following section.
DISCUSSION
This study set out to find a causal explanation for hung parliaments that is applicable
across all cases. The significance of Model 2 in the overall cross-country analysis, as well as the
significance of postmaterialist values and the percentage of respondents who are strong party
identifiers, all support the theory that the rise of postmaterialist values and corresponding
developments contribute to the increased prevalence of hung parliaments. Three of the five
hypotheses are supported: those regarding the prevalence of postmaterialist values, the
percentage of respondents who are strong party identifiers, and the level of antiparty sentiment
(H2, H3, and I-L). The hypotheses regarding class voting and the ideology of third parties are
supported. The simultaneous support of the postmaterialism hypothesis and the lack of
support for class voting suggest that these two developments occur independent of each other
and lends credence to Hout, Brooks, and Manza's argument that class is not declining.
However, the country-by-country analysis shows that no consistent relationship exists across all
three cases. The analyses of each country show a different relationship between the
independent and dependent variables, which suggests that the national context plays an
important role in hung parliament electoral outcomes.
The UK

The analyses of the UK cases show that my theory does not account for the results of the
general elections in this case. Of all three countries, the UK is the only case in which none of the
multiple regression models are significant. This could be due to a variety of factors. Firstly,
class-based voting remains strongest in the UK. Dalton finds that class interests continue to be
important in British politics, but that this influence has declined by approximately fifty percent
between 1950 and 2000.42 However, even with this decline class voting in the UK is still higher
than the other cases in Dalton's study, the US, France and Germany. This is congruent with the
finding in Model 6 of the UK analyses that as class voting decreases - as indicated by lower
scores on the Alford Index - the percentage of parliamentary seats won by the winningest party
decreases. Thus, the decline in class voting that has been noted by Dalton is related to
increasingly narrow electoral margins. However, this study uses a much smaller time period
than Dalton's investigation, which suggests that the observed trends are less pronounced. This
could explain why the class-based voting variable was only significant in one model and why
no models are significant.
42

Dalton 2002.
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Dalton also finds that the UK has lower levels of postmaterialist values than many other
advanced industrial nations.43 It seems that the UK is lagging behind Canada and Australia in
terms of the developments of these values. This case exhibits less pronounced changes than
Canada and Australia, and the significance of the models could then be more highly impacted
by the small number of cases. In order to better understand the UK case, it would be useful to
use a longer period of time. It could be useful to not only go further back in time but also
analyze new data that comes out in the future. This will help to identify whether or not the rise
of postmaterialism and the decline of class are becoming stronger in the UK.
Canada

Of the three countries included, the analysis of the Canada shows the clearest support
for the postmaterialist theory. The increased prevalence of postmaterialist values is related to a
decline in the percentage of seats won by the winningest party in each significant model where
the postmaterialist values variable is included. Furthermore, each model that includes the
postmaterialist values variable explains more than 80% of the variance in the percentage of seats
won by the winningest party. However, the postmaterialist values variable is the only
significant independent variable in any of the models. From the bivariate analyses, we see that
the prevalence of postmaterialist values is positively related to strong antiparty sentiment and
negatively related to the percentage of respondents who are strong party identifiers. Since the
data are only bivariate correlations it cannot be discerned whether the change in postmaterialist
values causes a change in antiparty sentiment and strength of party identification or vice versa.
More research is needed to determine the causal direction of these relationships.
According to the theory presented here, one would expect that the increased prevalence of
postmaterialist values amongst the electorate is causing increased antiparty sentiment against
major parties and a decline in the percentage of people who consider themselves strong party
identifiers because major parties have not incorporated postmaterialist values into their
platforms. Also, decreased levels of class-based voting are related to levels of strong antiparty
sentiment. Again, the causal direction of this relationship cannot be proven without further
research, but it is hypothesized that as people become more disgruntled with the traditional
parties, they will be less likely to vote with their natural " class" party.
Finally, class-based voting is not significant in any of the models. This lends further
credence to Hout, Brooks, and Manza's argument that class may not be declining as a
significant electoral cleavage. The fact that class-based voting and postmaterialist values are not
related to each other also further indicates that the processes of increasing postmaterialist
values and declining class are independent of each other.
Australia
The Australian case provided two unexpected results. Both class-based voting and the
prevalence of postmaterialist values are related to the percentage of seats won by the

43 Ibid.
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winningest party, but in the opposite direction than was hypothesized. Firstly, as class-based
voting decreases, the percentage of seats won by the winningest party increases. Secondly, as
the prevalence of postmaterialist values increases, the percentage of seats won by the
winningest party increases.
In order to explain these findings, it was necessary to examine the responses to the
individual questions in the World Values Survey (WVS) from which the postmaterialism index
is derived. Between the two Australian waves of the WVS (1995 and 2005), the biggest shift in
respondents' first priority is a ten percentage point increase in the number of respondents who
named maintaining order in the nation. Furthermore, maintaining order in the nation is cited as
respondents' first choice about twice as often as fighting rising prices in both 1995 and 2005.
These results can be reconciled with Australia's recent economic and security situations.
With regards to its economy, Australia experienced seventeen consecutive years of economic
growth until the global financial crisis. After the financial crisis, Australia's economy
rebounded after only one quarter of negative economic growth, and the government expects to
return to budget surpluses by 2015.44 This history of strong economic conditions in Australia
explains the comparative unimportance of economic issues when measured against maintaining
order in the nation.
In the early 2000s, illegal immigration became Australia's most salient security issue.
The increased importance placed on the issue of illegal immigration is most likely driving the
decline in postmaterialist values from 1995 to 2005 and may account for the observed positive
relationship between postmaterialist values and the percentage of seats won by the winningest
party. Results from the Australian Election Study indicate that the percentage of seats won by
the winningest party may be a function of the degree of consensus in the Australian electorate
on which party is seen as best on issues of national security and defense.45 Thus, the salience of
security issues causes a decrease in the level of postmaterialist values, and the divide in the
electorate over which party is best suited to handle these issues could be correlated with
declining electoral majorities. Furthermore, this shift from viewing the coalition as
overwhelming more capable of dealing with security issues may have led some voters - most
likely working class voters who had voted for the coalition because of their strong position on
national security - to return to their "natural" class-based parties. This accounts for the finding
that as class-voting increases, the percentage of seats won by the winningest party decreases. In
the future, it will be interesting to see how class-based voting and postmaterialism are impacted
if and when the issue of illegal immigration loses political salience.

LIMITATIONS
This study is limited in a several ways. First, only a small number of elections are
included for each case. This is due to the lack of Australian data, as the Australian Election
44

CIA World Factbook 2010.

45 McAllister and Clark 2010, 16.
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Study only bean being conducted in 1987. In order to cover a comparable time span for each
country, the data for earlier elections for Canada and the UK are not included. In closer
analyses of these two cases, it would be beneficial to use a longer time span.
Also, another central weakness is the operationalization of the third party ideology
index. The index was not detailed enough to allow for adequate variation between cases and
had to be excluded from both the Australian and Canadian analyses, which made it impossible
to test the fifth hypothesis in these analyses. Where it has been included in the analysis, the
third party ideology index is never significant. This could be due to the limits of the measure
and not the unimportance of third party ideology itself. A better measure would account for
more dimensions of postmaterialist values than social justice and environmental issues and
allow for a wider range of variance. Data from the election studies could be used in crafting
such a measure, since questions are generally asked about which party is seen as most capable
of dealing with various issues. These sorts of questions could be useful in creating a more
nuanced index. However, a more in depth understanding of third party ideologies and how
that ideology is manifested is required in order to do this. If this concept were accurately
measured, further analysis may in fact show that it does play a role in explaining electoral
outcomes.
FUTURE RESEARCH & CONCLUSIONS
Since this study cannot conclude that its framework provides a universal explanation for
the occurrence of hung parliaments, future research should focus on the individual countries
included in the study, in order to better understand the role of the national context. Future
research should also investigate the impact of illegal immigration on postmaterialist values and
on electoral outcomes in Australia. The Canadian case should be further evaluated in order to
ascertain why postmaterialist values play a much larger role there than in other countries.
Alternative explanations should be investigated for the UK, since this theory does not seem to
explain the cause of its hung parliament. Also, antiparty sentiment should be further
researched since it was the variable that most often exhibited a relationship with the other
independent variables. Research is needed that investigates the causal relationship between
antiparty sentiment and class voting, postmaterialist values, and strong party identification.
This could prove important in better understanding the role of these variables in contributing to
the occurrence of hung parliaments.
This study has endeavored to find a universal explanation for the occurrence of hung
parliaments in advanced industrial democracies. However, the current study has not met this
lofty goal. While the implications of the rise of postmaterialism seem to explain hung
parliaments in Canada, the UK and Australian cases do not provide such clear-cut support for
the present theory. Despite these mixed results, this study has found some causal factors that
influence electoral results in majoritarian parliamentary democracies. This is an important first
step in explaining why hung parliaments occur and to what extent the national context plays a
role in these outcomes.
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WHAT WILL TIP THE SCALE?: TOWARD A THEORY FOR UNDERSTANDING
DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION IN IRAN

Sara Ghadiri
The world watched Iran in 200 9 to see what the aftermath of its presidential election would
hold. It seemed as if the stage was set for regime change - all requisite factors appeared to be present. Yet
the theocratic Iranian regime that has been in place since197 9 remains as entrenched as ever. This leaves
us at an interesting juncture. What is the reason for this entrenchment? What explains the fact that the
200 9 election did not spark a successful democratic transition? I posit that Iran has an additional factor
that must be taken into account when considering democratic transition: its institutional structure. It is
not enough for the opposition to coalesce around a symbolic figure - they must coalesce around a real
leader with enough power to push for democratic change. However, if this leader is to arise out of the
system, he or she will likely be tainted by the system through which power was gained. This phenomenon
will stunt any push for change that might come from within the ranks of the elites. As the result of a
systematic examination of normal mechanisms for the occurrence of regime change, this study concludes,
then, that a push must then come from elites outside of the system if Iran is to achieve democratic
transition.

Abstract:

IRAN 2009: WHAT HAPPENED?
The world watched Iran in 2009 to see what the aftermath of its presidential election
would hold. It seemed as if the stage was set for regime change - all requisite factors seemed to
be present. The economy was faltering, divisions were arising within the elite, parts of the
opposition had coalesced, large portions of the population were mobilized in protest, and the
international and expatriate communities had become involved. Add to this litany the fact that
there existed a history of active struggle for democratic rule, a relatively homogeneous
population, few border contentions, high literacy rates, movement towards modernization, and
high urbanization, and nearly every typical indicator of a transition seemed to be in place. Yet
the long-standing Iranian regime remains as entrenched as ever. This leaves us at an interesting
juncture. What is the reason for this entrenchment? What explains the fact that the 2009 election
did not spark a successful democratic transition? In order to understand what is required to tip
the scale in favor of democratic transitions in Iran, we must examine factors that tipped the
scale in other cases, and then attempt to understand why it is that Iran does not follow these
models.
The goal of understanding regime transition in Iran is framed by the context of
understanding the influence of factors that could cause regime change in Iran, along with
predicting what factor or factors will tip the scale towards democratic transition. In this study, I
first analyze and assess the current status of the aforementioned factors that can tilt a regime
towards transition or indicate that a regime is headed towards a transition. I then posit that the
institutional structure through which the most powerful Iranian leaders have arisen was
purposefully designed to parcel out just enough power for them to have political influence, yet
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still keep each one from truly realizing enough power to convince any other faction that they
ought to lead. Upon examining this institutional structure, I find one factor vital to Iran
achieving a democratic transition: A clear leader must emerge who can organize the opposition,
either by virtue of his own power or the conglomeration of power to which he has access, all
while avoiding becoming tainted by the system through which that individual gained power.
In order to achieve a successful democratic transition, political scientists must first
attempt to understand the concept of democratic transition. For this study, a democratic
transition refers to a precise moment in time in which a regime "makes a qualitative leap in
levels of democracy, either from an authoritarian regime to an electoral democracy or from a
semi-autocratic regime to a more democratic system."l With this definition in mind, where does
Iran stand?
LITERATURE REVIEW
In 2005, Michael McFaul noted that Iran has "the best structural endowments for
democracy that is still ruled by an authoritarian regime."2 McFaul's observation sets an
interesting tone for this inquiry. Iran employs a three branch institutional scheme, but exhibits
several idiosyncrasies. There is a two-part leadership between the President and Supreme
Leader in the executive. In addition to these two institutions, Iran's executive branch includes
the Assembly of Experts, Expediency Council, and Council of Guardians.3 Inherent in this large
executive is the illusion of checks and balances, because all power lies either directly or
indirectly in the hands of the Supreme Leader. Another of its idiosyncrasies comes in the fact
that Iran also has elections. The candidates for all elections, however, must first be screened by
the half-cleric, half-jurist Guardian Council. These elections do feature high turnout and high
public interest, and while recently of questionable validity, they still present a potentially
democratic institution that could function liberally were it given the opportunity.
I first examine the literature on democratic transition. The broad-based theories that
currently exist generalize based on cases that share a common geographical location. These
theories, however, are often not generalizable to other geographic areas. In spite of this, these
theories can still be examined and used to extract factors that have triggered transition in other
countries as a starting point. This framework can then serve to evaluate the factors at play in
Iran. This 'approach acknowledges that there are several factors that tend to predispose regimes
towards democratization. Although these vary based on time or place, they can be separated
into four categories of factors: economic, political, social-cultural, and geographic.
In the economic category, the greatest factor is the strength of the economy.4 A weak
economy, signaled by high unemployment, high inflation, and low growth, is often seen as the
fault of the government. Haggard and Kaufman also note that in years preceding democratic

1 McFaul et al. 2008.

2 McFaul 2005.
3 CIA World Factbook 2010.
4 Haggard and Kaufman 1997.
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transitions, patterns of declining growth and increasing inflation tend to be evident.5 Though
economic crises are neither necessary nor sufficient to cause a transition, poor economic
performance reduces inter-elite bargaining power and strengthens anti-regime opposition
movements. Even where economic crises are not the source of factional conflicts between hard
and soft-liners, however, they are likely to widen them.6 Economic factors such as these surface
so prevalently in situations of regime transition that they seem to be the only factors that can be
generalized across geographic areas.
In terms of political factors, almost all of the studies on development and democracy
focus on the interests, choices and strategies of political actors. Furthermore, most research on
transitions focuses on the interests and strategies of regime and opposition elites, along with the
constraints facing them? Political factors for regime change vary widely and include domestic
and international features. For example, opposition cohesion can point to a regime that may be
tipping towards transition.8 Institutionally, a two-ballot electoral system can often be helpful in
producing a successful transition, and have been helpful, especially in Africa.9 O'Donnell and
Schmitter's theory states that divisions within the authoritarian regime itself cause change.10
This model fits many Latin American transitions, but not post-Soviet ones. Contrary to their
theory of internal divisions of the regime, however, elite pacts, or agreements between elite
leaders, also might facilitate successful transition, as has been the case in Africa.11 There is,
however, little support for the second theory outside of that continent.12 Additional political
factors for regime transition include international engagement and external pressure, though
the extent to which those are relevant varies widely by geography and by case.13 Finally, Bratton
and van de Walle, as well as McAdam et al., have pointed to popular mobilization and
contentious collective action as a cause of democratic transition.1I14 Bratton and van de Walle
note that collective action often played a critical role in pushing African authoritarian rulers to
initiate liberalization.15 If this trend holds in Iran, it is possible that we could see these protests
play an important role there as well. Work by McAdam et al. makes the stronger claim that
democratization and contentious collective action are inseparable. In fact, McAdam et al. argue
further that " democratization, then, never happened without contention;" however, they also
note that there are " only certain cases in which contention causes democratization."16 Popular

5 Ibid.
6 Ibid.

7 Geddes 1999.
8 Van de Walle 2006.
9 Ibid.
10 O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986.
11 Geddes 1999.
12 Ibid.
13 Bunce and Wolchik 2010.
14 Beissinger 2002, 14.

15 Bratton and van de Walle 1997.
16 McAdam et al. 2008, 269, 272.
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mobilization and contentious collective action did not cause transitions in Latin America; they
did, however, force elites to begin negotiations in Eastern EuropeY
There are also social-cultural factors that might tip the scales in favor of democracy,
including a history of active popular struggle for democratic rule, a homogeneous population,
and high literacy rates.18 McFaul also points towards movement towards modernization and
high urbanization as explanatory factors for transition. This category, however, has less
literature devoted to it. Recent work is being done on the impact of social media and the
Internet in relation to the socio-cultural organization of protest movements, but much still
remains unanswered about how new media " digital democracy" contributes to pushes for
democracy across the world. It is certainly clear that the increased prevalence of Facebook,
Twitter and other Internet sites are changing the way people communicate, and that has some
sort of impact on democratic transitions.
The geographic considerations for regime transition focus mostly on having a set of
clearly defined state borders and a clear sense of who is a part of the state.19 McFaul also
indicates the importance of having few border contentions. This category essentially establishes
that countries that are involved in external conflict or border disputes are less likely to
transition, as transitions do not occur as commonly during wartime. This is a well-studied
factor, but Iran does not have border disputes that would make this an issue.
In addition to these bodies of literature surrounding specific groups of factors, Geddes
notes that "it seems as though there should be a parsimonious and compelling explanation of
the transitions, but the explanations proposed thus far have been confusingly complicated,
careless about basic methodological details, often more useful as description than explanation,
and surprisingly inconsistent with each other."20 Most of the generalizations that have been
proposed have failed either to accommodate the details of the real-world variation or to explain
that variation. To combat this, many attempts have been made to classify types of authoritarian
regimes in order to better understand them and generalize based on those types. There are
current theories and models that seek to separate these types of regimes, most popularly
Geddes' division of authoritarian regimes into personalistic, militaristic, or single-party regimes,
and Howard and Roessler's tree typology categorizing countries using the relative freedom of
their elections.21 Geddes notes that military regimes are those where a group of officers decide
who will rule and exercise some influence on policy, while single-party regimes' access to
political office and control over policy are dominated by one party. In personalist regimes,
access to office and the fruits of office depend solely and completely on the discretion of an
individual leader.22 Iran's constitution, however, enshrines both guardianship and popular rule
in the constitution, and puts far more power in the hands of the people and individuals other
17 Bratton and van de Walle 1997; Ulfelder 2005; McAdam et al. 2008.
18 McFaul 2005.
1 9 Rustow 1970.
20 Geddes 1999, 117.

21 Howard and Roessler 2006.
22 Geddes 1999.
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than the Supreme Leader than a traditional personalist regime.23 It also has no political party
system that would give rise to a single-party regime, and the Supreme Leader is not a military
general, nor did his power come about because of a military coup.
Howard and Roessler, on the other hand, divide regimes into five classifications: closed
authoritarian, hegemonic authoritarian, competitive authoritarian, electoral democracies, and
liberal democracies. These categories are defined by freedom of elections and status of civil
liberties and move from most restrictive, closed authoritarian, to most free, liberal democracy.
Howard and Roessler differentiate competitive authoritarian regimes from hegemonic
authoritarian systems by identifying cases where the winning party or candidate received over
70% of the popular vote. Ahmadinejad won the 2009 election with 63%,24 which would put
Iran in the competitive authoritarian camp. However, there were wide allegations of fraud in
this election, in addition to the candidate vetting system, which calls into question how truly
"competitive" these elections are. It seems, then, as if it is unfair to label these elections as
competitive. As it has been shown, Iran evades both of these classification systems, and, even
when forced, appears as a hybrid or seems to be caught between two categories. Existing
classification schemes concerning regime type and factors for regime transition do not
encompass the unique situation in Iran. I thus reject these classifications and approach Iran as a
case study on its own.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND FOR IRAN'S 2009 ELECTION
The presidential election of 2009 cannot be considered as a harbinger of reform or
revolution without understanding the underlying dynamics of the election. This election was
pitched by the Western media as a powerful impetus for the democratic movement. For context,
we must take a historical perspective. Iranian elections have always been a struggle between
reformists and conservatives. Reformists, also called soft-liners, "seek more expansive powers
for republican institutions," while conservatives, or hard-liners, "support the absolutist power
of the Supreme Leader and related unaccountable institution. "2s In 1997, Iran saw the election of
its first "reformist" president, Mohammad Khatami. In 2000 it saw a reformist victory in the
Majles (also called the National Assembly, or Islamic Consultative Assembly), including the
solidification of the 2nd of Khordad Coalition, a coalition of 18 reformist groups that was formed
after Khatami's 1997 win.26 In 2001, Iran saw Khatami's reelection. However, 2004 saw
widespread allegations of fraud in the parliamentary elections.27 In 2005, Mahmoud
Ahmadinejad, a "true believer in the antidemocratic and anti-liberal dictates of the late
Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini" and hard-line conservative, was elected. Ahmadinejad

23

Tez�iir 2008.

24 Ansari 2009.
25 Posusney and Angrist 2005, 65.

26 Boroumand and Boroumand 2000.
27 McFau1 2005.
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represents the most conservative of the factions in Iran gaining power.28 The 2008 parliamentary
elections were marred by the mass disqualification of reformist candidates.29 With this electoral
history, Iran approached the 2009 elections.
Four candidates for the presidency were cleared to run in 2009 by the Guardian Council.
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, the sitting president, was backed by the Supreme Leader, Grand
Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. Mohsen Rezaei, also a conservative, was deemed the pragmatic and
technocratic successor of former president Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani. Mehdi Karroubi, a long
time politician and reformist cleric, campaigned on nationalization of the oil industry. Mir
Hossein Mousavi, another leader in the reformist camp, was designated as the ideological
successor to Mohammad Khatami. These candidates illustrate the main elite cleavages that
exist in Iran.3o One side champions a fundamentalist, confrontational approach to domestic as
well as international problems. Internally, the fundamentalist group works to suppress all
dissidents, even among its own allies, and quell any voice of moderation. Internationally, it
pushes an aggressive and uncompromising program. In contrast, the opposite camp, the
reformists, favor an open society at home, one that is able to move on a democratic path, albeit
step-by-step, while pursuing a rational and clear diplomatic approach to Iran's international
problems. Even with these broad groupings, however, four candidates surfaced in the election.
While they can be grouped into reformists and conservatives, stark ideological differences
existed between each individual candidate, even those from the same side of the ideological
divide.
Mousavi was and is the most publicized of the reformist candidates. However, he was
and is not the most "reformist." He marketed himself as a "religious intellectual" dedicated to
lawfulness and advancement of Iran, both economically and socially. His campaign materials
expressed that his platform consisted in "coming to make an Iran far from lies, superstition, and
backwardness."31 His revolutionary credentials allowed him to pass through the candidate
vetting system of the Guardian Council, and his status as a sayyid, or direct descendant from the
Prophet Mohammad (PBUH), solidified his religious credentials. Once he passed through, he
stated that he would push for the same policies that Khatami had espoused: equality of the
sexes, freedom of speech and other civil liberties, and the resumption of relations with the West,
provided that Iran would not suffer great costs because of it. His base was made of the urban
middle class, professional elites, women, and young voters.32 They were well educated, and
many of them had relatives that have left Iran in favor of economic or academic opportunities
elsewhere. Many groups printed individual campaign literature supporting Mousavi,33
28 Ibid.
29 Tez<;tir 2008.
30 Milani 2009.
31 SeUad-e Javanan-e Hamieh Khatami 2009.
32 Esfandiari et al. 2009.
33 During my visit to Iran from May 2009-July 2009, I personally collected campaign literature from all
four candidates. The references to campaign materials regard materials that were collected and translated
between May 30, 2009 and June 12, 2009. Please see contact author for images and translations of
campaign materials.
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including workers groups, student and youth groups, and martyr groupS.34 In addition, he had
the support of filmmakers, actors and actresses, athletes, and a group of reformist-leaning
clerics.35 His popularity was partly due to the fact that he was not a cleric, and partly the fact
that he, as the most prominent reformist, was not Ahmadinejad.
In a manner unusual for an Iranian election, Mousavi's wife was also quite prominent
during the campaign, and has remained prominent since. She appeared often on his campaign
literature, and has appeared with Mousavi and spoken in public as well. She has been described
as a "Michelle Obama-like figure" and has her own political credentials, including a PhD in
Political Science from one of Tehran's premier universities, as well as a chancellorship at the
premier women's university in Tehran.36 She is an ardent supporter of women's rights, though
also has revolutionary Islamic credentials. Her influence in this structure is unclear; however, it
is clear that her prominence in this election gave the Mousavi campaign credence in his
women's policy as well as strengthened his support among women.
Karroubi, the other reformist, had a slightly different platform and base. His policies
were and remain the most reformist, even more so than Mousavi. His advisers are among the
country's most respected reformist technocrats, and he ran on a specific program of reforms
targeted at specific electoral groups such as women, students and non-Persian minorities.37
Along with policies supporting fiscal responsibility and strengthening the rule of law, Karroubi
promised that, if elected, "he would sign Iran up to international protocols on women's rights,
and would end patrols by the country's religious police, who enforce Islamic dress codes for
women."38 Karroubi has the support of both the largest student group and the largest group of
university graduates who came out of that activist student group,39
Another candidate, Rezaei, represented the military faction within the right-wing
movement, and was the face of the pragmatic conservative movement that included former
President Rafsanjani for this election. Rezaei's agenda included criticism for Ahmadinejad's
inflammatory rhetoric and "games of chicken" in the international sphere. He mentioned
reducing military service from two years to one, and also promised to incorporate more ethnic
minorities in his cabinet. His economic agenda revolved around better management of oil
revenues and more robust economic planning. He also wanted to develop Iran by easing
relations with the West and being less confrontational. Rezaei had largely technocratic support,
and as a technocrat himself, ran as the "architect of the Iranian economy."40 His support base in
the election, which continues even after the fact, was made of conservatives who were
dissatisfied with Ahmadinejad's carelessness in politics and economics, yet were still staunch
34The martyr community in Iran holds a significant amount of clout in politics. The government entitles
veterans, martyrs, and their families to special benefits and recognition. Their support is "revolutionary
support" and the individual who can capture this support has important social capital.
35 Summary Testimony of Actors/ Artists, Athletes, Religious Scholars, and Families of Martyrs 2009.
36 Esfandiari et al. 2009.
37 Esfandiari et al. 2009.
38 Laban-Mattei 2009.
39 Esfandiari et al. 2009.
40 Rezaei Campaign Flyer 2009.
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supporters of the regime and individuals within it. Their issue was more with Ahmadinejad
himself and less with the status quo.
Among all of the 2009 candidates, Ahmadinejad's platform was (and remains) best
known. He ran largely on his agenda and his populist past record. Ahmadinejad supports very
seclusionist policies, and advocates for programs that have alienated Iran in the international
sphere, including the nuclear program. He is best noted for his " clampdown on all forms of
dissent - on press, on women, on bloggers, on dual nationals--and for strengthening the role of
the revolutionary guards and the revolutionary guard culture that has developed with the
former commanders and former members."41 Allegations abound that Ahmadinejad used state
funds for travel, and for "bussing in supporters from one district to another so he looks like he
has big crowds at many events."42 Local papers also reported during the run-up to the election
that his government handed out " gold coins, cash and 400,000 tons of potatoes to rally
support."43 Allegations of corruption abound even beyond this. For example, during the
campaigning period, Mousavi campaign materials raised questions for Ahmadinejad regarding
where $207 billion in oil revenues went.44
Ahmadinejad's base in the election was drawn from the lower class, both in rural areas
and among the urban poor. His populist policies of handouts to individuals either in the form
of money, loans, or food, have endeared him to these classes. These families are often also the
families of martyrs or have members in the Basij, the paramilitary force that was responsible for
some of the violent clashes during the protests. Their support is crucial to the maintenance of
the existing power structure, as control of the paramilitary force is paramount for suppressing
dissidents in the streets.45
However, the matters at stake in this election should not be confused. None of the
candidates spoke of any serious overhaul of the Islamic system. They were, and are, all fully
committed to the idea of the Islamic republic. A nuanced examination suggests that the
concepts of "Islamic-ness" and "republican-ness" were actually in question. The broad-based
ideological coalitions that exist in Iran continue to follow the patterns suggested by this election.
They are thus split between the reformist and conservative camps. However, there remains no
complete unification within these movements. Additionally, is important to note that, strictly
speaking, there are not organized political parties in Iran that parallel those that exist in other
countries. The II parties" that exist are largely ideological coalitions around political figures, and
thus the nature of the political system is largely centered on individual players within the
system. Several conservative groups have come together under two separate coalitions, which
are called the United Front of Principlists and the Broad and Popular Coalition of Principlists.46
Some conservative groups remain outside either coalition. Similarly, several reformist groups,
41 Esfandiari et a1. 2009.
42 Ibid.
43 Ibid.
44 Settad-e Javanan-e Hamieh Khatami 2009.
45 Esfandiari et al. 2009.
46 CIA World Factbook 2010
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such as the Islamic Iran Participation Front (also known as Mosharekat) and the Mojahideen of
the Islamic Revolution came together as a reformist coalition in advance of the 2008 Majles
elections.47 Another influential reformist group is the National Trust Party, of which both
Mousavi and Karroubi are members, though the group supported Mousavi in 2009.48 These
facts present Iran against an unusual backdrop as compared to other cases examined in the
literature about regime transition. From this point, I move to the analytical portion of this study,
in which I examine the presence of factors for regime transition within the Iranian case, and
note the circumstances of their failure to produce typical regime transition.
In our consideration of the political climate, it is important to also note the history of
Ayatollah Ali Khamenei's reign in Iran. Khamenei rose to power after the death of Ayatollah
Ruhollah Khomeini. His religious credentials have been questioned--when Ayatollah Khamenei
took the seat of Supreme Leader, the constitution was amended to allow the post to be held by a
lower-ranking theologian, as he did not have the religious rank of Khomeini.49 He has often
been at odds with high-ranking clerics regarding his interpretations of Islam and his place as
Supreme Leader is more fragile than he would admit. In the months preceding the 2009
elections, he had clashed individually with Khatami, Mousavi, Rafsanjani, Larijani, and even
Ahmadinejad. It is his precarious position that set the stage for the 2009 election.
IRANIAN REGIME CHANGE ANALYSIS: FACTORS FOR TRANSITION
METHODS
Because of the unique nature of the Iranian case, a case-study approach examining the
specific factors for transition in the aftermath of the 2009 elections serves as the only theoretical
approach that allows the depth required to fully understand Iran in the light of the literature.
Iran has not, to this date, had a truly successful democratic transition. Yet, as McFaul et al. note,
a II serious analysis of the external influences on internal change cannot focus only on cases of
democratic development, but must also look at instances of regime change when the outcome
was not democracy."5o Comparative studies in general rarely use Iran because of its
uniqueness, and this trend holds true in group case studies regarding democratic transition. I
have thus selected Iran on its own for two reasons: first, because the fragile nature of the politics
of the region suggest that this topic requires inquiry that can only be comprehensively achieved
through a case study, and secondly, because examining factors for a democratic transition is
just as necessary where they did not succeed as where they did. Because I am assessing a certain
point in time as the II tipping point" for democratic transition, all of the data that will be used to
assess the aforementioned economic, political, and social factors for democratic transition is
from three months prior to three months after the 2009 election.

47 Ibid.
48 Ibid.
49 British Broadcasting Company 2010.
50 Mc Faul et al. 2008, 8 .
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ECONOMIC FACTORS FOR TRANSITION IN IRAN

Iran faces a number of significant economic challenges. Internal challenges include: the
large role of oil export revenues in financing government spending and vulnerability to oil price
fluctuations, dependence on gasoline imports to meet domestic energy needs, high inflation,
unemployment and poverty levels, reported domestic economic mismanagement, and
widespread economic inefficiency.51 The central role of oil exports makes the economy quite
volatile and vulnerable to changes in oil price. For example, the price of oil dropped 38 %
between 2008 and 2009, leaving Iran with budgetary problems, and giving credence to the
rentier state theory. This theory states that in countries that are largely dependent on the export
of one commodity, the revenues from that commodity are used to co-opt groups through
patronage or placate large swaths of society with public aid.52 Political instability can be
expected when there is a downturn in commodity revenue and the state no longer can use that
revenue. In the cases of oil crises in the 1970s, populations that were plunged into poverty
blamed their governments and gradually took the risk of demanding change.53 It would not
have been unlikely, then, for a similar effect to have taken place with the drop in oil prices in
2009.
On June 9, 2009, in the days preceding the election, an inflation rate of 23.6% was
released by the Central Bank of Iran. Unemployment figures had skyrocketed from 10.5% in
2005 to 17% in 2009.54 Additionally, the International Monetary fund had projected that Iran's
economy would expand less than it had in previous years, up by only 3.2% in 2009, which is
down from 4.5% in 2008 and nearly 8 % in 2007.55 Real GDP growth was estimated by the IMF to
have decelerated to 2-2.5% in 2008-09, from almost 7% in 2007-08.56
These economic problems spread dislike of Ahmadinejad to the lower and middle
classes as well. "Dismissing opposition to Ahmadinejad as a north Tehran phenomenon, limited
only to affluent urban areas, is insulting to the millions of middle-class Iranians who have
suffered the most under his tenure."57 Affluent Iranians, much like affluent individuals
anywhere, are not affected as sharply by high inflation and unemployment. It is people of
modest or low income who feel the pinch when an economy begins to falter and slides into
stagnation. These are the people who end up in the streets protesting, which will be discussed
in the next section.
Not only do economic downturns cause public discontent, but they can also cause elite
fragmentation over policy. Lisa Anderson points out that " divisions between 'hardliners' and
'softliners' are not necessarily linked directly to differences over economic policy" . However,
"even where economic crisis are not the source of factional conflicts . . . they are likely to
51 Ilias 2010.
52 Anderson 1999.
53 Geddes 1999.
54 New York Times 2009.
55 International Monetary Fund 2010.
56 Ibid.
57 Moaveni 2009.
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exacerbate them."58 This points to an important interplay between factors, further confusing the
possibility of assigning causality. Most significantly, though, economic downturns generally
spell trouble for the ruling government.
These factors present the necessary economic platform for democratic transition: the
state of the economy, especially inflation and unemployment, had led to widespread discontent.
As Anderson notes, "for incumbents, deteriorating economic performance cuts across social
strata and affects a wide swath of society."59 The abysmal economic conditions in Iran, then, are
widespread and far-reaching, therefore presenting us with the requisite platform to provoke a
democratic transition. Yet in 2009 even with these economic factors in mind, Iran failed to
achieve a democratic transition. Continued evaluation of possible triggers and indicators thus
becomes necessary, and my analysis hence moves to the examination of political factors.
POLITICAL FACTORS FOR TRANSITION IN IRAN
As a framework for this political discussion, van de Walle noted several suggestive
patterns in his analysis of African cases of transition. He showed that opposition cohesion is
positively correlated with opposition electoral victory, though it "is not a cause of transition but
rather a consequence of a growing probability of transition due to a number of interrelated
factors."6o This study, therefore, focuses on opposition cohesion as a predictive indicator for
transition. The Iranian opposition is loosely consolidated as what is known as the "Green
Movement" or the "Green Wave." It has three symbolic leaders: Former President Mohammad
Khatami, Former Prime Minister Mir Hossein Mousavi, and the sixth Speaker of the Parliament
(Majles) Mehdi Karroubi. The opposition movement began with the election of Mohammad
Khatami in 1997 and the development of the 2nd of Khordad Coalition. This coalition is a very
loose association of factions that includes moderate right and democratic-Islamist groups. In the
2009 election, the coalition had come together around former Prime Minister Mir Hossein
Mousavi. He was deemed a "smart move to garner votes from the anti-Ahmadinejad elements
within the Islamic right while at the same time inoculating the reformist movement against
accusations to be essentially counterrevolutionary."61 This rejuvenated the coalition, which had
suffered defeat in 2005 when Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was first elected president. It appeared as
though the opposition was coming together. Even after the elections, these candidates both filed
petitions protesting the election results, citing similar ballot inconsistencies. They made several
public appearances together, and pushed for an investigation into the election.
Secondly, van de Walle notes that the majority of the cases examined that had successful
electoral transitions took place in two-round systems (TRS). This means that in a case with TRS,
we might be more likely to find a transition. A two- round system, as described by the ACE
Electoral Knowledge Network, works in the following manner: The first round is conducted in
58 Anderson 1999, 96.
59 Ibid., 97.
60 Van de Walle 2006, 78.
61 Posch 2009, 1 .
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the same way as a single-round plurality/majority election. In the most common form of TRS,
this is conducted using FPTP. A candidate or party that receives a specified proportion,
normally an absolute majority of valid votes, is elected outright, with no need for a second
ballot. If no candidate or party receives an absolute majority, then a second round of voting is
held and the winner of this round is declared elected. Van de Walle notes that two-round
systems "facilitate opposition unity."62 Iran uses this system, and the 2005 election was pushed
to the second round. Had the election of 2009 been pushed to a runoff between Mousavi and
Ahmadinejad, it is not unreasonable to suppose that Karroubi's followers would have thrown
their support behind Mousavi, as both of them come from same group and both draw support
from within the 2nd of Khordad Front. The election, however, rife with allegations of fraud, did
not go to a second round. In my travels, I heard it widely theorized that the fraudulence in the
election was perpetrated for just this reason.
As suggested by varied authors throughout the literature, no transition is embarked on
without some kind of internal division within the regime itself."63 This happens most often in
cases of single-party electoral hegemonies. Since 2005, Iran has become more like one of these
electoral hegemonies, mostly because of the alleged fraud of 2009. If we take Iran as one of these
hegemonies, we can examine the role of the fragmentation of the elite in Iran. Currently, there
are four main leaders within the regime in Iran: Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei,
President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, Parliament Speaker Ali Larijani and Expediency Council
chair Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani.
During Ahmadinejad's first term as president, a split developed within the
conservatives. The split places pragmatic conservatives, led by Ayatollah Ali Akbar Hashemi
Rafsanjani, against an emergent ultra-conservative faction led by Ahmadinejad. This division
has only become more inflamed in the final years of Ahmadinejad's last term and has been
exceptionally vicious since the June presidential vote.64 Ayatollah Khamenei had tried to
remain above the factional politics of Iran. He has generally preferred to pit various blocs
against one another to perpetuate his own top position in the Iranian political system. The
election fallout from 2009 was so intense because of the popular discontent, however, that
Khamenei was faced with the choice of intervention or the potential loss of his position. The
Supreme Leader, in a risky but calculated move, came out in support of Ahmadinejad and the
hard-liners, angering parts of the conservative ideological groUp.65 This backing prompted
Rafsanjani and his pragmatic and technocratic conservative followers to come out against the
Supreme Leader and instead ally with Mousavi's reformists.66 Khamenei's outright support of
Ahmadinejad exacerbated this and other divisions.
The last player in this complex milieu is Iran's current speaker of parliament, Ali
Larijani, whose family now controls two of the three branches of the Iranian government - Ali
62 Van de Walle 2006, 88.
63 O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986, 19.

64 Strategic Forecasting (STRATFOR) Intelligence 2009.

65 STRATFOR 2009.

66 Ibid.
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controls the legislature while his brother, Sadegh, heads the judiciary. Ali Larijani has emerged
publicly in opposition to Ahmadinejad, often finding himself at odds with Ahmadinejad's
inflammatory rhetoric. He was also one of the few regime officials to publicly warn that many
Iranians questioned Ahmadinejad's victory in the 2009 presidential election.67 The Larijani
Ahmadinejad split exemplifies the ideological rift in the conservative camp as well, framing
pragmatists against fundamentalists over Ahmadinejad's behavior.
Besides the split between political leaders, there has also been a split between the
leading clerics in Iran. Following the election of 2009, many of the most powerful ayatollahs,
including Hossein Ali Montazeri, Yousuf Sane'i, Jalaluddin Taheri, and Hossein Mousavi
Tabrizi, "openly defied Khamenei, dismissed the election, and either called for a fresh vote or
else implied that even that would no longer be sufficient."68 In the aftermath of the election,
Khamenei began to have trouble with many senior clerics in the holy city and seat of Shia Islam,
Qom. The Supreme Leader has also been publicly denounced by Grand Ayatollahs Bayat
Zanjani and Vahid Khorasani, who refused to meet him during his 10-day visit to Qom.69 There
was also discontent from Grand Ayatollah Safi Golpayegani, Makarem Shirazi, and Sobhani
over the handling by Khamenei's office of the 10-day show in Qom, where "private" meetings
turned into photo opportunities and displays of the Supreme Leader's authority.7o The level of
discontent from such a large number of these clergymen hints at a certain weakness for
Khamenei. He must have the support of these individuals in order to maintain his power, and
divides within these religious leaders could also hint at trouble lurking beneath the surface.
These ayatollahs have significant clout with the general population, many of whom look
to the ayatollahs for guidance in life as well as in religious matters. The most politically
significant intra-clerical rift is between Rafsanjani and Khamenei. Rafsanjani has repeatedly
challenged decisions by Khamenei, and Khamenei has responded threateningly to him. This
split has extended through the senior clerics, as they have taken either the side of Rafsanjani or
Khamenei. Three more Grand Ayatollahs -Javadi Amoli, Shobeiri Zanjani, and Makarem
Shirazi -have "politely" criticised Khamenei for not challenging Ahmadinejad's non-deferential
behavior toward Rafsanjani. Grand Ayatollah Mousavi Ardebili did not visit the Supreme
Leader on the latest trips to Qom either, because of how Rafsanjani has been treated by
Khamenei.71 It is not only the split in the political elite that is present in Iran, but also in the
religious elite. Even with splits in both of these elite groups, we are still at a loss for a reason
why transition did not occur.
Geddes (1999) notes that little evidence was found to support the claim that pacts
increase the likelihood of democracy. They may have had that effect in isolated cases, and
Geddes notes that "we cannot rule out the possibility that the likelihood of both pacts and stable
democracy is increased by the existence of well established, coherent parties" that can make and
67 Wright 2009.
68 Milani 2009, 12.
6 9 Bozorgmehr 2010.
70 Ibid.
71 Ibid.
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adhere to pacts.72 Because Iran does not have an established party structure, a discussion of
pacts in reference to parties is not particularly relevant, and is not a transition factor that we can
consider in this case.
International engagement and external pressure are also factors that are of consequence
to democratic transition. Levitsky and Way posit a theory of leverage and linkage to explain the
effectiveness of international intervention in democratic transition. International actors exert
leverage in different ways, including political conditionality and punitive sanctions, diplomatic
pressure, and military intervention. Leverage raises the cost of repression, electoral fraud, and
other government abuses. However, Western leverage over electoral authoritarian regimes is
"rarely sufficient to convince them to democratize."73 According to Levitsky and Way, leverage
is "most effective when combined with extensive linkage to the West."74
The United Nations issued a non-binding resolution condemning the post-election
protests and the crackdown on protesters. In addition to the UN, the United States also passed
resolutions condemning Iranian actions regarding the election. On June 19, 2009, ABC News
reported that President Obama warned Iran that " the world was watching." Major European
politicians, including Gordon Brown, Nicolas Sarkozy, and Angela Merkel also issued
statements condemning the actions.75 The UN General Assembly passed Resolution
A/ C.3/ 64/L.37 on October 29, 2009, which condemned the government response to the
protests. This resolution, which passed with 74 yes, 59 abstain, and 48 no votes, contained an
explicit reference to the 2009 elections, in that it expressed "particular concern at the response of
the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran following the Presidential election of 12 June
2009 and the concurrent rise in human rights violations."76 The leverage factor, then, is present.
The West, though Iran would fain admit it, does have linkages in the case of Iran, but
not by the usual methods of trade, foreign investment, or mutual involvement in international
organizations. Iran has a very large diaspora community in many European countries as well
as the United States. The Iranian diaspora population, based on a compilation of the most recent
national censuses from major receiving countries (excluding Turkey), is estimated in the range
of two to four million, with an estimated 691,000 to 1.2 million in the United States alone.77 This
community was involved in the protests in the United States, the United Kingdom, as well as
other European countries, and many send sizeable remittances back to Iran.78 Additionally, the
expatriate community runs radio broadcasts, internet sites, and satellite channels that are
routed into the country both legally and illegally, and the BBC now supports a Persian service.
Because the leverage and linkage between Iran and the West is unusual, it is difficult to say
whether it can be thought of as extensive enough to meet Levitsky and Way's requirements.
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What is certain, however, is that the international community was indeed "watching" during
these protests. While no military action was undertaken, action was taken through diplomatic
channels. This action, however, did not create enough momentum for a democratic transition.
The most internationally prominent feature of this discussion is the protests that
occurred after the June 2009 elections in Iran. Protests are examples of contentious collective
action, which is defined as collective events which represent "potentially subversive acts that
challenge normalized practices, modes of causation, or systems of authority. The case of Iran
can be approached with this notion of protests. There are three types of contentious collective
action: riots, general strikes, and anti-government demonstrations.79 Of these three, two
occurred in Iran. Most of what occurred in the two months following the 2009 presidential
elections were anti-government demonstrations, which are " any peaceful public gathering of at
least 100 people for the primary purpose of displaying or voicing their opposition to
government policies or authority, excluding demonstrations of a distinctly anti-foreign
nature."80 Some of these demonstrations, however, degenerated into riots, which are described
by Ulfelder as "any violent demonstration or clash of more than 100 citizens involving the use
of physical force."81
June 12, 2009 saw thousands of protesters pour into the streets, later clashing with
police. On June 15, seven people were killed during a march by Mousavi supporters in Tehran,
state media said, and protests broke out in other cities. Tens of thousands of pro-Mousavi
demonstrators marched in northern Tehran in June 16. June 20 saw state television report that
450 people were detained during clashes in Tehran in which 10 people were killed. These
actions certainly qualify as contentious collective action under Ulfelder's typology. The
question of the political logic behind these protests remains unanswered. The reasons for
individuals flooding the streets are numerous, though analysts have been unable to completely
explain the mass riots. They were clearly expressions of pent-up frustration and anger at the
regime. The extent to which they were instrumentalized by the opposition, however, remains to
be seen, though many marched in green clothing, carrying pictures of Mousavi. At this point, it
does not appear that the protests were effectively used to channel political motives past the
months after the election. These protests, however, did not trigger democratic transition.
We have now examined the economic and political considerations for democratic
transition and found them all met. There is still the problem that all factors point to transition.
However, there has been no regime change. With the economic and political factors in mind it is
now necessary to examine social-cultural factors.

79 Ulfelder 2005.
80 Ulfelder 2005, 320.
81 Ibid.
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There are several social-cultural factors that might tip the scales in favor of democracy,
including a history of active struggle for democratic rule, a homogeneous population, and high
literacy rates, as well as modernization and high urbanization.82 Iran has a hundred-year history
of active struggle for democratic rule. The norms, traditions, and organizations characteristic of
a democratic civil society existed in various forms for most of the twentieth century, and they
endure to this day. Most recent in Iran's collective memory is the Islamic Revolution of 1979.
This event, as well as the Constitutional Revolution of 1905-11 (which was caused by
dissatisfaction with economic stagnation, influence of Western power, results of the Russo
Japanese War of 1904-05, and the Russian Revolution of 1905), in addition to the popularly
supported 1953 coup by Mohammad Mossadegh (that prompted the nationalization of the oil in
the face of Reza Shah's Western-friendly oil policies), are both examples of the history of
popular expression of discontent with the government.83
Iran also has a relatively homogeneous population and has maintained a unique
national identity even through its long history of invasion and occupation. Though the
dominant ethnic group, the Persians, make up only 51 % of the total population, literary and
artistic traditions have served to unite the populace behind an Iranian identity.84 Additionally,
most of these minorities, including the 24% Azeri Turks, are integrated into Iranian society,
participate in politics, and identify with the Iranian nation.85 For example, of candidates
running in this past election, Mousavi is an ethnic Turk, and Karroubi is an ethnic Lor,
however, neither of them faced problems regarding their ethnicity in the elections or in their
moves toward power.
If we use Lipset's factors of higher levels of education and urbanization and more
sophisticated and varied means of communication,86 it is apparent that Iran is also moving
towards modernization. In Iran, 36% of the popUlation of tertiary age is in tertiary education
(post-high school education program), up from just 18% in 2002.87 The overall literacy rate is
77%, and that rate is even higher, 96.6%, among youth aged 15-24. Iran also scores high on
many other proxies for measuring modernization, including level of urbanization and density
of communications connectivity. 68 % of total population lives in urban areas, and the current
rate of change in urbanization is 2.1 % .88 Additionally, Iran is incredibly connected in terms of
communications density. It ranks seventeenth in the world in number of internet users, twelfth
in number of land lines in use, and twenty seventh in number of mobile phone users.89 High
levels of internet use coupled with the extensive use of social-networking sites such as Facebook
82 McFaul 2005.
83 Behnam 1986.
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and Twitter, as well as YouTube and large e-mail listservs, indicate that Iran is on the forefront
of cornrnunication.90 After examination of socio-cultural factors in addition to all other varieties,
it seems that Iranian regime change should have occurred in keeping with the political science
literature. We are still at a loss for the explanation of why Iran did not experience a democratic
transition in 2009. There must be another factor.
ANOTHER FACTOR?
I posit that Iran has an additional factor that must be taken into account when
considering democratic transition: its institutional structure. The government of Iran consists of
a three branch scheme, but with certain additions. As mentioned previously, there is a multi
part leadership in the executive, with the Supreme Leader as head of state and the President as
head of government. The executive branch also includes the Assembly of Experts, Expediency
Council, and Council of Guardians.91 Iran has a unicameral legislature, the 290-member Majles.
The judicial branch consists of the Supreme Judiciary.
The interaction of the political structure and the elite cleavage structure is of greatest
interest in this study, as it is the elite structure that largely leads the ideological factions due to
the personalistic nature of Iranian politics. The aftermath of the 2009 elections saw important
implications in this structure. I argue that it is this structure that reinforces the fractionalization
of the elites, and that this fractionalization prevents a realization of the possibilities in coalition
organization.
Within this structure, there are certain elected bodies and certain unelected bodies. The
most notable feature of the system is that is that the "Supreme Leader either directly or
indirectly controls almost every aspect of governrnent."92 Of all of the bodies in the executive,
the Council of Ministers, Assembly of Experts, Expediency Council, and Council of Guardians,
the only one completely elected by the people is the Assembly of Experts. It is important to
note, however, that all candidates for all elected officials must first be vetted by the Guardian
Council, which is half appointed by the Supreme Leader and half nominated by the judiciary
and confirmed by the parliament. The institutional structure is intentionally designed to
dissipate power and consolidate power simultaneously. It is clear that the Supreme Leader has
considerable power; it remains that the factions in Iran are still quite powerful throughout all of
these institutions. How is this possible, and what does this mean for Iran's prospects for
democratic transition?
The Iranian system of government is confusing and convoluted. Figure 1 demonstrates
this confusing yet ultimately somewhat ingenious structure. The Supreme Leader is the most
important official in Iran, but seeks input on policy decision from a small circle of elite advisors,
including the President. The President's influence is dwarfed by that of the Supreme Leader,
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but it is by no means negligible.93 Though the Iranian president's policymaking power is under
the direct oversight of the Supreme Leader, especially in issues of foreign policy, this is not to
say the president is powerless. As proven by Ahmadinejad, the president can be the voice and
face of the entire nation. The behavior of the president within the international community
directly affects the issues that are most important to Iranians, including issues of trade and
human rights. Furthermore, the president does actually have the weight necessary to
implement domestic economic and human rights policies as he sees fit.94 This is the kind of
power in which all of the individuals grappling for power are interested.
Figure 1 : Power-Flow of Iranian Elected and Unelected Institutions95
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The Guardian Council is key to the Supreme Leader's position, and is the most powerful
group in the government. The Council must approve all bills passed by parliament and has the
power to veto them if it considers them contrary or inconsistent with the constitution and
Islamic law. The Council is currently chaired by Ayatollah Jannati, the most conservative high
ranking cleric in Iran.96 While the Supreme Leader can change the rulings of the Council, he
does so rarely as to attempt to preserve the legitimacy of the body, preferring to instead install
like-minded individuals in the positions instead. The Council can also bar candidates from
standing in elections to parliament, the presidency and the Assembly of Experts, and thus holds
quite a bit of power, as they decide who can and cannot be in the running to gain power. They
determine the players in the game, and thus can alter the playing field as well by restricting
what role any given individual can play.
The Assembly of Experts is not a particularly active body, but it ought not be cast aside
as a do-nothing body. It meets but twice a year, and its sole purpose is to elect a Supreme
Leader, monitor his performance, and remove him if he is deemed incapable of fulfilling his
duties. There are 86 members in this body, and it is headed by Former President Rafsanjani.
93 Esfandiari et al 2009.
94 Whatley 2009.
95 BBC 2009.
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Here, we can see Rafsanjani's strategy. It is unlikely that an Assembly would ever be chosen
that would remove Khamenei, because the Guardian Council approves who can and cannot run
for Assembly seats. Rafsanjani has been president once, but has tried running for president
since then and reached the runoff election in 2005. Since his loss in 2005 to Ahmadinejad, he has
moved to pursue other venues for power. Rafsanjani is poised for when Khamenei either passes
away or for some other reason falls from power. As head of this committee, he will direct the
selection of the next Supreme Leader. Whoever is chosen will owe a great debt to Rafsanjani
and thus, Rafsanjani stands to gain very much from a change in leadership. His main goal at
present is to remain powerful - he will not endanger his political position any more than he has
to for fear of losing his game of time. This means that he will likely not throw weight behind the
reformists again while he still perceives a threat.
The Expediency Council is the Supreme Leader's advisory body. It has ultimate
adjudicating power in disputes over legislation between the parliament and the Guardian
Council. The members, who are prominent religious, social and political figures, are all
appointed by the Supreme Leader. In October 2005, the Supreme Leader gave the Expediency
Council supervisory powers over all branches of government, delegating some of his own
authority as is permitted in the constitution}7 This body is also chaired by Rafsanjani, and
again, we can see him simply waiting for his opportunity to use the political capital he has
accumulated thus far to secure even more power.
The Majles is largely a podium for addressing the public. Its powers are severely
constrained, and thus the legislation that is passed is mostly irrelevant, for legislatively-driven
change is all but impossible given the Guardian Council's oversight. The speaker of the Majles,
however, can use his place to make public statements on behalf of legislators. For example,
Larijani and Karroubi, who have both held this position, have used it to issue statements and
gain public attention. The power of this institution as a legislative body, then, is not as
important as the role it plays as a venue to establish the power of the speaker.
While none of the candidates spoke of any serious overhaul of the Islamic system, it is
clear that they saw an opportunity to grab power in the system.98 Whenever such weakness is
identified, however, it is sometimes the case that an individual will not join with others and
form pacts, but rather sojourn alone. While there is evidence that Rafsanjani has been to Qom to
speak with leading clerics on behalf of Mousavi, ultimately he is a pragmatist and a self-server.
His silence since the election /I may well reflect a desire to hedge his bets so as to protect his
influence and power over whoever remains in control."99
Karroubi has also moved away from Mousavi following the election, recently choosing
instead to pursue a more confrontational policy towards the government, thereby dashing any
hopes of a united reformist opposition.100 When Mousavi announced the creation of a new
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movement, the Path of Green Hope, Karroubi said that he would not be joining it. 101 Instead,
Karroubi is focusing his efforts on pressuring the government on the allegations of rape and
abuse of opposition supporters arrested in the post-election crackdown - an issue to which the
Iranian populace is very sensitive. His high moral ground as a cleric allows him the ability to
criticize the government on this issue, and the nature of the topic endears him to the people.
His success with this approach during the 1979 revolution might lead him to believe that such
tactics will be equally successful this time around. This move, however, further splits
Mousavi's base of support. Karroubi does not have enough power in the system to be successful
alone.
I examined earlier the coalition of the opposition, and examined how the opposition had
come together in support of Mousavi. It is because of these powerful figures that the opposition
was able to move together as it did before the election. Unfortunately, having such strongly
delineated factions within the groups hurts the ability of the opposition to maintain a coalition
with a clear and definite leader post-election. The institutional structure has allowed too many
heavy-hitters that have gained power in the institutional arena. They have created a body of
elites with citizen followers that are not content with the current system, yet refuse to
completely defer to or support one individual that could truly push the movement forward for
fear of loss of personal power. Though Mousavi is the symbolic head of the movement, the
power he would need to sustain the Green Movement is not in his hands. The institutional
structure through which he and the other powerful leaders arose parcels out just enough power
for them to have a modicum of political clout, yet still keep each one from truly realizing
enough power to convince any other faction that they ought to lead. Too many of these
individuals (and others, including Khamenei's first choice for the 2005 presidential election and
the current mayor of Tehran, Mohammad Qalibaf) do not perceive the political opportunity to
form such an alliance without severely losing personal power.
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
In the time following the June 2009 presidential election, the stage was set. All of the
factors that, in other locales, point towards or have caused democratic transitions were present.
The economy was down, growth had slowed, oil prices were down, divisions had erupted
within authoritarian regime itself, the populace was mobilized and there was contentious
collective action in the streets, the opposition moved to support Mir Hossein Mousavi as their
candidate in the election, and the international community was engaged with external pressure
from the US, UN, and European Union. Iran has a history of active struggle for democratic rule,
a homogeneous population, few border contentions, and high rates of literacy, urbanization,
and modernization. Had the elite factions been willing to choose one leader and throw all of
their power behind him, or if any of the leaders had been able to collect enough individual
power to pose a real threat, Iran would have had a tipping factor that, on top of all of the other
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indicators that marked Iran as ready for change, plus Khamenei's weakness, might have
triggered a democratic transition.
As it stood in 2009, the post-election movement lacked a real leader. The impetus for
movement was there--the symbol of movement is Mousavi, but the actors behind the scenes
have to stop forcing their way through the door all at once and let someone go first. It is not
enough for the opposition to coalesce around a symbolic figure -they must coalesce around a
real leader with enough power. This leader, however, if they are to arise out of the system, will
be tainted by the system through which they gained power. This will stunt any push for change
that might come from within the ranks of the elites. A push must then come from outside. This
leaves us with several questions for further research. Who are the players outside of the system?
Where are they? What are the extra-institutional powers that players outside of the system can
gain? And perhaps most interestingly, what will be the role of further protests in Iran?
There is no answer as of yet. The political landscape in Iran is ever-changing, and Iran
analysts have continually posited reasons for the durability of Iran's authoritarianism. Political
actors jump from seat to seat, moving from Speaker to President to Expediency Council
chairman, attempting to achieve power through as many alleys as possible, yet are continually
thwarted by the nature of the institutional structure. The institutions are designed to be
debilitating, provoking competitions between actors, thus making it exceptionally difficult to
garner enough power to exact change from within the system. As details arise about the nature
of the relationships between these elite players, further examination will be required to assess if
there is movement within the elites towards alliances, or if it appears that someone has found a
way to gain more power outside of the system. It will be difficult, if not impossible, for regime
change to come from within the system. Simply by virtue of the fact that all elites must be
vetted by the Guardian Council, there will never be actors that will be able to both gain power
and unseat the regime. The elites are tainted, and thus any change will be as a result not, as
Geddes claims, from elites and their discourse and alliance structure, but from motion outside
of the elites. An outside force must be able to gain extra-institutional power that can rival that
of the Supreme Leader, and that requires some sort of catalyst, be it a severe miscalculation or
misstep by the Supreme Leader, or his death. As is the trend that is evident in the history of
Iran, only time will telL
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REDISTRICTING EFFECT IN A NONPARTISAN WORLD:
TOWARD A THEORY OF REAPPORTIONMENT AT THE COUNTY BOARD
LEVEL OF GOVERNMENT
Amy Uden
Abstract: Electoral redistricting shapes political scientists' perceptions of partisan polarization and

incumbency. This paper examines the redistricting process at the county level of government, using the
cases of McLean and Champaign Counties, Illinois. This research analyzes the McLean County board's
voting cleavages in order to highlight considerations of nonpartisan electoral bodies. With Champaign
County as a comparison, it also uses a series of linear regression models to analyze redistricting's effects
on county incumbency and board composition. Redistricting impact proved insignificant, but the study
demonstrates correlations between county electoral composition and state-level electoral trends, and also
confirms the important influence of partisanship on redistricting and electoral outcomes.
INTRODUCTION
In February of 2007, the McLean County Board voted to take a stance regarding a legal
ban of smoking indoors in Illinois, with eleven out of nineteen members voting against a board
declaration of support for the ban. At a time when the issue was a contested topic at the state
level of government, the board members, though not capable of directly impacting the state
legislation's outcome, felt compelled to declare a position. Ideological and personal
considerations undoubtedly played into this vote, which did not split cleanly along party lines,
although the issue had partisan overtones at the state leveL Significantly, such votes often occur
on the McLean County Board, in spite of its reputation as a nonpartisan body. At other
instances in the board's history, members have chosen to take similar stances on everything
from video gaming to terrorism. For an ostensibly nonpartisan body, this behavior raises
questions of a more nuanced background story of board interaction.
County governments receive very little attention from political scientists, and have been
famously acknowledged to be the /I dark continent of political science,"l although perhaps they
deserve more attention than they generally stimulate. Political scientists often perceive county
government as insignificant because of characteristics such as local specificity and
nonpartisanship. Yet why, in a body with allegedly little partisan influence, would board
members feel the need to act in such an ideologically driven fashion? Issue positions like those
taken on the smoking ban could be harmful to board cohesion and personal interaction, and
could also risk alienating state-level legislators whose work controls county intergovernmental
constraints. Under these circumstances, the risks of the situation seem high compared to the
psychological pay-off involved. This anecdote highlights just one instance of interest within
county politics, suggesting the merit of further study in this area.
This study will examine one of the most highly contested issues in political science
within the unusual framework of a county government-that of electoral redistricting. This
research will use cases from central Illinois for an exploratory look at a largely ignored subject.

1

Gilbertson 1917.
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Reapportionment problems touch many aspects of political science, from incumbency to
partisanship. In this exploratory study, the role of partisanship in McLean County Board voting
is examined, as well as the applicability of redistricting theory to county government. A
comparison of McLean County, a body with a reputation for little partisanship, to Champaign
County, a more competitive body, as well as to other findings in the field, could provide a
springboard for further research on the role of these political issues in all levels of government.
LITERATURE REVIEW
There is little doubt that electoral redistricting is a hotly contested issue at federal, state,
and local levels of government. Incumbency advantage, district competitiveness, and partisan
competition constitute some of the concerns expressed by scholars and politicians with respect
to redistricting. For purposes of this county government research, the most directly relevant
issues are those of partisan competitiveness. Generally, scholars agree that the institutional
arrangements for redistricting do impact partisan competitiveness.2 Partisan and bipartisan
plans pursue different ends, and deal with the often-competing interests of the party
organization and individual incumbents. No definitive answers exist for these questions of seat
efficiency and polarization. While some perceive redistricting as beneficial to democratic
representativeness and responsiveness, others find that its impact is limited or diminishes over
time.3 Overall, the exhaustive redistricting literature emphasizes the importance of partisan
competition in the reapportionment process, and the redistricting process's well-studied nature
at the national and state levels far eclipses its examination within the context of counties .
Addressing the situation o f county-level redistricting also implies examining urban
rural representation, bringing nonpartisan voting effects to the forefront. Regional voting
patterns tend to be insignificant alongside partisan splits, unless they are somehow
institutionally reinforced.4 Even if a split based on non-partisan characteristics exists for a
legislative body, its impact is less likely to hold up over time without the backing of some
structural trait of the body, such as its electoral districts. At this point, McLean County's
historically limited competitiveness becomes relevant to the discussion. Partisan
competitiveness sparks interest most often when a formerly weak party becomes stronger,
which seems to be the case in McLean County at this time, as two-party competition has only
recently developed. For instance, in the case of post-war Southern realignment, as migration or
social changes caused the growth of the Republican Party, the shift was aided by congressional
redistricting, and incumbents had to adjust representation accordingly.5 Southern realignment
could provide a comparative example for the perceived strengthening of partisan
competitiveness in McLean County. This case's progression of social change and gradual

2 Mann and Cain, eds. 2005; Gelman and King 1994; Jewell 1955.
3 Cain 1985; Squire 1998; Gilligan and Matsuska 1999.
4 Robeck 1970; Broach 1972.
5 Polsby 2004; Sundquist 1983; Shafer and Johnson 2006; Basinger and Ensley 2007.
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electoral change can provide a springboard story for future research on county
reapportionment.
When measuring partisan competition, scholars look to the attitudes of both candidates
and voters within elections. 6 In state legislatures, parties both provide a default cleavage
structure and help with institutional and ideological organization.7 While that approach
examines electoral impact of partisan competitiveness, party formation and competitiveness
may apply differently at the local level where legislative indicators are not fully developed.
When applying this to county or local party context, past research often stresses both the
importance of a "trickle-up effect" of party, and points out that although variations exist in
county-level party organizations, even without a clear chain of command, local parties
undergird electoral process.8
However, little of the existing research deals with the shape and make-up of partisan
competitiveness within county government. While Beck discusses county demographics in
relation to party, even his work does not explicitly examine county governments.9 This provides
another basis for comparing the constituent make-up and partisan competitiveness of counties.
Although party organization may not be directly tied to the redistricting process in the county,
the connections between these fields of study suggest that vibrant partisan competitiveness has
significant implications in the electoral redistricting process. As more intense competitiveness
arises, the level of partisanship in redistricting will also likely rise. MacManus extends these
studies with a compilation of county make-up survey responses dealing explicitly with board
elections and partisanship. Although she notes a trend toward increased competition reported
in board elections, she also suggests at several points that the effects of term structures and
other generally influential institutional electoral arrangements have received no empirical
testing at this levepo
Intertwining these several different bodies of scholarship will add to the scholarly
conversation by linking these fields to the " dark continent." The county can provide a venue
through which to examine the variance of electoral competition and party development in a
different ideological environment. The states have often been dubbed "laboratories of
democracy" by political scientists, and by similar logic, local governments can bring
experimentation to new levels and throw structure of government into even sharper relief.11
While reviewing the scholarship on redistricting, Theodore Arrington discusses the multiplicity
of issues touched by redistricting questions, including party, race, representativeness, local
boundaries, and decision making in the face of competing criteria.12 Less weighed down in
bureaucratic and federal limitations, local governments can be uniquely situated to embrace

6 Basinger and Ensley 2007.
7 Wright and Schaffner 2002.
8 Frendreis et al. 1990; Dyck, et al. 2009; Eldersveld and Walton 2000.
9 Beck 1974.
10 MacManus 1996.
11 New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann 1932.
12 Arrington 2010.
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future redistricting questions by implementing different plans and experimenting with new
technologies. Connecting local partisan competition to redistricting politics, along with
applying these principles to the county level of government in both McLean and Champaign
counties, may provide new perspective to our knowledge of electoral redistricting and
partisanship.
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND HYPOTHESES
The use of theoretical approaches that examine incumbency and partisan advantage in
conjunction with redistricting has been supported by a wealth of empirical evidence,
particularly at the national level. Most research distinguishes between partisan, bipartisan, and
nonpartisan redistricting processes)3 County governments experience electoral
reapportionment in a similar manner to those at state and national levels of government, yet
application of redistricting theory to counties has seldom occurred. Conversely, normative
theory suggests that, particularly when we emphasize democratic representation, local
governments provide for citizen-government interaction in unique and more direct ways.
Moreover, local context can also indirectly play a significant role at high levels of government,
due to mixed influences such as perceived competition, ideological similarity, and complacency
effects. 14 In addition to partisan representation, constituent-based representation, such as
urban-rural interest splits, can play an important role at this level, though perhaps only if
institutionally reinforced in the county legislative body.ls Therefore, applying redistricting
theory to county governments has potential normative significance. The approach here will be,
to the greatest extent possible, to apply the theoretical frameworks surrounding redistricting to
the county level of government in an exploratory type of study.
Based on this foundation, redistricting will be examined through the implications of
partisan competitiveness, or lack thereof, in the county environment. McLean County is
historically a one-party Republican county, but has experienced a strong trend toward
increased two-part competition over the last generation. Historically, the political divisions in
the county were more likely to be urban-rural than Democratic-Republican. McLean County's
urban-rural divisions are also somewhat similar to the up-state versus down-state split of
Illinois at large. As the county has become more competitive, the county board's "nonpartisan"
reputation has increasingly been called into question. This does not, however, indicate that
Democratic considerations have replaced urban ones on the McLean County Board, because
party lines have not necessarily coincided cleanly with urban and rural areas thus far.
This research also examines Champaign County as a useful electoral comparison and
control. Champaign County and McLean County are similar in size and close in proximity. 16

13 Gelman and King 1994.
14 Dyck 2009.
15 Broach 1972.
16 According to the u.s. Census Bureau's 2009 estimates, Champaign County's population is 195,671, and

McLean County's population is 167,699.
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Both counties have twin-cities at their center, with influential universities, high mobility, and
parallel urban-rural divisions. The county board structures of the two also have similar features,
with relatively large elected bodies and staggered terms. Despite these similarities, Champaign
County has a reputation for being a much more partisan. An examination of the voting margins
for election to the Champaign County Board as compared to those of McLean County provides
empirical evidence supporting this claim (See Figure 1 below) . Since questions of partisanship
play so heavily into redistricting, these two cases supply a controlled comparison of the state of
partisanship within counties.

Figure 1: McLean and Champaign Counties' County Board
Average Margins of Victory, 1980-2009
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Since partisan composition of electoral districts plays such a vital role in the redistricting
process, the existence or lack of existence of partisan competitiveness in the county has key
significance. This solidifies the rationale for examining partisan competitiveness in conjunction
with electoral redistricting in McLean County and other counties. Furthermore, the increasing
population of McLean County, fueled by migration to the twin cities of Bloomington-Normal
may be intensifying two-party competition. It may also be producing higher levels of
partisanship in its elected legislative body. Empirical confirmation for these trends would assist
in applying the standard theories of redistricting to the county level of government. If this is the
case, partisanship could be expected to be the most salient in the politics of redistricting. The
hypotheses will therefore include the following:
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HI: As partisan competition in the county electorate increases, partisan decision-making in the

county board also increases.
H2: As the role of partisan competitiveness in the county board increases, standard electoral

trends accompanying redistricting will also become more evident in the county.
These hypotheses focus primarily on the existence of, or increased growth of, partisan
competitiveness. This phenomenon is not always active at the county level, but plays a strong
role in determining redistricting plans' outcomes and effects. Because of the role of
competitiveness in redistricting theory, its place in McLean County must be established. The
questions concerning redistricting theory are contingent upon this first descriptive aspect of
research concerning the nature of county representation, so only after uncovering this
relationship should the other hypothesis be pursued.

EMPIRICAL MODEL AND FINDINGS: HYPOTHESIS 1
This study uses a number of basic linear regressions to test its theoretical framework. A
very limited level of compiled data exists at the county level of government, so measures had to
be created. For the first hypothesis, the model aims to discover the impact of partisan
competitiveness in the county electorate as a whole on county board decision-making
considerations or cleavages. Board decision-making splits will be measured based on a
comparative group cohesion score, defined as the average percentage of each groups' cohesion
over the percentage of average total board cohesion.17 These cohesion scores were based on
aggregated roll call voting patterns for pairings of individual members across time. Roll call
votes are a standard measure of legislator behavior. Although increasingly less common in
recent years for the McLean County Board, roll call voting occurs at the county level for
controversial or procedurally significant votes. These votes can potentially explain members'

17 To construct these cohesion scores, individual board members' roll call voting histories were initially
established. Then, pairs of individual members were matched up to create member to member cohesion
scores for each pair of members on the board. Cohesion can be described as the number of votes together
out of the total number of votes on which both member voted. Once these scores were compiled, group
averages were calculated, i.e. Republicans voting with Republicans, Democrats voting with Democrats,
and so on. Again, because some board members did not vote in every roll call, either due to absence from
meeting, abstention, appointment to the board mid-year, or (in the case of the chair) procedure, the
cohesion scores for each pair of members come from the percentage of votes " together" out of votes in
which both members voted. Unanimous votes always remain within the set, because although they
elevate the scores slightly, members did have opportunity to vote non-unanimously and chose not to do
so. In the case of some members who voted only on one or two votes in the course of the year, their scores
were outliers that skewed the average. Accordingly, if an individual member votes on less than one third
of the roll call votes, their percentages do not make up a part of the board average scores. One third of the
votes functioned as the threshold because it minimized the number of cases that would be removed while
still accounting for the problem of outliers. However, in order not to haphazardly remove nuance from
the voting patterns, this rule only took effect in situations for which theoretical justification existed, such
as in the case of board chairpersons or members with partial-year terms.
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actions based on their ideological framework better than any other measure. Using this measure
of the comparative frequency with which members of different groups on the board vote
together will serve as a proxy measure for how important the different considerations of party
and regional interest are to board decision-making. If board members vote together by group
substantially differently from how they vote as an overall body, movement across time or in
comparison to county electorate trends may be revealing about partisan competitiveness and its
role in the board as a legislative body.
Independent variables in the model include the state of Illinois' presidential and
gubernatorial margins (Republican vote minus Democratic vote), McLean County presidential
and gubernatorial models, the change in composition of the county board in the previous
election year, the number of uncontested seats in the previous election year for each party, and
the number of incumbents reelected in the election of the year before the cohesion scores. Each
of these variables demonstrates the strength of partisan competition in the electorate, as
opposed to the existence of an electorate not dominated by only one party or ideological
framework. Furthermore, since this study also attempts to uncover the impact of redistricting
on county boards, it controls for redistricting with a variable indicating the number of years
since the last redistricting process.
The model examines the McLean County Board's roll call voting back to 1982, the year
when the current County Board ten-district structure came into place. Within the data set, each
case covers a two-year time span, including election data from only election years and board
decision-making data from the election year and the following year. This time lag provides a
built-in attempt to gauge the effects of competition in the county at large, measured through
various election results, on the board's decision-making cleavages. Using the two-year span as
the unit of analysis presumably meshes the actual outcome of the various elections with county
board actions. Previous studies on electoral redistricting also examine the impact of redistricting
on incumbent security and partisan composition over an extended period of time, strengthening
the rationale for using two-year intervals as opposed to the one-year intervals common in roll
call analyses.18
In terms of other measures, the presidential and gubernatorial votes measure the
strength of partisan competition in the county as compared to a control of the state for macro
level trends. State-level data serve as the control because factors that impact McLean County
will presumably be more likely to parallel those of impacting Illinois more closely than those at
the national level. Including a variable representing the strength of local parties, such as those
from each party who filed to be precinct committeemen, may also have been beneficial, but the
data for this component were not available.
Changes in board composition also play a large theoretical role in explaining the
variance in the dependent variable. This research tracks board composition as it changes in
election years by measuring the number of Democrats elected out of the total number of

18

Gelman and King 1994.
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available seats, including those for unexpired terms that were up for election. Especially in the
case of McLean County, increasing Democratic presence on the board would suggest a more
competitive body, in a fashion that may parallel the growth of Democratic competition in the
county over time. The number of uncontested seats from each party could work in opposite
directions, as Republican uncontested seats would indicate less competition, but Democratic
uncontested seats may mean the opposite in a generally Republican county context. The
average margin of victory for McLean County Board seats serves as a final indicator of
competition. To measure this margin, Republican percentage of the two-party vote is used. The
average of each Republican candidate's strength across all of the districts shows the electoral
strength, and therefore measures change the same way as the mathematical margin. Greater
margins of victory indicate a less competitive county, and in the model, should be negatively
related to the expected outcome of movement in cohesion scores based on increased party
competitiveness.19 The controls for incumbent reelection and redistricting also attempt to
incorporate redistricting theory, by taking into account the potential for the board to have its
partisan composition influenced by these factors.
As explained above, the models separate the board into Republican, Democratic, rural,
and urban groups, in order to uncover the strength of each of these cleavages as considerations
for board decision-making. More fit in a model indicates that board group cohesion moves in
relation to changes in county partisanship. In other words, increased group cohesion suggests
possible increased prevalence of group association in members' decision-making. The model
tests whether or not movement in board group considerations occur based on the impact of
increased partisanship within the county electorate. Significant results indicate that a group on
the board votes more cohesively with increase of county partisanship.

Practically speaking, the

shape of McLean County's efforts to redistrict in 2011 may be determined by whether or not
urban-rural considerations remain consistent. Therefore, in order to explain which group votes
together most strongly in conjunction with the level of partisan competition in the county, the
model has been run with each group's cohesion scores individually serving as dependent
variables. Results of each model appear as follows:

19

In 1998 for McLean County, and in 2002 for Champaign County, incomplete election records left out
some of the districts. Accordingly, a margin that averages the preceding and following years' election
margins has been created as a substitute measure, in order to preserve all possible cases.
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Table 1: Models of McLean County Partisan Competitiveness and
Average Board Roll Call Vote Cohesion, by Group, 1982-2009

Dependent Variable: McLean County Board Average Group Cohesion Compared to Average Total Cohesion

. .
.
. .
.
.
n g)
(WIth mcreased group coheSlOn suggestmg
POSSI'ble mcreased. preva1ence 0f group assocIation m members' deCIslOn-maki)
.
Independent Variable

Constant

State Presidential Margin

Republican Cohesion

Democratic Cohesion

Rural Cohesion

Urban Cohesion

62.430
(47.428)

4.165
(204.299)

-149.789
(266.206)

137.214
(86.509)

-.614
(.903)

1.323
(3.889)

-1.030
(5.075)

5.830
(1.647)

-2.892**

-.780

(.186)

2.410
(.800)

.220

Margin

(1.045)

(.339)

McLean Presidential

1.092
(.805)

-1.587
(3.467)

.938
(4.524)

-5.426
(1.468)

Margin

3.057**
(.243)

-2.939
(1.048)

-.285
(1.368)

-.429
(.444)

Board Composition
(Percent Democrats

-1.215**
(.214)

.960
(.921)

.365
(1.202)

-1.175
(.390)

McLean Uncontested
Races-Republican

.339
(.145)

-.322
(.625)

-.796
(.816)

-.638
(.265)

McLean Uncontested
Races- Democratic

-.138
(.226)

.315
(.972)

.554
(1.268)

.338
(.412)

-1.132*
(.334)

.342
(1.437)

.753
(1.875)

-1.253
(.608)

McLean Incumbents
Reelected

-.189
(.062)

-.043
(.269)

.551
(.351)

-.202
(.114)

Redistricting Year

-.287
(1.218)

.278
(5.246)

.388
(3.589)

.088
(2.221)

14
.751
4.917

14
.030
1.040

14
-.942
.369

14
-.589
.518

State Gubernatorial

Margin
McLean Gubernatorial

Elected)

McLean County Board
Average Margin
(Rep. Vote)

N
Adj. R-squared
F-Test

Note: Standard errors In parentheses; * p �.1, ** P �.05, ***p �.01

Table 1 presents the results for each of these models, although none are statistically
significant overall. Interestingly, the model explains the most for Republican group cohesion
and the least for rural group cohesion. By this logic, rural-urban splits on the board could be
influenced least by changes in the partisan composition of the county. While this may suggest
that these considerations vary less over time in board decision-making, it also may suggest that
urban-rural groupings' importance to the board simply moves inconsistently as compared with
county partisanship. On the other hand, the random variance in cohesion scores based on
member personality, along with the limited number of cases, could be interfering with or
diminishing the effects of any discernible trend. Within the models, some of the variable's
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correlations are significant, but the findings are mixed in terms of their movement in the
direction anticipated. The number of cases limits possibility for significance in these models, as
well as others throughout the study. However, this limited "N" comes from the fact that the
current board structure did not come into place until

1982, so cases before this time would cause

internal inconsistency within the model.
The model for Republican group cohesion on the board had the greatest explanatory
power. When the average margin of victory for board seats increased, meaning that
Republicans were more secure, they voted together less frequently. This suggests that
insecurity, or increased competitiveness, would impact board decision-making along partisan
lines. The significance of this model of increased county competitiveness on Republican voting
cohesion suggests that party may be becoming more important to board process. On the other
hand, as the board becomes more Democratic (Board Composition Change), Republican
cohesion also decreases. Bivariate correlations between the various indicators of partisan
competition and board cohesion measures also present mixed findings. In most cases, cohesion
scores across years waver around a central score, but do not trend in any particular direction.
This creates difficulty in identifying the overall strength of voting cleavages on the board, and
distinguishing partisan or urban-rural considerations from those of particular members' voting
habits and personalities. In McLean County's specific case of redistricting, to rule out
institutionally reinforcing urban and rural considerations in the board decision-making process
may at this point be empirically unsupported.
To clarify some of these models' mixed findings the bivariate relationships between
Board Composition Change, Average Margin of Republican Victory, and each of the cohesion
scores were examined. Interestingly, the only correlation that achieved significance, aside from
those measuring similar phenomena, was that of Democratic Cohesion and Board Composition
Change. Since Board Composition Change measures the increase in the percentage of
Democrats elected to the board, the expected positive correlation

(.458*)

occurred. For this

correlation only to achieve significance among the other measures suggests that Democrats, as
the smallest group on the board, tend to experience the effects of partisan competition the most.
Accordingly, their voting patterns on the board, including their relative tendency to vote
together as a group, move significantly with their strength in the board composition. This
finding has interesting implications for board voting patterns if the board's composition
continues to become more competitive, as predicted.
A graphical representation of two of these group cohesion measures, Republican and
rural, as compared to McLean County's presidential vote margin, displays some of the
ambiguity surrounding groups' cohesion scores. Depicted visually below in Figure I, contrary
to the hypothesis, rural voting patterns have stayed equally cohesive and even discernibly
increased as partisan competition has increased (shown in terms of a decreasing Republican
margin of victory over time). Republican voting cohesion, on the other hand, seems to neither
trend upward nor downward over time, though it may be in the process of increasing slightly.
In spite of statistical insignificance, this trend, at least in McLean County up to the present,
would seem to indicate that partisan decision-making on the board has not necessarily become
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a more salient cleavage even as the partisan competition of the board changes. These findings
emphasize the benefit of maintaining the urban-rural split in McLean County's board, and the
type of decisions faced by board members, concerning issues like zoning, may support this
emphasis.

Figure 1: Republican and Rural Board Members' Average Cohesion and
McLean County Presidential Voting Margins, 1982-2009
Board Group Cohesion Scores and
McLean County Presidential Margin
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Significance issues for all of the data supporting this hypothesis again make it difficult to
draw substantive conclusions. Perhaps, however, this reinforces a different aspect of local
government and partisanship. Because of its face-to-face nature, partisan competitiveness may
have a less overt impact on county government. Alternatively, these measures may not be the
best depiction of the interactions that take place within county government. For instance, more
qualitative or content-based analysis could better represent the influence of different voting
considerations on the county board.
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EMPIRICAL MODELS AND FINDINGS: HYPOTHESIS 2
This study has also hypothesized that in counties with greater partisan competitiveness,
electoral redistricting has a greater impact on county board composition. This model utilizes
variables similar to those that made up the independent variable set in the previous modeL This
portion of the studies deals with the effects of redistricting on various measures of board
security and incumbent advantage. Table

2 presents the data from Champaign County, an

adjacent jurisdiction with a history of much higher partisan competition.
The first regression uses as its dependent variable the composition of the counties'
respective boards, measured in terms of percent of Democrats elected. While this variable does
not measure total board composition because it accounts only for those elected in each election
cycle and county board members have staggered terms, its change from year to year captures
the shape of change in board composition. By looking at this measure first, one can gauge
whether or not redistricting has any influence on board composition at the county leveL
The model's independent variables consist of multiple controls, including state and
county presidential and gubernatorial margins of victory. Controlling for the overall change in
the political or partisan forces impacting the county will allow for any effects of redistricting to
be distinguished from the general pattern of board composition change that might have
occurred even without redistricting. In this model, the logic of including uncontested races has
shifted slightly from that in the first model of this study. Here, uncontested races contribute a
general control for the tone of the board in terms of its normal trend of competition, and
accounts for local electoral patterns in specific districts. The percentage of incumbents reelected
also serves as a control in this situation. Incumbency advantage and redistricting effects are
often tied to one another in the literature. Yet if the counties experience robust incumbency
advantage effects from year to year, their impact would skew the perception of redistricting
effects, and for this reason, incumbency also serves as an independent variable.
Finally, the redistricting variable should, according to the hypothesis, influence the
board composition. As the years since a redistricting process occurs lapse, the redistricting's
effects on board elections should decline. The table below presents the results of this model for
both Champaign County and McLean County:
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Table 2: County Board Redistricting and Board Composition Measure, 1982-2009
Dependent Variable: Board Composition (Percent Democrats Elected)
Champaign County

McLean County

Independent Variable

Constant

State Presidential
Margin

Independent Variable

-37.730
(41.370)
1.192
(1.005)

Constant

83.406
(102.756)

State Presidential
Margin

.740
(2.094)
-.344

State Gubernatorial
Margin

1.021
(.185)

State Gubernatorial
Margin

(.430)

Champaign Presidential
Margin

-.634
(.998)

McLean Presidential
Margin

-.530
(1.872)

Champaign
Gubernatorial Margin

-2.107*
(.366

McLean Gubernatorial
Margin

(.569)

Champaign Uncontested
Races-Republican

-1.224*
(.550)

McLean Uncontested
Races-Republican

-.587
(.308)

Champaign Uncontested
Races- Democratic

2.033**
(.881)

McLean Uncontested
Races- Democratic

.460
(.474)

Champaign County
Board Average Margin
(Rep. Vote)

-1.190
(.824)

McLean County Board
Average Margin
(Rep. Vote)

-.423
(.730)

Champaign Incumbents
Reelected

.435
(.156)

McLean Incumbents
Reelected

-.102
(.144)

Redistricting Year

.609*
(1.802)

N

14
.744
5.192*

Adj. R-squared
F-Test

Redistricting Year

Note: Standard errors m parentheses; * p ::;.1, ** p ::;.05, ***p ::;.01

-.057

.341
(2.633)
14
.291
1.591

In this model, a positive relationship exists between the lapse in years after redistricting
and change in board composition, although it is only significant for Champaign County. One
feasible explanation hinges on the Republican strength. As more time passes from the
redistricting more Democrats are elected, so perhaps redistricting favors board Republicans. Yet
another possibility is that the relationship between these two variables does not capture
redistricting effects within the right time span or type of measurement. Especially in
Champaign County, where the board is more competitive and composition may be more stable,
a simple measure of board composition change may not reveal the full story of redistricting
effects. Again, the problem of a small sample size surfaces as well, since various races'
individual characteristics may impact board composition more, especially at the county level.
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Because of the ambiguity accompanying an exploratory study such as this, it was

necessary to measure redistricting effects in terms of other dependent variables as well. Board
Composition may only suggest one part of the total impact redistricting has on a county board.
The next model examines the effect of redistricting on incumbent reelection rate. If county
government parallels other governmental bodies, redistricting may be used to make incumbents
safer. Therefore, using incumbent reelection rates as a measure of the impact of redistricting on
the nature of the county board ultimately meshes with the logic of the question. The
construction of the incumbency dependent variable was similar to that used in other studies,
and consists of a percentage of incumbents reelected out of the total number of seats up for
reelection. In some instances, this may not account for the fact that incumbents chose not to run
for reelection. However, eliminating these instances from the possible pool of seats up for
election may remove some of the data's descriptive power because the fact that incumbents
chose not to run for one reason or another could also be an effect of redistricting. Therefore,
retaining the total number of possible seats in which incumbents could have run and won for
the basis of comparison in the variable contributes to its theoretical power to explain. With the
logic of this variable set forth, the findings of the impact of redistricting on incumbent reelection
rates for McLean and Champaign Counties are listed in Table 3 below:
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Table 3: County Board Redistricting and Board Member Security Measures, 1982-2009
Dependent Variable: Incumbent Reelection Rate
McLean County

Champaign County
Independent Variable

Constant

Independent Variable

77.936

Constant

State Presidential
Margin

-1.657
(2.578)

State Gubernatorial
Margin
Champaign Presidential
Margin

147.788
(372.386)

(110.366)
State Presidential

.000

Margin

(7.227)

-1.224
(.534)

State Gubernatorial
Margin

-.940
(1.445)

1.173
(2.487)

McLean Presidential
Margin

.126
(6.442)

Champaign
Gubernatorial Margin

2.659*
(1.056)

McLean Gubernatorial
Margin

.586
(1.931)

Champaign Uncontested
Races-Republican

1.289
(1.884)

Mclean Uncontested
Races-Republican

(1.096)

Champaign Uncontested
Races- Democratic

-1.948
(3.848)

McLean Uncontested
Races- Democratic

(1.804)

Champaign County
Board Average Margin
(Rep. Vote)

-1.041
(2.595)

McLean County Board
Average Margin
(Rep. Vote)

-.548
(2.560)

Board Composition
Change (Percentage of

.811
(1.036)

Board Composition
Change (Percentage of

-.261
(1.689)

Democrats Elected)
Redistricting Year

N
Adj. R-squared
F-Test

.744

.077

Democrats Elected)
-.801*
(4.873)

Redistricting Year

-.449
(9.256)

14

14

.522
2.576

-.815
.351

Note: Standard errors m parentheses; * p ::;.1, ** P ::;.05, ***p ::;.01

For McLean County especially, this model has the least explanatory power of any of the
models put forth in this study, and is also not significant. However, this could be more
indicative of a truth about the county level of government than it would appear. In other levels
of government, one would expect measures like redistricting, the composition of a legislature,
and the partisanship of the surrounding district to play a significant role in explaining
incumbency advantage. Interestingly, only in the Champaign model did redistricting play a
statistically significant role in explaining the movement in incumbency reelection rates.
Furthermore, in Champaign County, redistricting did impact incumbency in the expected
direction, since as time since redistricting increased, incumbent advantage decreased. The
findings of this model, therefore support the second hypothesis, although the models achieved
only mixed levels of significance.
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The final model presented below follows a similar logic in terms of controls to that of the

two preceding models. Here, however, average election margin of county board races serves as
the dependent variable. This shuffling of variables attempts to test the different directionality of
effects on various measures of redistricting effect in order to uncover the most useful way of
examining these questions at this level of government. Cycling dependent variables in this way
allows for more discovery of what measures function best as controls or capture variation the
most. Average Election Mar gin for county board races depicts the level of safety that victors
experience in the election, along with the general competitive nature of the county. This would
estimate redistricting effects on the general competitiveness of the county board races which
would potentially be linked to each county boards' composition in the long run.

Table 4: County Board Redistricting and Board Race Competitiveness Measures, 1982-2009
Dependent Variable: Average County Board Election Margin (Republican Percentage of Two-Party Vote)
McLean County

Champaign County

Independent Variable

Constant

Average Margin

37.623
(7.699)

Independent Variable

Constant

Average Margin

124.039
(34.778)

-.638
(.455)

State Presidential

State Gubernatorial
Margin

-.471
(.097)

State Gubernatorial
Margin

-.322
(.275)

Champaign Presidential

.340
(.449)

McLean Presidential
Margin

-2.618

Margin
Champaign
Gubernatorial Margin

1.167*
(.170)

McLean Gubernatorial
Margin

-.223
(.363)

Champaign Uncontested
Races-Republican

.789***
(.165)

McLean Uncontested
Races-Republican

(.216)

Champaign Uncontested

-1.175**
(.368)

McLean Uncontested
Races- Democratic

(.326)

State Presidential Margin

Races- Democratic

Margin

Board Composition
Change (Percent
Democrats Elected)

.384
(.165)

Board Composition
Change (Percent
Democrats Elected)

Champaign Incumbents
Reelected

-.180
(.078)

McLean Incumbents
Reelected

Redistricting Year

-.309
(.912)

Redistricting Year

N
Adj. R-squared
F-Test

14
.917
17.022***

Note: Standard errors In parentheses; * p ::;;.1, ** P ::;;.05, ***p ::;;.01

3.070
(1.042)

(.967)

.153

-.227

-.291
(.300)

-.147
(.090)
-.294
(1.676)
14
.512
2.516
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The significance of the Champaign County model with average margin as the dependent
variable causes it to stand out from among other models in the study. Problematically, most of
this significance and explanatory power could come from the uncontested seats variables,
which are among the only independent variables also significant in this model. This suggests
that collinearity may also have occurred, discrediting the model. For example, in Champaign
County, these variables most likely move together with the average margin of victory because
there are fewer contested seats, so they pull the average more severely and the movement is
thus more significant. The logic behind retaining the uncontested seat variables, however, was
an attempt to control for local effects, wherein a board member may remain unchallenged for
years because of his or her high name recognition in the community. Alternatively, in McLean
County, even these measures do not have a significant correlation with the dependent variable.
In addition to the uncontested races variables, the Champaign County gubernatorial margin
achieves significance in this model, though the opposite is true for McLean County. The most
plausible explanation here comes from Champaign's more competitive county make-up, which
causes it to move more in line with the pattern of the state.
In this model, redistricting does not have a significant correlation with Republican
electoral strength. Again, this insignificance possibly results from the small number of cases
available here. Theoretically, with a larger number of cases, if a negative correlation were
sustained, it would suggest that as time passes after a redistricting, the gap between Republican
and Democratic electoral strength shrinks. In some ways, this could be opposed to the
hypothesis that redistricting will directly impact board composition by altering the status quo of
electoral districts, potentially improving prospects for change. On the other hand, redistricting
could strengthen the majority party, causing its electoral strength to increase most when the
time lag since redistricting is at its least, so this negative correlation could also have some
theoretical justification.
With models that have so little statistical strength due to their small number of cases, the
overall picture of these findings may be more important than the predictive success of the
individual variables. The fact that greater explanatory power and more instances of significance
occurred in Champaign County models than in McLean County models provides insight into
redistricting theory on a broader level. McLean County's board has been demonstrated by
Hypothesis

1 and Table 1 to be the much less competitive body. Interestingly, it shows less

overall tendency to fit the basic tenants of redistricting theory in political science literature, such
as expected redistricting effects on incumbency, electoral safety, and board composition.
Perhaps redistricting's impact only arises in a more partisan political culture, where electoral
competition provides more of an impetus in the redistricting process. Champaign County's
models' comparatively high levels of explanatory value in some ways confirm the expectation
that McLean County's redistricting issues are much less centered on partisan lines.
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CONCLUSIONS
In spite of statistical significance issues that followed from the data's limited number of

cases, the findings presented in this study fill a gap in the existing literature. Although an
increased number of cases could provide more conclusive statistical evidence, the expectations
of increased partisan strength in county board decision-making in McLean County have thus
far failed to surface. The findings of this study are exploratory and suggest possible patterns in
electoral politics of county redistricting and board members' decision making. For example, the
number of roll call votes taken by the county board decreases dramatically within the sample
time frame from

1982-2009.

As the board increased its reliance on committee structure in

government, its partisanship may not surface in roll call voting as reliably as in previous years.
The discussion of voting cleavages within the McLean County Board would therefore
necessitate further examination, although in general it would seem that increasing partisan
competition has the most correlation with the cohesion of the Republican group of board
members, and the urban-rural group cohesion patterns do not seem to vary in a specific
direction over time. A final note on this segment of the study draws attention also to the
significant bivariate correlation between board composition change and Democratic voting
cohesion, which again may indicate that future increases partisan competition could continue to
impact the strength of party as a mechanism for the formation of voting blocs on the county
board. Because of Republican model strength and the seemingly contradictory picture of
continuing urban-rural group cohesion, I also find it likely that the impact of partisan influence
in McLean County may be increasing, but just as in the case of Southern realignment, may not
yet be fully iterated in the legislative body of the county board.
The models comparing the impact of partisan competition on redistricting trends
suggest that a more competitive partisan county government follows trends of electoral politics
and redistricting more closely than a less partisan body. However, the redistricting process
itself has minimal discernible impact in both communities, at least in terms of measurement
used in this model. Although results were mixed within the models, the McLean County data's
lack of significance in the relationships between standard measures of electoral competition and
board composition, incumbency, and member security all suggest that units of government
with strong two-party competition have more consistent patterns of electoral behavior. This
broad finding may assist public administrators and managers in understanding the principles
behind different redistricting schemes.
A more detailed look at redistricting impact or a comparison of redistricting processes
from county to county could be valuable additions to future research. For instance, covering a
broader range of counties would assist in minimizing the small N issues with the model and
would add greater confidence to the findings of this exploratory study. Furthermore, measuring
redistricting only in terms of time lapsed since the last redistricting process most likely limits
the measure of the impact of this variable. One useful addition would be a measure that
included the impact of the redistricting on different districts and their partisan makeup. This
would require an in-depth examination of individual counties' redistricting processes year by
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year. Again, the impact of having this improved measure would help scholars isolate the impact
of redistricting at the county level.
Other measures could generate more explanatory power about the workings of partisan
competition within county boards themselves. For instance, including committee votes and
action would be relevant in a situation with more cases. Analyzing the use of party as a
decision-making mechanism for board members through a content analysis of divisions on
issues at board meetings could also be insightful. One additional possibility for measuring the
strength of local party organizations would be the percentage of precinct committeemen chairs
filled by parties.
This study strengthens the framework of the literature, applying it to a new level of
government with the suggestion that bodies that are traditionally less partisan experience less
well-defined impact of redistricting and national party -strength trends. In linking the study to
the literature, Broach's ideas of institutional reinforcement of non-partisan divides parallel the
research of this study.20 Interestingly, the conclusions from these models also bolster his claim
that redistricting effects apply more clearly in two-party systems than elsewhere. Even in the
face of insignificant findings, this exploratory study has attempted to lay the groundwork for a
fresh method of applying party development, competition, and redistricting theory to
America's 1/ dark continent." County government directly impacts the lives of citizens in
tangible ways. The role of electoral competition in its operations, although it varies from county
to county, is important for developing an understanding of politics in the most neglected level
of government.

20 Broach 1972.
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EUROPEAN INTEGRATION: A PLAN TO MAKE THE GRADE
Megan Weinstein

Abstract: Since World War II, millions of immigrants have settled into European societies. While many

of these ethnic minorities are entering their second and third generation within their host countries there
is still a deep sense of disunity and alienation. Some researchers suggest that the best way to acculturate
these migrants into society is through structural integration where migrants are exposed to and involved
in institutions such as the educational system. To examine the importance of education's impact on
socio-cultural integration, this article examines the effect of educational structures on the socio-cultural
integration of Europe's ethnic minority populations, including foreign-born migrants. More specifically,
this report examines the relationship between socio-cultural integration and starting age and duration of
compulsory education.
INTRODUCTION
In almost any immigration country, the integration of minorities into the host society is
vital to the cohesion and harmony within that society. Since World War II, Europe has
witnessed a large influx of immigrant populations, mainly due to temporary and guest worker
programs followed by permanent settlement. Many of these migrants, even two or three
generations after settling, encounter economic and social disadvantages, discrimination,
xenophobia, and exclusion from civic and political participation. Of the many vehicles through
which integration can be improved, structural integration, and more specifically education, has
gained recent esteem within studies conducted by the European Union. These studies have
recognized that education is able to set the ground work for further integration in both the
cultural and structural realms because it reaches the population at a young age.
Policymakers throughout Europe are aware of the dangers of social exclusion and have
been experiencing greater pressure to adopt effective approaches for increasing the integration
of these new members into their respective host societies. The European Commission has called
for leadership committed to overcoming social division and adopting policies that will promote
equality. This is a problem that is not likely to go away on its own. In an increasingly
globalized world, migratory movements will continue to bring an influx of minority
populations, and as long as there continue to be cultural differences, there will be a distinct
need to increase levels of social tolerance and inclusion.
This research inquires how institutions, particularly compulsory education, play a role
in advancing the integration of migrant cultures in Europe. The role of education has been
generally neglected by policymakers in the past, but holds value because of the state's ability to
make structural changes which may further affect socio-cultural aspects of integration.
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Defining Integration
This research examines the inclusion process of migrant populations within the social
and institutional realms of the host society. Within social science research, several terms have
been used to describe this phenomenon including but not limited to: absorption, adaptation,
race relations cycle, assimilation, acculturation, inclusion, incorporation, and integration. For
the purpose of this research, the focus is on social integration, referring to "the process by which
people who are relatively new to a country become part of a society." l This consists of "the
inclusion and acceptance of immigrants into the core institutions, relationships, and positions of
a host society."2 According to the Council of the European Union, it acts as a dynamic, two-way
process of mutual accommodation by all immigrants and residents of the member state.3

Integration vs. Assimilation
The most common terms used to describe this process are integration and assimilation.
The notion of integration differs from assimilation mostly in historical conception. Historically,
assimilation has been viewed as a unidirectional process where migrants are forced to abandon
their own culture in order to adapt to the host society. This often arouses negative
connotations of suppression, ethnocentrism, and violence. This reaction stems from the rise of
abusive nationalism throughout Europe in the late

19th and 20th centuries. Some of these

extreme forms of nationalism motivated attempts to create culturally homogenous nations; in
the process, I assimilation' became a form of cultural suppression. The most obvious cases of
such occurrences include Germany throughout WWII and the "brutally homogenizing"
aspirations of Jacobian Republicanism in France.4
However, Rogers Brubaker argues that, in reality, there are two distinct forms of
assimilation: the general and abstract term and the specific and organic term. The specific and
organic term depicts assimilation as "convert into a substance of its own nature, as the bodily
organs convert food into blood, and thence into animal tissue. . . to absorb into the system,
incorporate."s In this sense, this form implies a sense of total absorption and is the form of
I

assimilation' most associated with negative historical connotations. 6 Meanwhile, the general

and abstract form of I assimilation' is rooted in the idea of increasing similarity or likeness. Here,
assimilation regards only the notion of becoming similar, to make similar, or to treat as similar.
This version of the word is being used more widely in the past decade. Authors are challenging
the taboo by incorporating the term in their research instead of integration.7 Heckmann and

1 Rudinger and Spencer 2003.
2 Bosswick and Heckmann 2006.
3 Joppke 2007.
4 Brubaker 2003.
5 Oxford English Dictionary.
6 Brubaker 2003.
7 Brubaker 2003;

Bosswick and Heckmann 2006; Joppke 2007.

82

RES PUBLICA

Schnapper state that it does not need to just be a one-sided process but can instead be used to
shrink the differences and social distance between two or more groups or parts of them.
Regardless, "assimilation" does have negative and distorted connotations that require continual
clarification.8 Because of this, for pragmatic and communicative purposes, 'integration' serves
as a more appropriate word than ' assimilation' within the realm of migrant integration. It better
serves as a concept that is adequate for scientific purposes as well as for communication with
policy makers and the wider public.

Modes of Integration: Integration of a Nation
Methods of migrant regulation vary from country to country. However, they have often
been generalized into four main approaches for the incorporation and integration of migrants
into society: assimilation, differential exclusion, multiculturalism, and two-way integration.
These approaches to integration are strongly connected with the past immigration trends
unique to each country, as well as the historical concepts of nationalism and citizenship. Each
approach demonstrates a cultural view of integration and places integration responsibility on
the migrant population, the host society, neither, or both.
The first main category focuses on the complete assimilation of migrants in terms of
learning the national language and adopting the social and cultural practices of the host society.
As previously discussed, the concept of assimilation usually includes migrants giving up old
practices in order to fully adopt the new national identity. Therefore, the responsibility of
integration falls entirely on the shoulders of the migrants. This approach is appropriately titled
an "assimilationist approach" by both Castles and Crul.9 Meanwhile, the differential exclusion
method focuses more on the separation of migrants and the host society. Typically, this form is
found in countries with temporary migration schemes like guest-worker or labor programs.
Migrants are considered strictly temporary and are therefore not given the right to family
reunification or permanent residence. This leaves migrants only temporarily integrated in the
labor market and excludes them from integrating into other levels of society such as political
participation and national culture.1° The next category is referred to as the "multiculturalism"
approach. Unlike the assimilationist and civic integration approaches, multiculturalism does
not assume the existence or necessity of homogenous and monocultural nation-states. It instead
works through the concept of pluralism in accepting cultural diversity and community
formation and emphasizes the promotion of equality.11 This is often times carried out through
anti-discrimination legislation and equal opportunities policies. The responsibility of
integration falls more on the host society as it is expected to accept newcomers along with the
cultural practices they carry.
While the previously described approaches to integration have been prevalent in the
past, the European Union is now encouraging member states to adopt an approach that focuses
8 Heckmann and Schnapper 2003.
9 Castles 2002; Crul and Schneider 2009.
10 Castles 2002; Crul 2009.
11 Castles 2002; Crul and Schneider 2009,

"Children of Turkish Immigrants".
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more on the fusion of the migrant and host societies. In this two-way integration" both the
II

migrants and the receiving societies must change in the process of integration. In reality this
supposes two separate one-way processes in which the burden of change falls on both actors.12
Christian Joppke states that this occurs in the dual presence of civic integration and the
antidiscrimination measures found in the multiculturalist approach.13

This method is

supported by the European Union because it acknowledges that integration is not a one-sided
process.14 Both the migrants and host communities are active participants in the integration
process, each with their own characteristics, reactions, and levels of adaptation.15 There is an
inherent interaction between these parties, and successful integration incorporates a change in
the perspectives of both the migrant population and the host community. 16
This push towards two-way integration is relatively recent, only gaining serious
attention in the past five years. Methods of assimilation, differential exclusion, and
multiculturalism still exist in many European countries. Those countries that have adopted the
two-way integration method have done so quite recently. Therefore, past ideologies of each
nation still have a large effect on the attitudes towards immigration and integration today. The
level of socio-cultural integration, social tensions, and discrimination can still be largely
influenced by this history.

Process of Integration: Integration of Individuals
While the national ideologies regarding immigration and integration are extremely
influential in determining the nation's capacity for integration, the actual process takes place at
the individual level.

Opportunities and incentives for integration manifest themselves in

multiple spheres of active life, whether going to the office, participating in local sports clubs, or
even just eating at a local restaurant. Integration acts as a multi-dimensional phenomenon
which manifests itself through

3 key systems: Legal! political, cultural, and structural

integration.
Legal! political integration refers strictly to the process of immigrants' inclusion as
members of the political community. The fundamental aspect of this process regards the
naturalization of immigrants and national policies directed at citizenship requirements. These
policies determine the difficulty with which migrants are able to claim national citizenship and
therefore gain full access to the political system. This access serves as a precondition for
exerting influence on the political system and provides a way for immigrants to partake in the
host societyP Often, the level of difficulty of naturalization relates back to the national ideals of
integration. For example, Germany, until roughly five years ago, did not consider itself an
immigration country ('Deutschland ist kein Einwanderungsland') and thus employed a strict

12

Christian 2007.

13 Joppke 2007, "Transformation,"
14 Entzinger and Biezeveld
15 Penninx 2005.
16 Rudinger 2003, 5.

2003.

17 Bosswick and Heckmann 2006.

247-248.
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system of differential exclusion, which made gaining citizenship relatively difficult compared to
other European states. 18 Even today with its new acceptance of two-way integration, the
citizenship requirements are still extensive. Meanwhile, the French assimilationist model
allows for full-fledged citizenship to those who subscribe completely to the principles of the
country's political system and accept its national ideals. However, while naturalization is quite
simple, upon subscribing to this culture one forfeits any state recognition of individual cultural
or religious heritage and receives no safeguards against discrimination. In general, the
legalj political aspect of integration has a large impact on an immigrant's ability to partake in
society as the stepping stone to gaining legal and political rights. However, this one-way form
of integration focuses solely on the burden on the immigrant and has little effect on the host
culture. Such legalj political inclusions are a necessity but not sufficient for full integration.
While legalj political integration is necessary for access to legal rights and the political
system, it is through cultural and structural integration that two-way integration takes place
and migrants are able to fully acculturate with the host society. Cultural integration refers to
the cognitive, behavioral, and attitudinal changes experienced as migrants acquire the core
competencies of the host culture and society. It places the individual's personal identification
within the social system and determines whether they continue to identify with their national
culture or, rather, see themselves as a part of the host society.19 This does not necessarily mean
that immigrants must completely forego the culture and ideologies of their respective countries
of origin; cultural integration promotes an interactive, mutual process in which the host society
also experiences change as it adapts and learns to relate to the newcomers. Typically, cultural
integration includes knowledge of the host country language and cultural standards; it involves
adapting to a new way of life and social participation in the host culture. Such adaptation
associates higher rates of immigrants in social networks of the host society, including but not
limited to friendships, partnerships, marriages, and membership in voluntary organizations.2o
Structural integration is closely linked to cultural integration but includes migrants'
participation in the " core" institutions of the host culture. Bosswick and Heckmann title this
'placement' and define it as the process of an individual gaining a position in society, which
enables them to partake in socioeconomic institutions and gain cultural, social, and economic
capital,21 It includes the attainment of access to position and status within the economy and
labor market, the educational institutions, the housing system, etc. Bosswick and Heckmann
argue that structural integration is the most essential aspect of integration, for it enables
migrants to partake in socioeconomic institutions and gain capital, which, he believes, leads to
cultural integration over time.
While these different forms of integration have been discussed separately, it is important
to note that they are extremely interconnected.22 Heckmann argues that structural integration

" Migration Citizenship Education - Germany."
Bosswick and Heckmann 2006.
20
Ibid.
21
Ibid.
22 Entzinger 2003, 30-31.
18

19
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has the greatest effect because it introduces immigrants to the society and the host culture
through co-workers, classmates, neighbors, etc. Furthermore, failing to integrate migrants into
the institutions of a nation can severely impair their ability to culturally integrate because they
have no way of gaining capital and prominence within society. However, the same can be said
for the effect of cultural integration. Becoming acculturated in society and understanding the
basic social skills relevant to the host culture can positively impact migrants' abilities to succeed
in the labor market. Because integration is such a cyclical concept, it is imperative that policies
address both the structural and cultural aspects of integration as key to a better acculturated
society.
IMPACT OF EDUCATION
One strategy for integrating ethnic migrants begins with the reform of procedures,
practices, and policies that address the foundational systems through which integration takes
place.

A key example of this is the education system. The education system serves as a major

vehicle for integration because of its direct impact upon both structural and cultural integration.
The beauty of education is that it targets youth while they are still at impressionable ages and
has the ability to help set the foundation for their future success. However, education can also
be indirectly discriminatory or exclusionary if it fails to narrow the gap between the
achievements of migrants and host nationals.
Within the European Union, it is widely recognized that education serves as an excellent
medium through which a state can increase equal opportunities and foster the recognition of
diversity. It is because of this that the education sector is the main field of targeted integration
policies among European Union member states. Even those states averse to minority-specific
anti-discrimination and equal-opportunity policies have adopted education measures to aid in
the integration battle.23
In terms of cultural integration, entrance into the school system usually marks
immigrants' earliest and most intensive contact with the host society, and education has been
found to play an important role in shaping immigrants' cultural identities and relations with
host nationals. Policymakers suggest that education can bridge cultural gaps in times of high
social tension and negativity towards migrants. The exposure of both migrant youth to the host
culture and the host culture to the migrant youth encourages the recognition of diversity.24
Education serves as a form of two-way integration where migrant students are exposed to the
culture of the host society and adapt to social mores, while, simultaneously, students of the host
culture are exposed to ethnic diversity and can expand social understanding. Furthermore,
participation in education encourages social contacts and relationships across cultural and
ethnic boundaries. According to the European Commission and Organization for Economic Co
Operation and Development (OECD), it is through social contacts and the climate created by the

23 OEeD, 3.
24 Ibid., 8.
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possibility of such contacts that people develop a sense of belonging in a particular social
space.25
Structurally, education encompasses the fundamental building blocks of opportunity
that allow individuals to get ahead in society. Upon leaving the school system, students are
supplied with the necessary know-how and intellectual skills needed to partake in
socioeconomic institutions and to gain a position in the labor market.26 The level to which
students are able to integrate within the school system determines the opportunities and
resources available to them later on in life. One of the most recognized aspects of education's
structural effect on integration focuses on migrants' perceived lack of skills, particularly
language. It is through the acquisition and full competency of language that migrants are able
to gain comparable social and economic capital within the host society. Without such skills,
migrants compete at an inherently unequal level with host-country nationals and are often left
much more vulnerable to social exclusion and further disintegration. It is not uncommon for
migrant youth to be raised speaking a language that is foreign to the host society. In such
circumstances many students actually begin learning integral language skills only upon
entering the school system.
The realm of education encompasses multiple facets that may influence success levels
for migrants both within school and later on in the labor market and which may therefore have
an impact on cultural and structural integration. These include systematic structure,
curriculum, level of segregation, special programming, bilingual opportunities, and allocation
of funds.
INDICATORS

Education
While multiple aspects of education are relevant to migrant achievement, this study
focuses on the technical and social benefits of education through a specific focus on educational
structure, comprised of the age requirements and specific tracking of education. Educational
structures vary across countries, especially in the extent to which they constrain and maximize
choice and in how easy they are to navigateP Variations in structure may shape the pathways
that migrant children take into the labor market, higher education, and their lives as citizens.
According to The Integration of the European Second Generation (TIES) surveys, which
address issues of structural integration by comparing education and labor market positions,
there is a direct relationship between educational structure and attained levels of education of
migrants (in this specific case they look at second generation migrants).28 These surveys
demonstrate the impact of compulsory educational structure on second generation migrants'
ability to adapt and keep up with host-country nationals in terms of educational competencies.

25 0ECD, 6.
26 Entzinger 2003, 33.
27 Holdaway, Crul, and Roberts 2009.
28 Crul and Schneider 2009.

RES PUBLICA

87

For this project, the first indicator of educational structure is starting age. The starting
age of migrant children can have a large effect on their capacity for integration because the
beginning of formal education often times marks the beginning of many students' full exposure
to the host culture. This means that students who enter formal education earlier are more likely
to be exposed to social culture and language education during a critical period of emotional and
cognitive development.29 Furthermore, it is not unusual for migrant students to be raised where
the home language is other than that of the host culture. Therefore, their exposure to this
language does not begin until the beginning of formal education.3D
In this study, only the starting age for compulsory education is included because it is
completely inclusive of the migrant society. While pre-primary education, often termed
kindergarten, has been shown to have positive effects on the educational attainments of
migrants, there is a significantly smaller proportion of the migrant population attending pre
primary education in comparison to children of the host society. Including those ages in the
measurement may exclude a large portion of the migrant population.
The second indicator of educational structure is the length of time between starting age
and the age of first selection track. This indicator shows the greatest amount of variance. For
example, in Germany the selection of first track begins at age ten when students are placed in
three rather strictly separate school levels (Hautschule, Realschule, and Gymnasim) . Coupled
with the later starting age, migrant students in Germany thus have comparatively little time to
pull themselves out of their disadvantaged starting position. This early selection often leaves
more migrants students in the lower qualifying streams, especially Hauptschule, which is the
lowest track of secondary schooling.31 This is relevant for the exposure to the majority language
and a mixed social environment, but also for the chances of acquiring the necessary skills and
level of schooling for being tracked into higher qualifying strands of education. The longer a
child of immigrants has had the chance to be in education before a decision is made about the
most suitable track, the higher are her/his chances to access pre-academic paths.32 The problem
is that being tracked in lower qualifying school types frequently limits the choices for
professional careers afterwards.

Integration
The dependent variable in this study is the level of socio-cultural integration of the
migrant population. This pertains to the level at which migrants are integrated into the host
society, in terms of proficiency and use of the host-country language, mutual stereotypical
attitudes, and interethnic social contacts. It is recognized that integration outcomes are affected
by the interplay of a range of factors and that comprehensive measurement of this would
include language proficiency, amount of societal organizations migrants were regularly
involved in, mutual stereotypical attitudes, and the relationships they formed with members of
29 Eurydice, 130.
30 Eurydice, 11.
31 TIES, 6.
32 TIES, 10.
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the host society. Unfortunately, due to resource constraints, the amount of involvement in
social organizations and interethnic relationships are not available for this study. However,
measures of discrimination and ethnic tension are readily available. The indicators that will be
used to measure the dependent variable are the feelings of discrimination based on ethnic
origin and the extent to which there exists discrimination in each host country, as measured in
the Eurobarometer 71.2 (2009), and the amount of tension felt between people of different races
and ethnic groups, as measured in the Eurobarometer 72.1 (2009).
Specifically, the questions being analyzed are:

Eurobarometer 72.1:
QA15_1: In all countries there sometimes exists tension between social groups. In your opinion, how
much tension is there between each of the following groups in (OUR COUNTRY)?
Different racial and ethnic groups:
(1) A lot of tension
(2) Some tension
(3) No tension
(4) DK
Eurobarometer 71.2:
QEL1: For each of the following types of discrimination, could you please tell me whether, in your
opinion, it is very widespread, fairly widespread, fairly rare, or very rare in (OUR COUNTRY)?
On the basis of ethnic origin:
(1) Very widespread
(2) Fairly widespread
(3) Fairly rare
(4) Very rare
(5) Nonexistent
QE3_1: In the past 12 months have you personally felt discriminated against or harassed on the basis of
one or more of the following grounds? Please tell me all that apply.
Ethnic origin mentioned
(0) Not mentioned
(1) Mentioned
QE4_1: In the past 12 months have you witnessed someone being discriminated against or harassed on
the basis of one or more of the following grounds? Please tell me all that apply.
Ethnic origin mentioned
(0) Not Mentioned
(1) Mentioned
QE16_1: Do you have friends or acquaintances who are of an ethnic origin different than yours?
(1) Yes
(2) No
(3) Don't Know
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DESIGN AND STRATEGY

My formal hypotheses for this research are as follows:

H 1 : Nations in which compulsory education begins at an earlier age will have higher rates of socio
cultural integration.
H2: Nations in which compulsory education allows for more time between the starting age and the age of
first specific track selection will have higher rates of socia-cultural integration.
The methods used to test these hypotheses are based on a quasi-experimental design
that focuses on population surveys from seven countries: Denmark, Sweden, Germany, Austria,
the Netherlands, France, and the United Kingdom. This case selection allows for a variety of
dissimilar educational structures. Scandinavian countries, on the one hand, have a single
structure for all students until age sixteen and generally have automatic progression of students
through the years. On the other hand, Germany, Austria, and the Netherlands have
differentiation in students' routes through school beginning at age twelve or earlier.
Comparatively, this study includes France because of its intensive use of options and
channeling within the general structure and the United Kingdom for its coexistence of several
parallel structures.
The unit of analysis is the individual respondent from these selected countries and the
revised survey sample size contains an N of 7,248 total respondents. Findings first analyze the
effect of educational structure measures on individual discrimination and social tension
responses through cross-tabular descriptive statistics accompanied by Pearson's Chi Square
levels of significance and the Gamma measure of association. Then, to control for country,
crosstab analyses will be run and measured with Pearson's Chi Square and Gamma measures as
well. Finally, the study will examine the foreign popUlation proportion, GDP per capita, and
unemployment rates within each country to examine their separate effects on integration.
The dependent variables as taken from the Eurobarometer surveys have been re-coded on a 0-1
scale with 0 representing the highest level of discrimination or social tension within each
question and 1 being the lowest level of discrimination or social tension within each question.
This means that higher responses (those closer to 1) represent higher levels of integration and
vice versa.

Furthermore, an index has been created to represent the summation of all

dependent variables regarding measures of discrimination. This will measure the cumulative
effects in order to demonstrate the feelings of discrimination and tension across the board. The
scale ranges from 0 to 1 in .25 unit increments where 1 again represents the lowest level of
discrimination/ highest level of integration and vice versa.
One recognized potential problem within this design is the fact that the population
being measured for the dependent variable may not have necessarily gone through the national
school system in which they reside. Therefore, there is the potential that the sample will not be
representative of the population parameter.
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The independent variable measures are outlined as follows:

Table 1: Independent Variable Measures by Country

Denmark
Sweden
Germany
Austria
The Netherlands
France
United Kingdom

Start
Age
7
7
6
6
5
6
5

Track
Age
16
16
10
10
12
11
16

Duration

9
9
4
4
7
5
11

% Foreign
Population
5.8%
5.9%
8.8 %
10.3%
3.9%
5.8%
6.6%

GDP
Per capita
36,000
36,600
34,100
39,200
39,500
32,600
34,800

Percent
Unemployment
4.3%
8.3%
7.5%
4.8 %
4.9%
9.1 %
7.6%

The general spread of the dependent variables is as follows:

Table 2: Model Dependent Variable General Statistics

Discrimination Spread
Personal Discrimination
Other Discrimination
Friends of Ethnic Origin
Social Tension

N
28504
29768
29768
29458
25659

Mean
0.6441
0.9736
0.8951
0.5700
0.6481

Standard Deviation
0.25001
0.16044
0.30640
0.49509
0.32850

Index measures
Discrimination spread overall is concentrated in the middle-high range with 70.1 % of
respondents claiming it to be fairly widespread (26.9%) or very widespread (43.2%). Personal
discrimination was only mentioned by 2.6% of the respondents. However, the proportion of
respondents reporting witnessing discrimination of others was much higher at 10.� % of
respondents. Meanwhile, 43.0% of respondents reported having friends of a different ethnic
origin.
The index measure, which ranged from 0 to 4 in .25 increments, had a mean of 3.09 and a
standard deviation of .606. The distribution shows two major spikes around 2.75 and 3.75. To
achieve a 2.75 score, respondent's responses would include a I/fairly widespread" measure of
discrimination along with the recognition of 2 of the 3 other discrimination variables (personal
discrimination, other discrimination, or reporting no friends of a different ethnic origin) . To
achieve a score of 3.75, respondent's responses would include a "fairly widespread" measure of
discrimination along with the recognition of all 3 other discrimination variables. This shows
that, in general, much of the sample reports relatively high levels of discrimination.
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CONCEPTUAL FINDINGS

Table 3: Bivariate Correlations for Migrant Integration (All Countries)
Independent Variable: Starting Age in Country's Educational System
Discrimination spread
Personal Discrimination
Other Discrimination
Friends of Ethnic Origin
Social Tension

Chi-Square

Degrees of Freedom

Significance

Gamma

155.915
7.684
5.8
6.385
77.932

8
2
2
2
4

.000
(at the .05 level)
Not significant
0.041
.000

-0.111
0.127
0.019
0.015
.045

Table 4: Bivariate Correlations for Migrant Integration
(
Independen Variable: Duration (in years) Between Starting Age and Track Age
Discrimination spread
Personal Discrimination
Other Discrimination
Friends of Ethnic Origin
Social Tension

Chi-Square

Degrees of Freedom

Significance

Gamma

228.391
25.980
40.293
106.451
162.218

16
4
4
4
8

.000
.000
.000
.000
.000

0.179
0.192
-0.018
.107
.076

Hypothesis 1
The cross-tabulations examining the relationship between the starting age of
compulsory education and the dependent variables are significant at the 0.05 level, with the
exception of those measured against the witnessed discrimination of others. The results
demonstrate a positive correlation between starting age and levels of social tension with the
highest peaks at ages five and seven. This finding supports the research hypothesis. However,
the results demonstrate that there is actually a negative correlation between starting age and
levels of discrimination; as the starting age increases, the level of discrimination decreases. This
means that as the age at which students begin compulsory schooling increases, levels of
integration also increase. These findings do not support the research hypothesis.
Furthermore, for all cross-tabulations, the Gamma measure of association is quite low,
ranging from -0.111 to 0.127. Therefore, while the correlation between starting age and the
dependent variables is significant, the change in starting age only accounts for a very small, if
any, proportion of the change in the dependent variables.

Hypothesis 2
The cross-tabulations examining the relationship between the duration of time between
the starting age and first track age of compulsory education are significant at the .001 level. The
results demonstrate a negative correlation between duration and levels of discrimination; as
duration increased, the level of discrimination decreased. This means that as duration
increases, levels of integration also increase. This finding supports the research hypothesis.
However, the results also demonstrate a positive correlation between duration and the levels of
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social tension; as duration increased the level of social tension increased. This means that as
duration increases the levels of integration decrease. This finding does not support the research
hypothesis.
However, for all cross-tabulations, the Gamma measure of association is again very low,
ranging from -0.018 to to 0.192. These results demonstrate that the change in the amount of time
between starting compulsory education and the age of first track selection only accounts for a
very small, if any, proportion of the change in the dependent variables.

Ethnic Minority Control
In preparation for the country control, the responses of those identifying as an ethnic
minority in comparison to those not claiming ethnic minority status were examined.
Respondents identifying as an ethnic minority show significantly different results than those
not claiming ethnic minority status. The discrimination indicator's spread remains consistent
on all levels. However, there is a much higher percentage responding liVery Widespread"
among respondents identifying as an ethnic minority than those not claiming ethnic minority
status. Meanwhile, the personal discrimination measures, other discrimination measures, and
those reporting friends of different ethnic origin varied greatly with those claiming ethnic
minority status showed higher rates of discrimination than those not claiming ethnic minority
status. Within personal discrimination, 23.1 % mentioned being personally discriminated
against compared to the 1.7% of non-ethnic respondents. Within other discrimination, 29.7% of
ethnic minorities responded that they had witnessed somebody else being discriminated
against due to ethnic origin compared to the 9.6% of non-ethnic respondents. Finally, 81 .9% of
respondents identifying as an ethnic minority reported having friends of a different ethnic
origin while only 55.8% of non-ethnic respondents reported having friends of a different ethnic
origin.

Country Comparisons
In an attempt to control for the effect of individual countries upon the dependent
variable, a linear regression was run with the United Kingdom as a dummy variable. However,
the results could not be properly calculated because of the multicollinearity of the independent
variables. To further investigate the effect of educational structures within each country, several
cross-tabulations were run. The results were not significant, but may still be of interest.
To compare the variables controlling for country, the countries with the same starting
ages for compulsory education and the countries with the same duration of schooling before the
first tracking were matched up and compared. If countries with the same dependent variables
differ greatly, it is more likely that other country-specific variables are throwing off the data. If
they are similar, it may mean one of two things. The hypothesis would appear stronger because
a) there would be a continuation of effects across country borders, or b) countries with similar

93

RES PUBLICA

educational structures may also be quite similar in other structural and policy-oriented ways,
and the measures could be a result of these common variables.33
To compare within starting age, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom are paired
up, both starting schooling at age five; Germany, Austria, and France are paired up, all starting
school at age six, and Denmark and Sweden are paired up, both starting schooling at age seven.
I

The Netherlands and the United Kingdom have very similar responses for the discrimination
spread, personal discrimination, and other discrimination. Meanwhile, friends of ethnic origin
varied with 16.9% more respondents claiming friends of a different ethnic origin in the United
Kingdom than in the Netherlands. However, this could be a result of higher levels of ethnic
minority responses within the United Kingdom. For social tension, the United Kingdom
reported much lower levels than the Netherlands.
Germany, Austria, and France showed varying results. For discrimination spread,
Germany and Austria demonstrated similar findings, with Austria reporting a higher spread of
discrimination. However, France reported a much higher spread of discrimination than both
Austria and Germany. The responses for personal discrimination and other discrimination
were relatively comparable for all three countries. The number of respondents reporting having
a friend of different ethnic origin was much lower in France. Social tension variables for Austria
and France were very similar but Germany reported much less social tension.
Finally, Denmark and Sweden reported very similar results for all measures except for
the perception of other discrimination. Here, Denmark reported much higher numbers of
respondents witnessing discrimination of others at 20.2% compared to the 6.2% of Sweden.
To compare within duration, Austria and Germany are paired up, both with four years of
duration between starting compulsory education and the age of first track. Denmark and
Sweden are paired up, both with nine years of duration between starting compulsory education
and the age of first track.
Austria and Germany reported similar findings across all measures. Within
discrimination spread, Austria reported with slightly higher discrimination measures, but the
difference was mild. Affirmative responses for personal discrimination, other discrimination,
and having friends of a different ethnic origin were also very closely matched. The most
variation occurred within the social tension variable. Here, Austria reported more social
tension with 47.7% of respondents reporting " A Lot of Tension" compared to the 36. 9 % within
Germany, 46.8 % reporting "Some Tension" compared to the 54.9% within Germany, and only
5.5% reporting "No Tension" compared to the 8.3% within Germany. This difference may be
influenced by the fact that Austria had more respondents of ethnic minority than Germany.
Denmark and Sweden were again compared for duration and therefore demonstrate the same
results as stated before when compared for starting age.

33

For percentage spreads of different dependent variables, see Tables 5-7 in the appendix.
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CONCLUSIONS
Overall, while the effects on integration of both the starting age of compulsory education

and the duration between this age and the age of first track selection were significant, they were
not of sufficient magnitude for the hypotheses to be supported. The effect of the independent
variables on integration accounts for very little of the change in the dependent variable.
Therefore, it can be concluded that there are other factors that have a greater effect on
integration than educational structure.
In an attempt to account for such other factors, a multiple regression was run to examine
the effects of the percent foreign population, GDP per capita, and unemployment rates. Again,
there was a high level of significance, but with a very low Pearson's R-squared measure of
association. It appears that the data may be picking up nuances because of the large number of
cases being utilized. With such a large number, any variation in the data will impact the results,
even if the independent variable is only accounting for a very small proportion of the
dependent, as seen with the Gamma measures of association. Even upon controlling for
country, foreign population percentage, GDP per capita, and unemployment rates, the data
shows very little variation. Therefore, it is possible that the measurement for integration is
incomplete or inaccurate. It could also be the case that the sample is not representative because
it includes those who may have not gone through the education system of the country in which
they reside. The most likely error is that of internal validity. The measures of socio-cultural
integration do not appear to be accurately evaluating the theoretical concept.
Upon examining the results of the first hypothesis, the direction of the relationships
between the independent and dependent variables must be addressed. In order to support the
research hypothesis, the effect of starting age on discrimination and social tension should show
a positive relationship. While this was the case for the effect of starting age on social tension,
the effect of starting age on discrimination demonstrates a negative relationship overall.
Upon examining the results of the second hypothesis, again the direction of the
relationships between the independent and dependent variables must be addressed. In order to
support the research hypothesis, the effect of duration of compulsory education on
discrimination and social tension should show a negative relationship. While this is the case for
the effect of duration of compulsory education on discrimination, the effect of duration of
compulsory education on social tension demonstrates a positive relationship overalL
While the discrimination and social tension indicators were meant to cumulatively
measure the level of two-way integration, it appears that they may be measuring two different
things. After examining the results of the first hypothesis, several potential explanations for this
peculiarity surfaced. Upon further inspection, it seemed as though the measures of
discrimination may address the manifest discriminatory acts which occur in society, while
social tension addresses the more passive feelings of insecurity among those of different ethnic
backgrounds . In general, acts of discrimination have a high occurrence within structural and
institutional aspects of society. It may be the case that starting school at an earlier age allows for
more potential for discrimination to occur or for the perception of discrimination to occur. If a
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student has more time in school exposed to the hierarchy of the host culture, they may feel more
discrimination than if they were still at home. Furthermore, migrant parents with children in
school are going to be more conscious of discriminatory acts that their child may undergo
within the institution, which may further hamper the results. Social tension, on the other hand,
may still decrease for the reasons hypothesized. While early entrance does allow more potential
for acts of discrimination, the overall exposure to the student population may still reduce social
tensions through the forming of friendship � and relationships and the general cultural exposure
of the host culture to the migrant culture and vice versa.
Unfortunately, the results of this research do not support the second hypothesis, thereby
negating expected conclusions. In fact, they are completely reversed. The main explanation for
this phenomenon simply points out the potential insufficiency of the dependent variable. As
previously mentioned, there is a multiplicity of influences on integration. Perhaps the inclusion
of a greater number or greater variety of these influences would hold more significant and
similar results. When controlling for the country variables, there appeared no real pattern in the
results. Apart from the differentiation explained by the number of respondents claiming ethnic
minority status, most of the results were not cohesive. Furthermore, some of the results, such as
the very low discrimination and social tension scores of Germany, appeared out of place
considering the high political and media attention that such issues have received in recent
years. This again may allude to the measurement problems of the dependent variable.
Overall, the inconsistencies within the data create real challenges. While the project
demonstrated some provocative results, they are extremely difficult to interpret because they
fail to paint a clear picture. One aspect of this is simply the limitation of the methodology. Due
to time constraints and the impracticality of extended cross-tabular analyses, few opportunities
to test various controls existed. A suggestion for future research would include indicators for
both the independent and dependent variables with more variance. This would eliminate the
problem of multicollinearity, allowing the researcher to run logistic regressions. These
improvements in methodology would expand the scope of the data and provide for clearer
interpretation. Furthermore, as previously suggested, further research should include a greater
variety of indicators to measure socio-cultural integration. Future research may be able to build
upon the foundation laid by this project, in order to further our understanding of the link
between European integration and education.
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APPENDIX

Table 5: Discrimination Spread (by percent) for Model as Controlled by Country
Level of Discrimination
Austria
Sweden
France
Germany
Netherlands
Denmark
0
1.7
19.2
60.4
18.7

0.4
3.4
19.7
51.3
25.1

Non-existent
Very Rare
Fairly Rare
Fairly Widespread
Very Widespread

3.1
6.6
24.2
50.2
15.8

0.2
1.3
15.9
55.8
26.8

1.4
5.4
20.9
54.9
17.5

1.8
9.2
34.2
44.3
10.5

UK

1.1
5.8
31.2
45.0
16.9

Table 6: Dichotomous Variables: Affirmative Responses for Experiences of Discrimination (in percent)
Denmark

Sweden

France

Austria

G ermany

Netherlands

UK

2.4
20.2

1.2
6.2

2.1
17.7

5
15.3

2
13.6

4.1
9.8

3.9
10.6

41.1

42.0

34.1

43.8

45.0

48.6

31.7

Personal
Other
Have Friends of
Different Ethnicities

Table 7: Respondents' Perceived Level of Social Tension (in percent)
None
Some
A Lot

Denmark

Sweden

France

Austria

Germany

Netherlands

UK

2.7
40.5
56.8

2.0
50.6
47.4

4.9
43.0
52.1

5.5
46.8
47.7

8.3
54.9
36.9

1.9
42.0
56.0

4.8
54.1
41.2
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PROSPECTS FOR PEACE AND DEMOCRACY: POWER-SHARING IN
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

Michael Burgess
Abstract:

Sub-Saharan Africa is one of the most politically unstable and undemocratic regions in the
world. Theories of power-sharing and recent studies have indicated that institutions that allow for higher
levels of power-sharing are often more successful at consolidating democracy and stability in highly
divided societies, like those common in Sub-Saharan Africa. By examining the electoral system, executive
type, and level of decentralization, this study first determines the level of institutional power-sharing for
each of the 48 Sub-Saharan states. Next, it compares these levels of power-sharing to indicators of
democracy and state stability to determine if more power-sharing does correspond to greater democracy
and stability. Using a bivariate analysis and factoring in region, the data shows that there is a strong and
significant correlation between higher levels of institutional power-sharing and higher levels of democracy
and state stability in Sub-Saharan Africa.
INTRODUCTION
The Sub-Saharan region of Africa is arguably one of the most divided and conflict-prone
regions in the world. The region is home to more than a thousand languages, and in the past
twenty years most Sub-Saharan countries have experienced violence ranging from ethnic
rebellions to genocide.! The chronic instability and deep cleavages of the states in this region
present comparative political scientists and institution crafters with a unique challenge: how to
implement a democratic system that is truly representative and stable. This challenge is
heightened by the question of how to set up a system that is not susceptible to failure and gives
all parties involved an incentive to see it succeed. Power-sharing, it is theorized, can provide
solutions to both of these problems. The ability for power-sharing institutions to include all
major parties in the decision-making process would appear to make them ideal candidates for
alleviating the tensions that exist between competing groups in Sub-Saharan states. For the
aforementioned reasons, power-sharing institutions are considered especially relevant not just
to the divided societies of Africa, but those across the globe.
Sub-Saharan Africa provides a hard test for determining how effective power-sharing
institutions can be in states that are often extremely divided and have experienced violence
relatively recently. Disputed elections have produced violence, and tension between ethnic
groups has often resulted in conflict, exemplified most shockingly by Rwanda. The resurgence
of violence is often a concern to both policy makers within these states and the international
community, as violence in one state can destabilize the surrounding region. Successful power
sharing is theorized to prevent the outbreak of violence by bringing all major stakeholders to
the table. Evidence of this can be found in Burundi, where in 2009 the last rebel group, the
National Liberation Forces, laid down their arms and were recognized as a legal political party.2

1

Oppong 2006; Global Report 2009.

2 Freedom House 2010: Burundi.

100

RES PUBLICA

Such instances seem to provide evidence that power-sharing can promote peace and
successfully integrate opposing groups into the political process. However, power-sharing is
not without its critics. The formal recognition of ethnic or linguistic groups may only serve to
institutionalize differences and exacerbate existing tensions. Granting groups considerable
levels of autonomy may only serve to weaken the state, as it can potentially lead to secession as
in the case of Southern Sudan. Because of the controversial nature of power-sharing institutions,
both its proponents and critics must be considered.
This study will approach the topic of power-sharing first by taking a step back to
consider the arguments and evidence of supporters and detractors of power-sharing
institutions. The purpose of this study is not to consider why states adopt power-sharing
institutions. Instead, it is to examine whether those Sub-Saharan states that have adopted
institutions allowing for higher levels of power-sharing have experienced higher levels of
democracy and stability. This study seeks to answer that question by comparing the
institutional levels of power-sharing in Sub-Saharan states to their measured levels of
democracy and stability. While power-sharing institutions are often cited as solutions for
mitigating conflict and consolidating democracy in cleaved states, surprisingly enough, their
influence as yet has not been tested in Sub-Saharan Africa.
THE CASES FOR AND AGAINST POWER-SHARING
The importance of determining whether or not power-sharing institutions improve
democracy and reduce conflict cannot be overstated. Establishing systematic evidence to
evaluate the impact of power-sharing institutions is both theoretically and politically important
for determining if these arrangements promote long-term peace, manage conflict, and
consolidate democracy in ethnically divided societies. There exists an extensive literature
dedicated to these very issues, which has been developed over the past several decades. This
paper draws substantially from the seminal work by Pippa Norris in 2008 in which the theories
of power-sharing are tested in a large number of cases across the globe. These power-sharing
regimes are characterized by formal institutional rules that give multiple political elites a stake
in the decision making process.3 Power-sharing constitutions share common characteristics that
include the following: executive power-sharing among a grand coalition of political leaders
drawn from all significant groups, proportional representation of major groups in elected and
appointed offices, and cultural autonomy for groups.
It is argued that in post-conflict or ethnically cleaved states the only viable types of
settlements capable of attracting agreement from all factions are power-sharing regimes that
avoid winner-takes-all electoral outcomes. The more inclusive these power-sharing
arrangements are the more likely they will develop stronger support from stakeholders and
therefore ensure stability. While other methods of resolving conflict in ethnically divided
societies have been attempted in the past, such as partition, these are often costly and end in

3 Norris 2008, 22.

RES PUBLICA

101

failure.4 Street indicates that power-sharing addresses the key issues that have caused ethnic
tension and hostility, and thus is ideal as a remedy to such problems. Institutions that allow for
the horizontal and vertical dispersal of power are most relevant to heterogeneous societies that
have a history of conflict and are in the process of democratizing. In Africa there is a tendency
for elites to concentrate power at the center and use repressive means as a way of asserting
controLS Avoiding such circumstances is necessary if there is to be any substantial consolidation
of democracy. The use of power-sharing in these segmented societies guarantees all significant
stakeholders a place in the national or regional governments and provides a strong incentive
for politicians to accept the legitimacy of the rules of game, moderate their views, and
collaborate with rivals. Norris suggests that power-sharing institutions also encourage support
for democracy by avoiding winner-take-all elections and guaranteeing minorities a voice in the
government. With assurances that they will not be excluded from government, minorities are
also less likely to take actions that might undermine the stability of the state.
While power-sharing institutions are often cited as being the best option for highly
divided societies, there are still those who challenge the claims that power-sharing institutions
are best for promoting democracy and mitigating conflict. Power-sharing regimes may in fact
serve to institutionalize ethnic cleavages and deepen rather than alleviate them. Explicitly
recognizing the rights of ethnic groups can make it more difficult to generate cross-cutting
cooperation in society by reducing electoral incentive for compromise. The formal recognition
of ethnic or linguistic groups may magnify the political importance of these identities. Solutions
to ethnic conflict that take pre-democratic factions as fixed and grant each group rights and
autonomy may in fact reinforce sub-national identities. By de-emphasizing such identities it
may be possible to turn citizens towards a concept of society that is more inclusive and tolerant
of other groupS.6
In addition to reinforcing societal divisions, Spears argues that power-sharing
institutions lead to a surprisingly unstable form of government that at best only provides a
short reprieve from violent conflicU Power-sharing arrangements are difficult to achieve and
even more difficult to put into practice, and do not stand the test of time or resolve conflict. At
the same time power-sharing regimes in post-conflict societies have an extremely difficult task
ahead of them; they must bridge the cleavages of groups in conflict.s Power-sharing is not about
forming a grand coalition of friends, but reconciling groups that are enemies. Including warring
parties and excluding moderates can have negative consequences for divided societies using
power-sharing.9 Using Rwanda as an example, Spears suggests that it is as difficult to forge an
alliance with a member of the opposition as it is to form an alliance with someone who is

4 Street 2004.
Bratton and Rothchild 1992.
Norris 2008, 28.
7 Spears 2002.
8 Ibid.
9 Jarstad 2006.

5
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considered a murderer. For many of these ethnically divided or post-conflict societies, power
sharing can be equated to making a deal with the devil and is therefore unlikely to last.
THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM: PR OR MAJORITARIAN?
Of the factors considered in this study, the type of electoral system a state institutes is
arguably the most important. Electoral system design is a crucial variable in democratic stability
because it provides the means by which political parties or minorities are either included in or
excluded from government. Proportional representation (PR) electoral systems typically employ
open or closed party lists or the use of a single transferable vote. In a study of several Sub
Saharan states, Reynolds finds that those states using proportional representation were more
successful and stable democracies.lo Lijphart (2004) notes that the type of electoral system is
crucial because it is significantly related to the development of the party system, type of
executive, and the relationship between the legislature and the executive. ll States using
plurality methods are more likely to have a two-party system and a one party state with a more
dominant executive. PR, on the other hand, is likely to be associated with a multi-party state,
coalitions, and a more equal legislative-executive relationship. These characteristics define the
consensus model of democracy that relies on separation, instead of concentration of power.12
The former two characteristics are significant for the representation of a diverse number of
groups in divided societies, while the later prevents an executive take over. Like Reynolds,
Norris also finds that states making use of PR are more successful at democratic consolidation,
as opposed to those using majority or plurality electoral rules.13
However, proportional representation has several shortcomings, often cited by its critics.
To begin with, the low voting thresholds that are characteristic in many proportional
representation electoral systems give small minority group representatives little incentive to
appeal to people outside their own ethnic group, while moderate political leaders may be
branded as traitors for attempting to appeal to a wider base. Proportional representation also
may serve to institutionalize and reinforce ethnic tensions in society by failing to provide
political leaders with incentives for cross-group cooperation. As Lardeyret (1991) argues, PR
systems are inherently more unstable since coalition governments cannot cope with serious
disagreements. This leads to instability as the executive is left vacant and time is needed to
construct a new coalition and government. These small minority parties tend to wield an undue
amount of power as they are often the swing votes in coalitions.PR's tendency to allow even
extremist parties into government is also problematic as they often are anti-state. Lardeyret's
most important criticism is that PR is the worst system to adopt for ethnically divided states in
Africa.14 Elections often degenerate into a competition between ethnic groups over public office

10 Reynolds 2009.
11

Lijphart 2004.

12 Lijphart 2006; 1999; Norris 2004.
13 Norris 2008, 130.
14 Lardeyret 1991.
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and the best way to counteract this is to encourage members of each group to run against one
another on trans-ethnic issues in single member districts.
Majoritarian electoral systems, in contrast to PR, are characterized by the use of either a
majority or plurality system. Majority systems usually employ a second ballot, while plurality
systems typically use a first-past-the-post method and both types of systems also make use of
single member districts (SMD). These majoritarian systems are thought to encourage bridging
strategies and force political leaders to appeal to a wider base of voters. It is theorized that more
moderate electoral appeals should therefore foster social tolerance and cooperation. Parties
must combine the differing interests of as many voters as possible and offer their electors a
coherent program that they will govern by. A moderation of parties also comes from this, as
most of the votes parties receive are from undecided voters in the middle.15 As Barkan suggests,
in agrarian societies - common in Sub-Saharan Africa - PR often does not produce electoral
results that are much more inclusive than majoritarian systems with SMD.16 In addition,
majoritarian systems make elected members directly responsible to constituent concerns and
provide each district with a representative at the national level.17 Conversely, PR tends to
weaken the links between voter and representative as each region has no definitive
representative. This in turn reduces the prospects for long-term democratic consolidation.18
Majoritarianism, like PR, has a number of shortcomings. Critics of majoritarian systems
argue that winner-takes-all elections often fail to produce stability in post-conflict or divided
societies19. According to Lijphart, in ethnically divided societies "majority rule spells majority
dictatorship and civil strife rather than democracy."2o Majoritarian regimes often fail to
incorporate minorities into the government and encourage excluded groups to resort to
alternative methods to express their demands. These can range from violent protests to civil
war, and even state failure. Majoritarian systems are also capable of producing vagaries, such as
the exclusion of substantially supported third parties and a parliamentary majority being won
with fewer total votes than the opposition. Established democracies may be able to tolerate such
representational anomalies, but these could prove catastrophic for fledgling African
democracies.21
PRESIDENTS AND PARLIAMENTS
The concept of a parliamentary executive, or using the legislature as a source for the
executive, lends itself well to power-sharing and is advantageous for a number of reasons. The
prime minister and cabinet can only continue to hold power so long as they have the support of
the majority of the legislature. There is then a stronger incentive for the executive and
15 Lardeyret 1991.
16

Barkan 1995.

17 Norris 2004.
18 Barkan

1998.

19 Binningsbo 2006.
20 Norris 2008, 25.
21 Reynolds 1995; 1999.
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legislature to collaborate, which increases inter-electoral flexibility and acts as a safeguard
against unpopular prime ministers.22 Prime ministers also tend to lead more collegial cabinets,
as opposed to the hierarchical cabinets found in presidential systems. This creates more
collective accountability, as the ministers must present a united agenda. Overall, parliamentary
executives offer more forms of accountability and come closest to exemplifying power-sharing.
Opposed to a parliamentary system, the decision to use a presidential system poses
several risks. To begin with, both the president and the legislature have a rival source of power,
the people, which can make it difficult to resolve deadlocks and disputes.23 The fixed term
lengths of a presidential system are less flexible, whereas an unpopular prime minister can be
much more easily removed from power and replaced without destabilizing the entire
government. Presidential executives can also be a slippery slope for fledgling democracies in
Sub-Saharan Africa, which have led to authoritarianism in the past.24 Additionally, presidential
systems are more unstable and thus more susceptible to regime collapse, while the winner
takes-all outcomes of presidential elections simultaneously raise the stakes and make it less
likely that the loser will accept the outcome. To add to this, the combination of the roles of both
the head of state and head of government reduces the checks and balances on the executive.25
Presidential systems also lack in representativeness and legitimacy, both of which are crucial to
democracy.
Presidential systems are often criticized and seldom defended. However, Shugart and
Carey offer four areas in which presidential systems are superior to parliamentary systems.
These areas are accountability, identifiability, mutual checks, and an arbiter.26 Presidential
systems are superior when it comes to the principle of maximizing direct accountability
between voters and elected officials. Presidents, being directly elected by voters, cannot be
removed due to shifting coalitions or unpopularity in the assembly. Voters can also more easily
identify who they are voting for in a presidential race. Under parliamentary systems, especially
those using PR, voting on party lists might be the only way voters can influence the executive.
The mutual checks created by presidential systems also ensure that the executive can check the
legislature and vice versa. In parliamentary systems the executive is not in a position to resist or
check assembly initiative.27 Finally, the distance between the president and the assembly means
the president cannot threaten the legislature by declaring a measure before the assembly a vote
of confidence. Instead, a president can act as an arbiter or moderator of disputes to secure
legislative agreement.

22

Norris 2008, 141.

23 Ibid., 132.
24 Shugart and Carey 1992.
25 Lijphart 2008.
26 Shugart and Carey 1992.
27 Ibid.

RES PUBLICA

105
FEDERALISM AND DECENTRALIZATION

The choice of electoral system and executive type influences the horizontal checks and
balances of power in the central institutions of the state. On the other hand, decentralization
determines vertical power-sharing among multiple layers of the government. Political, fiscal,
and administrative decentralization are arguably constitutional solutions to help mitigate
conflict, consolidate peace, and protect minority communities.28 Decentralized governance has
several advantages. First, it generates more democratic participation, representation, and
accountability. Democratically elected local and regional bodies give voters more opportunities
to participate in the democratic process increasing the accountability and responsiveness of
local officials. Next, fiscal decentralization reduces corruption by increasing the transparency
and accountability of elected officials. This point should be noted in regards to Sub-Sahara
Africa, as many of the states in the region are some of the most corrupt in the world. Another
advantage is the strengthening of public policy by allowing local governments to create and
implement region specific policies. This is an important point for Sub-Saharan states, as the
large size and diversity of the groups and regions within these states likely leads to issues
pertinent to only a particular constituency. The flexibility of decentralization is also typically
associated with better administrative efficiency in regards to public services and regulations, as
these are molded to fit each community. The advantages of decentralization are of great
relevance to highly divided societies, such as those in Sub-Saharan Africa, because they can
assist in accommodating multiple interests. While there are many different ways to achieve
decentralization, a study conducted by Nicholas Charron found that accomodationist forms of
vertical power-sharing, such as ethno-federalism, outperform integrationist forms of vertical
power-sharing in heterogeneous societies, in regards to quality of government.29 This suggests
that accommodating interests, as theories of power-sharing argue, is more successful.
It is worth noting that with regards to plural societies, common in Sub-Sahara Africa
and defined as states that contain multiple groups identified by ethnicity, religion, language,
and a multitude of other characteristics, federalism and decentralization are important
strategies for protecting the interests of spatially concentrated groups, especially if the
administrative boundaries reflect the distribution of these groups. As Norris and Lijphart
indicate, if the boundaries of sub-national governments are based on real social boundaries, the
plural communities within these boundaries can become homogeneous within their region and
thereby reduce communal violence and accommodate a multitude of interests within a single
state.3° Even in plural societies where ethnic groups are dispersed, decentralization can be used
to facilitate the representation of local minorities. Locally elected officials and local decision
making can assist in managing conflict by including leaders drawn from minorities and manage
sensitive cultural or educational matters. Decentralization as a means of power-sharing allows
the diverse groups within plural societies to protect their rights and defend their interests.
28 Norris 2008, 157.
29 Charron 2009.
30 Norris 2008, 162; Lijphart 1999.
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While the case for decentralization is strong, critics often charge that decentralized
governance is overly complex and leads to slow response times. By adding another layer of
government bureaucracy, decentralization may increase costs, decrease efficiency, and result in
poor services.31 The proponents of centralized governance argue centralization enhances
integration, leads to more decisive action, and is more cost effective. The claim that
decentralization increases representation and accountability has also met criticism. With
numerous levels of government it may be unclear as to who to appeal to, and the
responsibilities of representatives at different levels may overlap. The existence of multiple
levels of government can also lead to the rise in regional parties, which in turn may fragment
the party system at the national level. Decentralized governance also increases the possibility of
clientelistic relationships forming between politicians and private citizens. Under such
circumstances corruption may actually expand, not contract. The persistent conflict in Nigeria
and Sudan indicates that federalism has had a less than perfect record in Africa. There are
critics, as Norris indicates, that argue when multiethnic communities are intermingled,
territorial autonomy is ineffective at managing conflict.32 The creation of sub-national structures
may break up the state, while increased demands for autonomy may lead to conflict and even
secession. In decentralized states where boundaries are drawn along ethnic lines it may lead to
the rise in ethnically based parties or encourage politicians to use the I ethnic card' as a means of
attracting votes. This reinforces ethnic identities, generates competition and conflict among
groups, and destabilizes democratic institutions.33 Institutional arrangements that facilitate
territorial autonomy may also provide ethnic leaders with access to the media and legislature
where they can promote an agenda of intolerance and discrimination.
TO SHARE OR NOT TO SHARE?
Substantial evidence exists for both supporting or decrying power-sharing. Since power
sharing draws on both electoral and federal institutions as well as a system's executive
structure, it is unlikely that there will soon be a consensus on the effects of power-sharing.
Either power-sharing institutions do as theorized or they are flawed, but this question must not
be understudied. Previous studies have either drawn on a broader sample or an altogether
different part of the world. With supporters of power-sharing designating it a source of
democracy and peace, the obvious place it needs to be tested is where democracy and peace are
often absent: Sub-Saharan Africa. With the preceding literature in mind and the focus on Sub
Saharan Africa, this leads to two hypotheses.

31 Prudhomme 1995.
32 Norris 2008, 164.
33 Mozaffar and Scarritt 1999.
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These two hypotheses suggest that power-sharing institutions do provide more democracy and
stability, and this study attempts to either support or disprove them.
Hl:

Greater degrees of institutional power-sharing will be associated with greater levels of democracy.

H2:

Greater degrees of institutional power-sharing will be associated with greater state instability.
RESEARCH DESIGN

Sub-Saharan African is a region where attempts at democratic rule have resulted in
mixed success. The states within this region have implemented a variety of institutions, some
with greater degrees of power-sharing than others. The wide variety of cases in Sub-Saharan
Africa allows for the examination of levels of democracy and state stability from cases with
relatively little or no power-sharing, to those states with relatively high levels of power-sharing.
This study will use a most similar case design for the Sub-Saharan region. Using this design is
intuitive because it will determine whether power-sharing can explain the increased presence of
democracy and stability. Since the study is examining only Sub-Saharan Africa there are a
number of variables that need to be controlled. These factors include low levels of development,
recent transitions to democracy, ethno-linguistic heterogeneity, and former colonization.
In order to study the effects of power-sharing in Sub-Saharan Africa, this study will
examine all 48 states that comprise this region, according to the State Department's Bureau of
African Affairs.34 The institutions and measures of democracy and stability will only be
examined as to where they stand as of 2010. While studying the changes in democracy and
stability over a period of time would be insightful, this study does not attempt to accomplish
this due to the relatively fluid and dynamic nature of political institutions in Africa.
Determining a time frame in which a majority of the Sub-Saharan states' political institutions
remained stable would be near impossible. To assess the relationship between the variables, a
bivariate analysis will be used to determine correlation between three variables: Power-Sharing
Index Score, Freedom House Score, and Failed States Index Score.
The four sub-regions of Sub-Saharan Africa - Eastern, Central, Western, and Southern
will also be included as control variables. The regions are defined using the UN's definitions of
regions with three exceptions. First, Sudan is considered part of Sub-Saharan Africa, yet under
the UN's classification is part of Northern Africa. For this study Sudan is grouped with Eastern
Africa because of its location and proximity to other East African states. The next two
exceptions are Zimbabwe and Mozambique. Both of these states are defined as being part of
Eastern Africa. However, upon further review and consultation these states were included as
part of Southern Africa. This is due to their geographic location and because without these two
cases Southern Africa would have been comprised of a mere five states.

34 See appendix for full list of states and their scores.
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INDEPENDENT VARIABLE

The independent variable in this study is institutional power-sharing. It is measured by the
extent to which the formal institutions of a country allow for the inclusion of all major political
actors in the decision making process. In determining the levels of institutional power-sharing, I
will look at the three major institutions related to power-sharing: the electoral system, type of
executive, and state decentralization. Decentralization in this study refers to political,
administrative, and fiscal decentralization. These three institutions are the most critical to
power-sharing and ensuring the consolidation of democracy.
Those states that use PR, a parliamentary executive, and federalism have higher levels of
power-sharing. States that utilize a majoritarian electoral system, presidential executive, and are
highly centralized constitute systems, that according to the literature, allow for very little
power-sharing. To quantify levels of power-sharing I have developed a 10 point index ranging
from 0-9 that rates countries levels of power-sharing based on the aforementioned factors of
electoral system type, executive type, and degree of decentralization. All three factors will be
based on a 4-point scale, from 0-3, with higher scores indicating more power-sharing.
For the electoral system the scale goes as follows: Proportional representation = 3pts;
Mixed Member Proportional (MMP) = 2pts; SMD or Plurality = 1 pt; appointed legislature or
non-existence of the national legislature = Opts. For the electoral system variable, only the type
of electoral system used for the lower house is considered in this index. The use of PR is
associated with higher levels of power-sharing due to the low barriers it presents to parties
trying to gain representation in the legislature. Such low barriers allow a multitude of parties to
attain seats in the national legislature. MMP is a compromise in that it is neither PR nor
majoritarian, but represents a middle ground between the two. While not as inclusive as PR, it
is a step above majoritarian systems in terms of power-sharing. The problem with MMP is that
often the threshold for the PR part of the system is as high as 5% or more. This means that
groups dispersed throughout the country may not be able to attain representation. Majoritarian
systems using SMD are seen as the least conducive to power-sharing as it is often much more
difficult for minor parties to gain representation. The United States and United Kingdom are
commonly cited examples of how such systems often lead to either a two party state or a one
party system. There are cases in which the national legislature is either wholly appointed or
non-existent. As this runs contrary to the purpose of power-sharing, which is to promote
democracy, such institutions are regarded as allowing no degree of power-sharing.
The next institution considered is the executive branch, coded as follows: Parliamentary
system= 3pts; Semi-Presidential= 2pts; Presidential= lpt; appointed executive or monarchy
=Opts. A parliamentary executive is associated with higher levels of power-sharing because the
executive is often drawn from a coalition of parties that make up the majority in the lower
house. Parliamentary systems also allow for the changing of the executive in a much more
stable manner without the need for another national election. Systems that divide executive
power, typically between a president and prime minister, are referred to as semi-presidential.
While such systems do allow for the election of a prime minister and president these two
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officials typically come from the same party. Semi-presidentialism can also be dangerous if the
prime minister and president are from different political parties as this can result in executive
deadlock and competition for power. Established democracies like France might be able to
survive these situations, but in less stable states this could be a catalyst for conflict. Presidential
systems invest all executive power into a single person and in addition to being less
representative, elections to this position can be seen as a zero-sum game in highly divided
societies. This gives the losing parties less incentive to accept defeat, as recent elections in
Zimbabwe and Cote d'Ivoire have shown. The appointment of the executive, such as by an
occupying force, or a monarchy like Swaziland represent an executive in which no power
sharing can take place as the institution is utterly undemocratic. It should be noted that in this
index those countries that have a president and prime minister are only considered semi
presidential or parliamentary if the prime minister is chosen from the lower house or directly
elected. If the president appoints the prime minister as part of his cabinet the system is
considered presidential because the president is still effectively considered the head of state and
head of government.
The final factor, decentralization, can be broken down into three categories and goes as
follows: Federations = 3pts; Decentralized Unions = 2pts; Unitary States = 1pt. 35 States with no
central government or little to no control over territory =Opts. Federal institutions create another
level of democratic representation in which minor or local parties can gain representation. This
additional level of government also grants a degree of autonomy to these locales and allows
them manage local affairs. Decentralized hybrids, similar to Tanzania, have devolved powers
down to local levels of government and represent a step in the right direction in terms of
power-sharing. However in these systems nearly all important decision making and real power
still rests with the central government, especially in fiscal matters. A majority of Sub-Saharan
states represent a highly centralized unitary structure. Under such systems, there is little, if any,
devolution of power and nearly all decisions come from the central authority. If a state is failed,
like Somalia, any form of devolution of powers is impossible. The state cannot even consider
local or regional issues, let alone address them. With no place for representation from the local
to national level, it is impossible for groups to share power.36
Not all states will fit perfectly within these definitions. Even two states that are
presidential republics may have nuanced differences that set them apart. Levels of
centralization and electoral systems can be especially complicated. States are often simply
identified as federal or unitary.37 For others though decentralization may be viewed as much
more subtle process that involves incremental steps.38 The study of electoral systems usually
involves identifying the rules of the system in place. For example, it is often important to
distinguish between open and closed list PR. The inability of the index to include such detail is
a limitation. However, nearly all state institutions can be classified under one of the three subNorris 2008, 173.
See Appendix for Power-sharing Index (PSI) Table.
3? Lijphart 1999.
3 8 Norris 2008, 170.
35

36
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categories. The index considers the most relevant institutions and system types, which allows it
to accurately rank states based on their levels of institutional power-sharing.
DEPENDENT VARIABLES
The first dependent variable is democracy. Democracy will be measured using the
composite score of a country on the Freedom House Liberal Democracy Index. Freedom House
uses the Gastil Index, a 7-point scale for measuring political rights and civil liberties. While
other measures of democracy were considered, Freedom House was the only one with scores
for the year 2010. Changes in a states' ranking are also explained along with any relevant
political changes that took place. The index also does not favor any particular type of
democratic institution. In other words, by default it does not consider a parliamentary executive
any more democratic than a presidential executive.
Freedom House, an independent think tank based in the United States began assessing
political trends in the 1950s. In 1972 it switched to the Gastil Index which assigns ratings of the
political rights and civil liberties for each state and then categorizes them as free, partially free,
or not free. The index tracks the existence of political rights by looking at the electoral processes,
political pluralism, and the functioning of government. Civil liberties are measured in terms of
the existence of freedom of speech and association, rule of law, and personal rights. The
classifications are based on a checklist of questions, which includes ten separate items that relate
to the existence of political rights and fifteen items concerning civil liberties. These items assess
the institutional checks and balances of power on the executive by the legislature, an
independent judiciary, and the existence of political rights and civil liberties. These also include
self-determination and participation by minorities, and free and fair elections laws. Each item is
given a score from 0-4 and all are equal when combined. The raw scores of a country are then
converted into a 7-point scale of political rights and a 7-point scale of civil liberties. These two
scores are then combined to determine the average rating of a state and whether it is free, partly
free, or not free.39
Although it provides scores for nearly all states and independent territories as well as
being a long running time-series of observations, there are several flaws and biases. First the
process used by Freedom House suffers from lack of transparency, so it is impossible to check
the reliability and consistency of coding decisions. The items used to measure political rights
and civil liberties also cover a wide range of issues, some of which might not necessarily be
indicative of democracy. Since no breakdown of the composite scores is made available it is
impossible to test which of the items correlate most with democracy. While it is biased in the
sense that it measures only liberal democracy, it is widely used and trusted as providing an
accurate representation of a states' level of democracy.4o
The second dependent variable is state stability. To measure this I utilized the Failed
States Index from ForeignPolicy.com and the Fund for Peace. The Failed State Index defines a
39 Freedom House.
40 Norris 2008; Munck and Verkuilen 2002; See Appendix for Freedom House Scores.
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state as failing when it loses physical control over its territory or a monopoly on the legitimate
use of force. The erosion of legitimate authority, inability to provide public services, and
inability interact with other states are also characteristics. The index includes 177 states and the
Fund for Peace uses the Conflict Assessment System Tool (CAST), an original methodology
developed over the past decade. The CAST model employs a four step trend-line analysis, (1)
consisting of rating twelve social, economic, political, and military indicators; (2) assessing the
capabilities of five core state institutions considered essential for sustaining security; (3)
identifying idiosyncratic variables or factors; and (4) placing countries on a conflict map that
shows the conflict history of the states being analyzed. The twelve indicators used are:
Demographic Pressures, Refugees/IDPs, Group Grievance, Human Flight, Uneven
Development, Economic Decline, Delegitimization of the State, Public Services, Human Rights,
Security Apparatus, Factionalized Elites, and External Intervention.41
The ranking a state receives is based on the total combined scores of these twelve
indicators. Each indicator is measured on a scale from 0-10, with zero being the most stable and
ten being the most unstable. These indicators are then combined to form a scale from 0-120 in
which higher scores indicate more instability. The CAST methodology has been peer-reviewed
over the past decade by independent scholars, educational, government, and private
institutions (Fund for Peace). Since the ratings are meant to measure the vulnerability of a state
they cannot predict when a state might collapse or experience violence. Although the trend lines
that these scores produce may be used as a means of determining the future direction of a state.
Unfortunately the raw data used in creating these rankings is not readily available due to it
being drawn from millions of news articles and reports. However the index values are readily
available to the public.42
REGION
Region is factored in due to the potential effects it may have on stability and democracy.
As has happened before in Africa, a result of civil war is often human flight. A massive influx of
refugees can place a great strain on the recipient country. The violence that drove these refugees
might not only follow them, but their sudden presence in a foreign state has the possibility of
inciting a xenophobic backlash among the native population. Another dangerous possibility is
the chance rebel groups may use neighboring states as a launching point for attacks. Regional
conflict has the potential to destabilize all surrounding states and maintaining stability is
undoubtedly easier if neighboring states are not imploding due to civil war. Region is also
important when considering democracy because of the idea of regional diffusion. In other
words, democracy in one state has the potential to influence and spread to surrounding states.
The ideas and institutions adopted by one state can impact those of another. If all states within a
particular region had adopted democratic institutions, while states outside of this region had
failed to do so, one could conclude that regional factors played a role in spreading democracy.
41 Foreign Policy.
42 See Appendix for Failed States Index Scores.
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DATA ANALYSIS AND RESULTS

As the data test the two competing bodies of literature on power-sharing institutions
and the possible effects of region, there are several expected outcomes. If the data support the
hypotheses that those states with higher levels of institutional power-sharing have higher levels
of democracy and stability, then there should be a positive correlation between the Power
Sharing Index Score (PSI) and Freedom House Score (FH). There should also be a negative
relationship between the PSI Score and Failed States Index Score (FSI). If the data do not
support the hypotheses, the opposite will be seen in the results. A third outcome in this case is
possible. The results may support none of the stated hypotheses and there simply might not be
a significant relationship in either direction. This would truly be disappointing as it would
imply that no set of institutions is likely to be any more effective in Sub-Saharan Africa.
If region does have any significant affect on democracy and stability we should see this
in the form of significant positive correlations between the individual regions and FH Scores
and FSI Scores. The absence of such significant correlations means we can rule out region as
have any meaningful impact on a state's measured level of democracy or stability. However, the
presence of any significant findings would indicate that there are regional factors that are
influencing how stable and democratic a state is. The number of cases used in this study, 48,
while relatively large for a comparative study, also means each individual case can have a
larger effect on the overall results. While this small number may justify the use of a ninety
percent confidence level, statistical significance will only be given to results achieving a ninety
five percent confidence leveL
Table 1 shows the results of the bivariate correlation between the FSI Score, PSI Score,
FH Score, and region. The first notable result can be seen in the strength and significance of the
correlation between democracy and stability. While this association may seem obvious, it
indicates that these two characteristics are not simply two random and unrelated concepts.
Instead, it points to the fact that these are two characteristics of a state that are strongly
associated with each other. Since power-sharing institutions are theorized to improve these two
aspects of a state, it is crucial they actually be related. The next significant result is the strong
correlation between institutional power-sharing and democracy. This indicates that those states
with higher levels of institutional power-sharing also have correspondingly higher levels of
democracy. This supports the hypothesis that a higher level of institutional power-sharing is
associated with more democracy. The correlation between power-sharing and stability also
turns out to be significant at the ninety-five percent level of confidence and moderately strong.
The negative correlation is expected here as it shows that higher levels of power-sharing
correlate negatively with instability. This supports the second hypothesis that higher levels of
institutional power-sharing will be associated with more stability. As we see with these results,
region has no significant relationship to either of the dependent variables. Thus the findings
exclude region as being strongly associated with stability or democratization.
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Table 1: Correlation between power-sharing (PSI), stability (FSI), democracy (FH) and Region
Dependent Variables: FSI Score and FH Score
FH Score FSI Score PSI Score
Western
Central
Eastern
FH Score

FSI Score

.703**
(.000)

PSI Score

.455**
(.001)

-.318*
(.028)

Eastern

-.114
(.438)

.028
(.852)

-.233
(.111)

Western

.167
(.257)

-.011
(.939)

.117
(.427)

.574**
(.000)

Central

-.255
(.080)

.181
(.218)

-.090
(.545)

.316*
(.029)

.331*
(.021)

Southern

.196
(.182)

-.213
(.147)

.247
(.091)

.292*
(.044)

.306*
(.034)

.185
(.209)

48

48

48

48

48

48

N
**p<O.Ol, *p<0.05

The other significant findings reveal that the regions correlate with each other, in all but
one instance, because they all share the similar characteristics of high instability and lower
levels of democracy. The one instance in which the regions do not correlate with each other is in
the case of Central and Southern Africa. This is most likely because Southern Africa is arguably
the most stable and democratic region of Sub-Saharan Africa, while Central Africa is the worst
in these regards. 43
CONCLUSIONS
Theories of power-sharing suggest that institutions that allow for the inclusion of all
major actors will produce more democracy and greater stability. These consociational systems
have been studied extensively over the past several decades by scholars such as Norris and

43 If Zimbabwe and Mozambique are grouped in with Eastern Africa the results of the correlation differ greatly for

Southern Africa and alter the conclusions that can be drawn. When this is done, Southern Africa has a correlation
with stability of -.319 that is significant at the ninety-five percent level of confidence. This is almost exactly the same
strength of the correlation between power-sharing and stability. This indicates that the stability of a region plays a
role in state stability. The relationship between democracy and Southern Africa also improves to .261 with a
significance of .073. The correlation with power-sharing also increases to .277 with a significance of .056. What these
alternate results point towards is that Southern Africa has adopted institutions with more power-sharing. In doing so
the result has been higher levels of democracy and stability.
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Lipjhart, producing a debate about their effects. This study has attempted to contribute to that
debate by testing the relationship between higher levels of institutional power-sharing and
democracy and conflict in the tumultuous region of Sub-Saharan Africa. The results show that
those states with higher levels of institutional power-sharing are associated with greater
democracy and stability. While these findings by no means conclude the debate, the results
clearly support proponents of power-sharing. There has been very little work done to study the
effects of power-sharing institutions of Sub-Saharan Africa. The theoretical literature predicts
two sets of competing hypotheses on the expected outcomes of increased power-sharing.
However, previous studies have not focused on the part of the world where these institutions
may be needed most. This study takes the first step in determining whether or not power
sharing institutions do work Sub-Saharan Africa.
With many African states deeply divided and under duress, studies of this kind can
assist policymakers in determining the correct institutions to implement. Looking to cases to
like South Africa, Cape Verde, and Sao Tome and Principe, other states can see how power
sharing institutions have assisted in creating free and stable states. This study should not be
viewed as the final word on power-sharing institutions in Sub-Saharan Africa. Examples exist
within Sub-Saharan Africa, such as Ethiopia and Niger, where states have moved to institutions
allowing for greater degrees of power-sharing and yet their levels of democracy and stability
remain dangerously low. It is important for scholars to continue studying the precise reasons as
to why power-sharing has been more effective in some states than others.
The aforementioned cases of failure point towards factors affecting power-sharing not
covered in this study. It is possible that corruption or lack of funds has prevented such
institutions from functioning as they are theoretically designed to function. The literature also
makes an important distinction between those states that are highly divided or post-conflict.
This difference is important because past conflict can make it more difficult to bring all major
actors to the table, while cleaved societies may simply be seeking a means of fairer
representation. Deeply divided societies with a high degree of ethno-linguistic fractionalization
may also affect the duration of such institutions as the possibility of conflict can be greater. As
mentioned in the design section of this study, institutional duration was something that
unfortunately had to be omitted for logistical reasons. However, examining the duration of
power-sharing institutions would go far in disproving the critics that power-sharing institutions
do not last, or vindicate their theories about the fragility of such institutions.
The purpose of this study was not to try and account for every possible factor
influencing the success or failure of power-sharing in Sub-Saharan Africa. Instead, it was meant
to act as a starting point for future research. To gain a better perspective on what conditions are
conducive to the success of these institutions and what may lead to their failure requires a more
in depth look into the regions and individual cases. In doing so it can also be more fully
understood how power-sharing institutions affect regime change and the formation of political
parties. With that being said it is critical that we determine which set of institutions are most
likely to provide democracy and stability for the states of Sub-Saharan Africa.
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Appendix

List of Sub-Saharan States, Scores, System Type, and Region
Electoral
Svstem

Executive

Decentralization Region

PR

Pres.

Unitary

Central

3

Maj.

Pres.

Unitary

Western

68.6

5

Maj.

Par.

Unitary

Southern

4

90.7

6

PR

Semi

Unitary

Western

Burundi

4.5

96.7

5

PR

Pres

Unitary

Eastern

Cameroon

6

95.4

5

Maj.

Semi

Decentralized

Central

Cape Verde

1

77.2

7

PR

Par.

Unitary

Western

CAR

5

106.4

3

Maj.

Pres.

Unitary

Central

Chad

6.5

113.3

3

Maj.

Pres.

Unitary

Central

Comoros

3.5

85.1

5

Maj.

Pres.

Federal

Eastern

DRC

6

109.9

4

MMP

Pres.

Unitary

Central

RofC

5.5

92.5

3

Maj.

Pres.

Unitary

Central

Cote d'Ivoire

5.5

101.2

4

Maj.

Semi

Unitary

Western

Djibouti

5

81.9

4

Maj.

Semi

Unitary

Eastern

Equatorial

7

88.5

5

PR

Pres.

Unitary

Western

Eritrea

7

93.3

3

Maj.

Pres.

Unitary

Eastern

Ethiopia

5

98.8

7

Maj.

Par.

Federal

Eastern

Gabon

5.5

75.3

3

Maj.

Pres.

Unitary

Central

Gambia

5

80.2

3

Maj.

Pres.

Unitary

Western

Ghana

1.5

67.1

4

Maj.

Pres.

Decentralized

Western

Country

FH Score

FSI Score

PSI Score

Angola

5.5

83.7

5

Benin

2

76.8

Botswana

2.5

Burkina Faso

Guinea

TTninn

Guinea

6.5

105

4

MMP

Pres.

Unitary

Western

Guinea-Bissau

4

97.2

6

PR

Semi

Unitary

Western

Kenya

4

1 00.7

3

Maj.

Pres.

Unitary

Eastern

Lesotho

3

82.2

6

MMP

Par.

Unitary

Southern

Liberia

3.5

91.7

3

Maj.

Pres.

Unitary

Western

Madagascar

5

82.6

4

Maj.

Semi

Unitary

Eastern

Malawi

3.5

93.6

3

Maj.

Pres.

Unitary

Eastern

116

RES PUBLICA

Country

FH Score

FSI Score

PSI Score

Electoral
System

Executive

Decentralization Region

Mali

2.5

79.3

4

Maj.

Semi

Unitary

Western

Mauritania

5.5

89.1

4

Maj.

Semi

Unitary

Western

Mauritius

2

44.4

5

Maj.

Par.

Unitary

Eastern

Mozambique

3.5

81.7

5

PR

Pres.

Unitary

Eastern

Namibia

2

74.5

6

PR

Pres.

Decentralized

Southern

Niger

4.5

97.8

6

PR

Semi

Nigeria

4.5

100.2

5

Maj.

Rwanda

5.5

88.7

5

Sao Tome &

2

75.8

Senegal

3

Seychelles

TTnion

Unitary

Western

Pres.

Federal

Western

PR

Pres.

Unitary

Eastern

7

PR

Par.

Unitary

Central

74.6

5

MMP

Semi

Unitary

Western

3

67.9

4

MMP

Pres.

Unitary

Eastern

Sierra Leone

3

93.6

5

PR

Pres.

Unitary

Western

Somalia

7

114.3

0

N/A

N/A

N/A

Eastern

South Africa

2

67.9

9

PR

Par.

Federal

Southern

Sudan

7

111.8

4

N/A

Pres.

Federal

Eastern

Swaziland

6

82.8

2

Maj.

N/A

Unitary

Southern

Tanzania

3.5

81.2

4

Maj.

Pres.

Decentralized

Eastern

Principe

Togo

4.5

88.1

5

PR

Pres.

Uganda

4.5

97.5

3

Maj.

Zambia

3.5

83.9

3

Zimbabwe

6

110.2

4

Bnion

Unitary

Western

Pres.

Unitary

Eastern

Maj.

Pres.

Unitary

Eastern

Maj.

Semi

Unitary

Eastern

Sub-Saharan States, Freedom House Scores, Failed States Index Scores, System Types, and Region.
Source(s); State Department Bureau of African Affairs; Freedom House 2010; Failed States Index 2010;
CIA World Factbook; UN Definition of Regions; Political Handbook of Africa: 2007. www.state.gov;
www.freedomhouse.org; www.foreignpolicy.com; www.cia.gov; www.un.org.
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Power-sharing Index Table (PSI)
Score

Electoral System

Executive

Decentralization

3

Proportional
Representation

Parliamentary

Federal

2

Mixed Member
Proportional

Semi-Presidential

Decentralized Union

1

Majoritarian
(Plurality/FPTP w /
SMD)
Appointed or nonexistent

Presidential

Unitary

Monarchy or Appointed

Failed State

0

Power-sharing Index (PSI). Source(s) : CIA World Factbook; Political Handbook of Africa: 2007.
www.cia.gov.
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INTRODUCTION TO THE CLASSICAL POLITICAL THOUGHT ESSAYS

These essays were selected by Professor Simeone as the three best essays for one of the
assignments in last fall's theory class. Students in the theory classes work on their persuasive
essay writing skills. The claim-objection-rejoinder format requires students to state their views
with economy and precision. Students vote for the best essay; the winner receives the coveted
"Certificate of Merit." The majority in the fall section chose Sara Ghadiri's essay. Which would
you choose?
The full title of the class is Classical Political Thought: Democracy in Athens and America. The
class has multiple goals; it fulfills both the department's theory requirement and an "intellectual
traditions" general education category. On the political science side, this class needs to
introduce students to the important debate over the drivers of state behavior among realists,
constructivists, and liberal institutionalists. On the general education side, the class is intended
to introduce students to the great texts of classical political thought and the key questions that
prompted those texts. These goals are addressed in part by reading Thucydides' masterwork,
History of the Peloponnesian War. Thucydides forces students to consider whether just wars exist
and the role of rhetoric in democratic societies.
The class also reads Sophocles, Plato, Aristophanes, and Aristotle. Plato's Crito provides the
essay contest question: under what conditions are democratic dissenters, i.e., those who disobey
the law of a limited government, justified?
Socrates makes at least three arguments in the Crito for why he ought to obey the jury sentence
against him: (1) because one ought "to fulfill all one's agreements, provided they are just" (4ge);
(2) because disobedience destroys "the Laws, and the whole state as well" (SOb); and (3) because
one is "even more bound to respect ... your country" than one's father (SIb).
Richard Kraut believes that despite these arguments, Socrates' view does allow for a measure of
civil disobedience such as the philosopher displayed in the A pology. This is because Socrates
also argues that "you must do what your city and your country commands, or else persuade it
that justice is on your side" (SIc). The addition of the persuasion option creates an opening for
dialogue and civil disobedience. But how wide is this opening for civil disobedience, and what
principles justify it?
To provide more specificity, we turn to the different answers to this question offered by
Americans Abe Fortas and Howard Zinno For Fortas the opening is very narrow because only
invalid and unconstitutional laws should be disobeyed, proper dissent is limited to breaking
only these laws, and dissenters must accept the punishment that comes even with breaking
unjust laws. Kimberley Brownlee calls this a "deference to the law" approach. Zinn argues that
both parts of Fortas' deference view - the limit on proper disobedience and the requirement of
accepting state punishment - are fallacious.
Students were asked to write an essay giving reasons for holding that either Fortas or Zinn has
the more defensible position.
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EXCEPTIONS TO THE RULE OF LAW

Michael Browning
Abe Fortas describes himself as a man of the law, saying that "each of us owes a duty of
obedience to law," claiming that it is "a moral as well as a legal imperative."l Fortas has great
reverence for the United States' system of government and law and its constitutional
framework, but admits that if he had been a "Negro" in the Deep South, he would have
disobeyed the state segregation laws.2 In his essay on Civil Disobedience, he groups
"trespassing on private and official premises" with "assaults upon recruiters for munitions
firms and for the armed services; breaking windows in the Pentagon and in private stores and
homes; and occupying academic offices."3 He dismisses excuses for this kind of conduct as
"nonsense." Fortas reconciles his belief in the rule of law and his belief in disobeying unjust
laws by insisting that only unjust and unconstitutional laws be disobeyed. Furthermore, he
believes that law breakers must accept their punishment, in what he describes as the "great
tradition" of civil disobedience.4 But when Dr. Martin Luther King ignored an injunction by the
state and led a protest in Birmingham that the Supreme Court later upheld as illegal, Fortas was
one of the dissenters, saying that he had "no moral criticism to make of Dr. King's action in this
incident, even though it turned out to be legally unjustified."5 How can one insist that a law
breaker is morally justified and at the same time believe that there is a moral imperative that the
law breaker owes a duty of obedience to the law?
Howard Zinn asserts that even Fortas himself cannot reconcile the two. Zinn claims that
Fortas' overall argument is inconsistent because "more and more, Fortas' definition of what is
moral coincides almost exactly with what is constitutional, and what is constitutional is what
the Supreme Court decides".6 Thus Zinn argues that Fortas' belief reduces morality to law,
which leaves little room for the sometimes extraordinary exceptions in which civil disobedience
is needed to change unjust laws and situations. Arguing in line with Henry David Thoreau and
other famed civil dissenters, Zinn says that "if political science does not include a moral
philosophy and the idea of civil disobedience, it becomes merely a register of whatever
regulations the politicians of the time have ordered."7 Referring back to Fortas' example of Dr.
Martin Luther King, Zinn asks "why was it right for Dr. King to accept an unjust verdict
corroborating an unjust injunction, resulting in an unjust jail sentence?"8 Zinn regards these
acts as oppressive, and insists that a law breaker should not be willing to admit wrongness and
fault just because the Supreme Court or any other court decided the other way. He writes that
"when unjust decisions are accepted, injustice is sanctioned and perpetuated."9

1 Fortas, Abe. 1968. Concerning Dissent and Civil Disobedience. New York: Signet, 18.
2 Ibid.

3 Ibid., 34.
4 Ibid.
5 Ibid., 35.
6 Zinn, Howard. 2002. Disobedience and Democracy: Nine Fallacies on Law and Order. Cambridge: South End
Press, 32.
7 Ibid., 34.
8 Ibid., 29.
9 Ibid.
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Fortas vehemently disagrees, contending that an individual cannot "pick and choose"
which laws to obey and accept the consequences. His regard for the rule of law falls under the
fair play theory, in which he says that "a citizen cannot demand of his government or of other
people obedience to the law, and at the same time claim a right in himself to break it by lawless
conduct, free of punishment or penalty."lO Fortas also goes on to condemn the use of violence
in protest, claiming that there are plenty of forums for civil discourse that allow dissenters to
persuade their government peacefully. Fortas notes that it is a city's duty to provide these
forums, and that "an enormous degree of self-control and discipline are required on both
sides".l1 If this fair play theory works as Fortas asserts it does, then civil dissenters have a duty
to follow laws or accept punishment for the laws they break in protest.
Unfortunately for Fortas, fair play is a theory and not a real world application. The
example that he cites with Dr. King in Birmingham reveals his inconsistencies. The government
does not always provide adequate forums for discourse, and specifically denied the venue for
Dr. King. Zinn notes that "if we check Fortas' language carefully, we note that the government
being bound by law is an expectation, while the citizen's being bound by law is a fact."12 Fortas
admits that "it is a deplorable truth that because [police] are officers of the state they frequently
escape the penalty for their lawlessness."13 Zinn further insists that Fortas' reliance on the
Supreme Court has not only failed in specific circumstances (like that of Dr. King and Dred
Scott), but is also inherently unfair because "the Court is still a branch of government... and in
the never-ending contest between authority and liberty that goes on in every society, the
agencies of government, at their best, are still on the side of authority."14 Additionally, the
government does pick and choose which laws it enforces, so the idea that a citizen cannot pick
and choose as a form of discourse contradicts the notion of fair play.
A system of government that allows for effective political discourse in all situations would
have no need for civil disobedience, but it is fallacious to assume that such a government exists
in the United States. History has proven that civil disobedience is sometimes a last resort
option to effect change in policies. Should the protest of unjust laws, whether in speech or in
action, be punished because of the theoretical implications of fair play? Violence and other
harmful actions certainly deserve stricter scrutiny than other forms of protest, but the idea that
Dr. King and Dred Scott were wrong because the Supreme Court declared it so is inconceivable,
yet that is what Fortas' logic requires. The laws in question for Dred Scott and Dr. Martin
Luther King violated the notion of what it means to be human, and there are no theories of law
that can justify the punishment afflicted on them. Moreover, there is no validity in arguing that
the justice system has eventually worked out these past atrocities. The individuals affected by
unjust laws will not be comforted by the assurance that it will all work out in the end. Thus, the
only theories of law that can account for true and effective civil discourse are those that provide
exceptions for one of the most valuable forms of speech in our nation's history, civil
disobedience.

10 Fortas 1968, 33.
11 Ibid., 36.
12 Zinn 2002, 23.
13 Fortas 1968, 33.
14 Zinn 2002, 8.
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THE LIMITS OF CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE

Chris Schaeffer
The opportunities for civil disobedience to occur within democratic institutions are
abundant. However, the extent to which persons can exercise civil disobedience is the subject of
great debate among scholars. To be clear, the term civil disobedience "has been used to apply
to a person's refusal to obey a law which the person believes to be immoral or
unconstitutional."l Some believe, as does Howard Zinn, that this practice should entail certain
excitable actions that are more extreme and blatantly unlawful in their execution.2 Others, like
Supreme Court Justice Fortas, believe civil disobedience should ultimately acquiesce to the rule
of law within a democratic institution.3 Overall, Fortas' argument is more defensible because
"the motive of civil disobedience does not confer immunity for law violation."4 A democratic
government provides alternative methods for countering unjust or unconstitutional laws.
Civil disobedience should not supersede the rule of law because in the American
constitutional system, the rule of law is dually prescribed to both citizens and the government.
The actions and consequences are limited and equal to both the population and the government
that is in power. Fortas defends this claim when he states, "Just as our form of life depends
upon the government's subordination to law under the constitution, so it also depends upon the
individual's subservience to the laws duly prescribed. liS Individuals who practice civil
disobedience should be bound by the laws, for if they are not, then the social compact between
the citizen and government is broken. Fortas furthers this notion when he claims, "A citizen
cannot demand of his government or of other people obedience to the law, and at the same time
claim a right in himself to break it by lawless conduct, free of punishment or penalty."6 A
mutual acceptance of the Constitution and laws is necessary to preserve democratic institutions
and ensure continued success. Socrates ponders this proposal when he asks Crito, "Do you
imagine that a city can continue to exist and not be turned upside down, if the legal judgments
which are pronounced in it have no force but are nullified and destroyed by private persons?"7
Even Howard Zinn, who is in disagreement with this position, recognizes the importance of the
state when he explains, "surely the state is an instrument. . . for the achievement of human
values."B However, if the rule of law is to be determined and enforced on a biased and
individual basis, then the state cannot exist to further any human values. Therefore, the rule of
law should be enforced, even in light of civil disobedience, so that democratic institutions can
ensure order and continuation of furthering the human values in pursuance.
Despite the position posited by Fortas, numerous objections can be made to the contrary.
The utilization of more extreme measures within civil disobedience is necessary to continually
aid the growth of democracy. Also, these forms of disobedience create a quicker avenue for
change within the democratic system. Zinn supports these claims when he suggests that civil
1

Fortas 1968, 30.

2 Zinn 2002, 18.
3

Fortas 1968, 30.

4 Ibid., 32.
5 Ibid., 33.
6

Ibid.

7 Plato. Hugh Tredennick and Harold Tarrant, trans. 1993. The Last Days of Socrates. New York, 90.
B

Zinn 2002, 10.
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disobedience should "resist the government's actions against the lives and liberties of its
citizens; to pressure, even to shock the government into change; to organize people to replace
the holders of power ... "9 Regardless of the speed of change this strategy suggests, this form of
civil disobedience is misapplied for the success and continuation of human values and
democracy. Fortas expounds on this point when he states, "Civil disobedience, even in its
broadest sense, does not apply to efforts to overthrow the government or to seize control of
areas or parts of it by force ... These are programs of revolution."lo These forms are inferior to
peaceful demonstrations of civil disobedience because they undermine the democratic
institutions and demand unlawful practices to alter the nature of government.
Although these ' exciting' and confrontational forms of disobedience may produce quick
and rapid results, they merely perpetuate the extreme measures for all future forms of
disobedience. Fortas explains this claim more eloquently when he declares, "Unremitting
pressure ... will undoubtedly expedite response ... but the reaction to repeated acts of violence
may be repression instead of remedy."ll The extreme measures of civil disobedience will be
met by more extreme measures to suppress the unlawful and insubordinate actions of the
participants. Furthermore, "Violence is never defensible - and it has never succeeded in
securing massive reform in an open society where there were alternative methods of winning
the minds of others to one's cause and securing changes in the government or its policies."12 If
extreme measures are continually utilized to "overthrow the government," then there will be no
peaceful transitions from one ruling party to the next. As a direct and dire result, the legitimacy
of a democratic institution is undermined for the violent and coercive forms of majority or
minority revolution. Instead, "it is basically conscience, justice, and a long and entirely justified
view of national interest that impel the. . . majority to rectify an intolerable situation."13 This
mirrors Socrates' belief, which states that "you must do whatever your city and your country
commands, or else persuade it that justice is on your side; but violence against mother or father
is an unholy act, and it is a far greater sin against your country."14 Ultimately, a democratic
government is an arena for debate, contemplation, and compromise in which the conflicting
ideologies and beliefs of a diverse citizenry are negotiated to further human values and justice.

9 Ibid., 7.

10 Fortas 1968, 30.
11 Ibid., 38.
12 Ibid., 40.
13 Ibid., 39.
14 Plato 1993, 91.
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ZINN AND FORTAS: FAIR PLAY AND CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE

Sara Ghadiri
Abe Fortas and Howard Zinn both present arguments defending civil disobedience, but
Zinn has the more defensible position. Both of them argue within the framework of the fair play
theory of obligation, where obligation is derived from the expectation that both parties will
follow the rules of the game. Zinn, however, argues that the individual ought to be able to
negotiate their side of the rules.
Fortas states that we owe a duty of obedience to law as a "moral and legal imperative."ls
Zinn counters, stating that the Fortas is inconsistent. According to Zinn, Fortas is actually
arguing that obedience to the law supersedes obedience to morality. To that point, Zinn argues,
"there can be no moral imperative to obey an immoral law, unless the very idea of obedience
has an overriding moral value."16 We cannot, therefore, obey immoral laws. The rule of law as
described by Fortas is a necessary condition for justice. Without the rule of law, we would have
no justice, and justice is paramount.
Zinn debunks the necessity of Fortas' rule of law, however. He has four claims: that the
idea that disobedience is wrong because it fosters a general disrespect for all laws, including
good ones, is false; it is empirically false that disobedience of bad laws creates disrespect for all
laws; while civil disobedience can have a proliferating effect, it does not lead to a general
breakdown of order; and the idea that civil disobedience will not lead to "bad" groups using
civil disobedience. These claims all entail that the rule of law is not necessary for justice.
It is from the rule of law, though, Fortas claims, that we derive order. The rule of law
means that individuals must accept rulings of the court and serve what punishment they are
dealt regardless of their immorality. We risk losing any semblance of that order and the stability
of the law would be undermined if we do not accept the punishments given to us. Order, he
argues, is just because it allows for change by the ballot box, or by peaceful means of protest.
Fortas seems to place order before justice.
Zinn argues contrarily that order and justice ought to be on the same footing. Were that
the case, he says, everything would be fine and no protest or civil disobedience would be
necessary. It is actually because the rule of law hides injustices, that civil disobedience is
necessary. The rule of law does not create order, but rather pretends to keep the peace in order
to perpetuate a false social conception of order. Individuals protest because the rule of law does
preserve justice. Thus, the rule of law should not be preserved by acquiescing to unjust
punishment. It is to this point that Zinn argues that those who commit acts of civil disobedience
should not be compelled to serve punishment for disobeying an immoral law. "When unjust
decisions are accepted, injustice is sanctioned and perpetuated."17 If we do not require the rule
of law for a sense of order, and we do not wish to sanction injustice, it is best that we commit
acts of civil disobedience. If justice and order are not held in equal esteem, justice ought to be
above order.
15 Fortas 1968, 18.
16 Zinn 2002, 13.
17
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Conversely, Fortas states that the system and the structure thereof allow full
opportunity for both the state and the individual to bring their claims before a court, thereby
limiting the amount of injustice that should occur. He also claims that the system promotes
lawfulness for all, and states, "just as we expect the government to be bound by all laws, so each
individual is bound by all laws."18 Furthermore, Fortas argues that a citizen cannot demand that
others obey a law while he does not follow it and is free of punishment.
Zinn rejoins that the language indicates that the government being bound by law is
expected, while the citizen's being bound is a fact. Thus, Fortas' claim that the law seeks to
equalize the citizen and the state in manners to present contention is inconsistent. Zinn argues
that the government picks and chooses what laws it chooses to follow, citing the inconsistent
adherence to the Fourteenth Amendment. He argues that if that is the case, citizens should be
allowed to pick and choose what laws they follow based on their individual concept of
morality? It is for this reason that Zinn argues that if there is to be obligation from the fair play
conception, both sides ought to be able to decide the rules.

18 Fortas 1968, 33.

